

The Birth of Afghanistan

A tale of violence of the unholy alliance against freedom

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Preface

A specter is haunting the land of Afghan¹ – the specter of freedom. All the powers of old worlds within Afghan-stan², in the region, in decadent Arab kingdoms and beyond far oceans have joined in a holy hunt against this specter, the Mollahs and Akhunds, forgotten generals and ethnonationalist politicians, radicals of all color, spies, lumpenproletarians, and cosmopolitan comedians and Pukhtun tribally triggered academicians.

The sole antidote of freedom to which the hunt of all powers is dedicated is primitivism. A peculiar, arsenic, obscene, exhibitionist and fatalist primitivism of a holy alliance carried on with a unique wave of raw violence and mercilessness by those Mollahs and Akhunds, forgotten generals and ethnonationalist politicians, pluripotent radicals of all color, spies and policing academicians.

The notion of freedom seems to make all those powers, mentioned above, to go blind and deaf, and to be disconnected from the most fundamental human feelings and sensibilities, and to violate and disrespect fundamental rights of humans as we are witnessing Taleban today, May 2024, in the land of Afghan. The sheer desensibilisation for vital issues of children, elderly, and of women and men as humans, has been a precursor of dehumanization of vast numbers of individuals and populations. Dehumanization is the preparatory fertile ground for mass killings and genocide as we are witnessing Taleban today, May 2024, in the land of Afghan.

The indispensable and essential dilemma of Taleban is the absolute lack of comprehension of any possible notion of freedom. In no dimension in the Taleban mentality structure, be it spiritual or religious, be it material and objective, be juristically or Sharia-based, in no dimension the notion of freedom has got a gnostic position. The absolute and fatal absence of the idea of freedom in Taleban mentality structure is not merely a metaphysical problem, as it is not a spiritual obstacle, it has always been a real-world ontologic issue. The Deobandi school of religieuse speculations and all its deviations some

¹ Literally, Afghanistan means the land of Afghan. The term Afghan is an exogenic ethnonym for Pushtun, one ethnic group with a peculiar “segmentary tribal structure”, well-studied by anthropologists. The political geography labeled with “Afghanistan” today, since ca. hundred years in official international documents, is encompassing at least 35 other ethnic groups additionally to the Pushtuns. The label, though, indication only a single ethnic group (out of other 35 groups) had been imposed and authorized on all other 35 “groups of humans” by a well-documented, raw state-derived bloody violence, explicitly monoethnic Afghan tyranny and family and clan-based despotism (e.g. Mosaheban family of the Mohammadzai clan of the Afghan Barekzai tribe ruling 1929-1978) during the 20th century. Factual common knowledge elsewhere, well-researched axiomatic facts and not an object of any scientific disputes. But yet, an artificially sustained object of evident “reality denial” by the adepts of the ideology, the ideology of Afghanism that is, de facto, the vehicle of raw violence and the place of imagination of a destructive supremacy against humans of the other 35 ethnic groups.

² See 1

senior Taleban might have attended, indicate neither a rationale access nor a transcendental approach to the field of human freedom³.

The very notion of freedom, in any thinkable dimension, in any transcendental space, in any reason sphere, belongs to the fundamentals of human existence.

On an individual niveau, "it is impossible for the mind to be completely under another's control; for no one is able to transfer to another his natural right or faculty to reason freely and to form his own judgment on any matters whatsoever, nor can he be compelled to do so." So, Baruch Spinoza in the 1670s. "For this reason, any effort on the government's part to rule over the beliefs and opinions of citizens is bound to fail and will ultimately serve to undermine its own authority. A sovereign is certainly free to try and limit what people think, but the result of such a policy, Spinoza predicts, would be only to create resentment and opposition to its rule." states Steven Nadler in reference to Spinoza's essential axioms.⁴ Spinoza, a first degree thinker of the notion of freedom, argues in favor of a free human spirit, "this freedom [of expressing one's ideas] is of the first importance in fostering the sciences and the arts, for it is only those whose judgment is free and unbiased who can attain success in these fields."⁵

Spinoza's notion of freedom is related to activity. "In Part I of the Ethics⁶, Spinoza defines, "that thing is called free which exists from the necessity of its nature alone and is determined to act by itself alone. But a thing is called necessary, or rather compelled, which is determined by another thing to exist and produce an effect in a certain and determinant manner".⁷ "According to this definition, only God, properly speaking, is absolutely free, because only God exists from the necessity of his nature and is determined to act from his nature alone. Nevertheless, Spinoza argues that freedom is possible for human beings insofar as they act: "I say we act when something happens, in us or outside of us, of which we are the adequate cause, that is, when something in us or outside of us follows from our nature, which can be clearly and distinctly understood through it alone". The cause would be: "I call that cause adequate whose effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived through it." From these definitions, we can see that if human freedom is constituted by activity, then freedom will be constituted by having clear and distinct ideas or adequate knowledge".⁸

³ G.F.W. Hegel (1820), Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts... Online: <http://www.zeno.org/Philosophie/M/Hegel,+Georg+Wilhelm+Friedrich/Grundlinien+der+Philosophie+des+Rechts> (Accessed April 2024). Spinoza, B (1677), and Kant, I, (1781 and 1788)

⁴ Nadler, S (2012) New York Times, online (<https://archive.nytimes.com/opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/05/spinozas-vision-of-freedom-and-ours/>) (Accessed December, 2023)

⁵ Ibid

⁶ Spinoza, B, (1975, first publication 1677)

Ethik.<http://www.zeno.org/Philosophie/M/Spinoza,+Baruch+de/Ethik> (Accessed September 1st, 2023)

⁷ Hegel, GFW, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, <https://iep.utm.edu/spinoza-free-will-determinism/> (Accessed September 1st, 2023)

⁸ Ibid

Hegel is the other pivotal thinker of freedom. “At the core of Hegel’s social and political thought are the concepts of freedom, reason, self-consciousness, and recognition.”⁹ In this core context, “the concept of freedom is one which Hegel thought of very great importance; indeed, he believed that it is the central concept in human history. ‘Mind is free’, he wrote, ‘and to actualize this, its essence – to achieve this excellence – is the endeavor of the world mind in world-history’”¹⁰ In the highly complex and dynamic interplay of his principal categories of reason, self-consciousness, and recognition, the notion of freedom¹¹, enhanced to a comprehensive concept would be a pillar of political studies and the philosophy of polity. A term, additionally to the principal categories, that will imply a wide array of political activities would be self-determination. It spans a firm and solid epistemic and ethical ground to the idea of freedom. Understanding freedom will be difficult if one does not scrutinize the spectrum of meanings within the notion of self-determination. The notion will find its path into the very reality of tyranny under Taleban militia today in Afghanistan, while we reflected various niveaus of understanding the meaning of self-determination. Hegel writes in his lectures on philosophy of history: ‘Wo die Minderheit der Mehrheit gehorchen muss, da ist keine Freiheit.’”¹² (Where the minority has to obey a majority, there is no freedom, translated by HB). A sentence that strikes at the nucleus of identity politics, materialized violently by Afghan Taleban, currently in September 2023. Of course, not Hegel, ex negativo, has solely been emphasizing the notion of freedom to the very nucleus of being and time. A researcher in the most prominent research center for the legacy of German idealism at the university of Leipzig, Dr. Andrea Kern, states that “was den Idealismus für uns so interessant macht, ist, dass er in einer bis dahin nicht da gewesenen Entschlossenheit die Idee der Freiheit ins Zentrum des philosophischen Nachdenkens gestellt hat. Und zwar nicht, weil die Autoren dachten, dass die Freiheit wichtiger sei als alles andere, sondern weil sie erkannt haben, dass die Freiheit das Prinzip der Daseinsweise des Menschen ist und damit also alle Themen und Gegenstände betrifft, über die der Mensch nachdenkt.”¹³ (What makes idealism interesting to us, was the pioneering decisiveness to position the idea of freedom into the center of philosophical thinking,..., they recognized that freedom is the principle way-of-being of humans...) Now we recognize and appreciate a revival of German idealism, forced, and induced by the reminiscence of a compendium of “theories of freedom” by this school of thought. In the center of the process of rethinking freedom by German thinkers between 1781 and 1831, there had been a single figure of thinking about freedom that is converging into the unique

⁹ Ibid

¹⁰ Parkinson, GHR (1971) Hegel’s concept of Freedom.

¹¹ Hegel, GFW (1955) Die Vernunft in der Geschichte (vol. 1 of Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte), Ed. Hoffmeister, 5th ed. (Hamburg, 1955).

¹² Ibid

¹³ Kern, A. On German idealism and Hegel and the leading path to the idea of freedom

<https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/freiheit-oder-naturalismus-zur-hochaktualitaet-hegels-100.html> (accessed September 2nd, 2023)

persona of Hegel and his sustainable reflections. He was convinced that freedom is not a status or a stagnant natural position of a preexisting attribute.

Freedom is the process of humanization.

Introduction

The primary inquiry of this research is the exact date, and of course those social, political and juridical conditions of the emergence of a new politico-juridical geographic entity unit with clear-cut and sustainable borders that are immanent, recognized internationally by global institutions and are, of course, valid to date in 2024. This would be the facile definition of a country in modern terms. The country we are examining had been named Afghan-Stan, translated to the “land of Afghan” (or by the incorrect rules of romanization: Afghanistan with an “i”, this “i” does not exist in the pronunciation of Afghan-Stan in Parsi, we write in the following the official country label). The land of Afghan was created during the 20th century as a functioning state, and it is today under the rule of a militia, the Taleban, that are religiously fundamentalistic, politically extreme and ethnonationalistic.

Why are we examining the exact date and, consecutively, the social, the political and those implicit juridical conditions of the emergence of the new politico-juridical geographic entity being named and consecutively called “Afghanistan”? We are aiming epistemologically at the very mechanism of the processes, structures and institutions of the creation of a new political juridical entity and we are aiming historically at the very essence of discourse formation in reference to valid agreements, border-setting delineation procedures, military commissions, interlacing imperial plays between British Raj and Zarian Russia, and we are aiming at the stories of forgotten and excluded populations in the land, a land that is not the land of “Afghans” (a label giving for Pushtun tribes by Parsi speaking rulers of larger Khorasan, thus an exogenic ethnonym, of a matter of primary axiomatic facts).

The scientific question would be: Exactly to what date a “juridico-political geographic entity” with clear-cut and sustainable borders named Afghanistan emerged on the surface of global politics and on the very surface of the cartographic maps?

There is not merely an epistemic rupture regarding the provided scientific knowledge in relation to the process of creation of the “land of Afghan”, its processes, structures, and institutions, but we observe a major absence of objective information and therefore of understanding to the subject of the inquiry.

Method

Our scientific enquiry, in this context, is merely an immediate consequence of restlessness and current and recent irritations and questioning of intelligentsia, students, literati and academics by themselves, each and as social groups, and by the media and, on the other hand, of political activists faced in the last decade in the country: They asked the question about the paradox and rationale of naming and labeling a country that a multi-ethnic and culturally diverse country after a single ethnic group. They asked and scrutinized the very

rationale of imposing a single ethnonym of the “Afghan ethnic group” as the name, label, and nominal attribute for the entirety of a vast and culturally and ethnically diverse country that is a multi-ethnic mosaic of populations. And, of course, the most recent irritation and current disturbing and functioning against any basic human right and valid citizenship rights, was the intentionally act of ignorance of rulers and the violence of the state of imposing a “name” of a single ethnic group to all those other non-Afghan and highly diverse inhabitants of the “politico-juridical entity” called a country, thus a state, without ever asking them about their perspectives and understandings or ultimate acceptance. This format as ethnically driven puritanic and violence-driven despotism¹⁴ by few families of the ruling Mohammadzai clan of the Barekzai tribe (since 1890s till April 1978) generated a wide array of fundamental issues and gaps within the new country with consequences people suffer today from.

It might seem like a facile nominalistic issue that one might reflect on the genesis of this primarily nominalistic problem. It turns out, post hoc, to be a pivotal social question mark in recent times. Our questions seem to be easy to be asked. The corpus of scholarly literature reviewed and read, had to undergo a rigorous structural analysis. The analysis, in its next step, had to be formed and structured to become logically firm, thus scientifically valid. For the sake of the logical structure of the paper, I am working with two premises (P1-2) that might be immediate, explicit, and transparent, and make the concept (C1), the context (C2) and, first and foremost the content (C3) comprehensible.

The primary logical premise (P1), well-documented and stable, is that we refer to the paradoxical issues of labeling and naming the heterogeneous population of a multicultural and multiethnic country as “Afghans”. The word “Afghan” is the exogenic endonym of a single ethnic group, the ethnic Afghans or Pushtuns. The term “Afghan” was used for description of Pushtun tribes in Southern Asia by Parsi speaking regional Persian rulers as well as by British colonist writers like M. Elphinstone (1815) for almost two centuries. “Afghan”¹⁵ (Awghan, Aughan), thus an exogenic ethnonym for Pushtun tribes in Southern Asia. A paradigm shift took place in the mid 1930s, during the Hashemian despotism of Mosaheban family of Mohammadzai clan of the Southern Barekzai tribe. The label Pushtun (A variation of Pakhtun, Pashton, Pachtana, Pathan, etc), thus an endogenic ethnonym, out of the sudden, appeared on the “nominalistic” political sphere. The meaning did change, the signifier changed. This politico-juridical entity of the geographic territory we know today de jure as Afghan-Stan, was formally created as a sole entity with its current geographical demarcations and thus its consecutively political borders during the 20th century. It has been shown that the allocation of the name “Afghan” to all inhabitants of the country started, impulsed by a royal edict of the regent Hashem Mohammadzai, exactly on March 14, 1937.¹⁶ This date was the point at

¹⁴ See details of Dhaka, A. (2015), Barfield (2010), Brundage, G. (2021)

¹⁵ Badakhshi, H. (2024), Dr Harun Badakhshi at the Oxford University Conference in November 2023

¹⁶ Badakhshi, H. (2024), a precise indication of the forcefully and oppressive polity of the “Hashemian Despotism” to decide to pose, out of a sudden, and in a multiethnic country, the name of regent’s ethnic affiliation to all inhabitants. This is the start of a despotic power process and the institutions of Afghanistanization of the country’s non-Afghan majority population and Pashtunization of the ethnic Afghans, living mostly in the South and the East. Afghanism emerged as an ideology after the 1930’s.

which, for the first time ever, the entire inhabitants of the country were called, out of a sudden, by the name, though an exogenic ethnonym, of only one ethnic group of Afghans, the country's inhabitants. This entire populations had been called themselves Hazara, Uzbek, Tajik, Nuristani, Turkmen, Aimaq, Arab or Baluch etc, to mention few major groups. The state, more precise, the government run of the Mosaheban family from the Mohammadzai dynasty (founded in 1820's) that took over the power by a brutal coup d'etat in October 1929 by killing the then king Habib-ollah Kalakani, abused the people by this unlawful act of arbitrary labeling major groups of humans. The despotic regime of Hashem Mohammadzai, the regent and real ruler of the country, experienced after 1935 under his absolutist rule a paradigmatic shift toward fascism and a police state.

The shift of the Hashemian rule¹⁷ toward fascism of German convenience had been hardly researched and rarely understood. Dr. Harun Badakhshi gave a first glance on this obscure constellation at the conference of the Oxford University in fall 2023¹⁸. Our research work is dealing now with details of the contacts the government of Afghanistan had at this time with Nazi German government. The minister of finance of the Hashem cabinet, Mr. Majid Zaboli, a businessman and "Afghan", thus Pushtun, ethnonationalist politician, had been the link between Hitler and Hashem. Zaboli travelled many times to Berlin after 1933 in order to execute his private business as well and, additionally, to act as a pluripotent minister and delegate of the Hashemian despotic government direct and immediately with fascist government of Germany under Adolf Hitler¹⁹. The relationship Zaboli attempted to establish between Afghanistan's regime and Hitler's Germany after 1933, became productive when the absolutist ruler Hashem Mohammadzai traveled in November 1936 to Berlin²⁰. The most intriguing fact in this context has been that Hashem stayed till April 1937 in Germany. A ruling regent of a country of the global south taking his "Germany-time" and enjoying fascism in action is anyways an attractive theme for further insights. With the highest certainty, one could claim that Hashem Mohammadzai was the one and only regent of another country staying months in Hitler's Nazi Germany and enjoying massive killings, group and individual murder, mass imprisonment, systematic torture, and the totality of oppression by the most inhuman regime of the 20th century, namely Hitler's horror system. The urgency for thorough and rigorous research would be the inquiry of a fact during the arrival of Hashem Mohammadzai. The reception committee for the regent at the Berlin airport Tempelhof had been not only unusual and unaccustomed but only a formidable trigger for more of a scientific and explicitly evidence-based close-up into the issue. The absolutist regent Hashem, born in

¹⁷ University of Central Arkansas's department Government, Public Service, and International Studies. <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/asiapacific-region/afghanistan-1919-present/> (Last access in March 2024)

¹⁸ Badakhshi, H (2023), presentation at the Oxford University Conference in November 2023, soon to be published.

¹⁹ Koplik, S. (2015)

²⁰ Badakhshi, H (2022) and (2023), conference presentations with submitted abstract, referring to the "Eslah" of November 4th, 1936. "Eslah": The official newspaper of the regime to that period.

British Raj / India in 1885 and educated and cared of in and by British system, has been welcomed by Alfred Rosenberg.

Alfred Rosenberg (death in 1946 after Nürnberg trial) was a German Nazi theorist and ideologue. He held several important posts in the Nazi government. He was the head of the “Aussenpolitisches Amt” (APA, fascist party’s Office of Foreign Affairs) during the entire rule of Nazi Germany 1933–1945, and led the “Amt Rosenberg” (“Rosenberg’s bureau”, an extraordinary privilege within the fascist system for close friends of Hitler and who were determining for the political actions and crimes against humanity), the “Amt Rosenberg” was an official Nazi body for cultural policy and surveillance, between 1934 and 1945²¹. Rosenberg, a close friend of Hitler since 1918/1919, was impactfully involved in the making of the fascist ideology of German convenience after the first great European war (1914-1918). The holocaust encyclopedia notes: “All the fruits of Western culture, Rosenberg posited, had evolved solely from the Germanic tribes; yet the Roman “priestly caste” which had arisen with Christianity had combined with Freemasons, Jesuits, and “international Jewry” to erode this culture and with it German spiritual values. While Rosenberg’s “völkisch” arguments and his emphasis on “Lebensraum” (living space) corresponded with party ideology, many fellow Nazis found his mystical constructs and his prose hard going. Rosenberg remained convinced his racist utopia would provide a recipe for Germany’s future as the leading European power.”²² Alfred Rosenberg received the regent Hashem Mohammadzai in Berlin, accompanied by a SS-regimen. The valid official protocol, at that time and today, to receive a head of a foreign state, in this case formally a prime minister, contained the responsibility of the ministry of foreign affairs, the minister or his deputy, and a regular and specialized army regiment, had to receive high grade foreign dignitaries. In this case, for reasons and causality yet to be researched, it is a unique occasion that a regent of a “politically yet insignificant” country, far from any actual global or even regional politics, receives an official ceremony by the chief ideologist and demagogue of Germany, and not as usual by the minister of foreign affairs. What could be the causal or correlational base of this unique event. The chief ideologist and demagogue²³ of Germany receives the regent of Afghanistan with a special SS-regiment. To sum up, we have a unique case of reception of Afghanistan’s regent Hashem Mohammadzai by the chief ideologist and demagogue of German fascism Alfred Rosenberg. An event of unique historic magnificence for all oppressive processes and violent procedures will happen in Afghanistan in times to come by the government of this absolutist regent. Hashem’s metamorphosis from a British India-born, British educated autocrat to an absolutist regent becoming a “classic fascist” of German-style with all ingredients that one will witness after 1937 in Afghanistan, is in need to be understood. While Hashem’s reputation of an absolutist regent in the internal historiography²⁴ of Afghanistan was described as oppressive,

²¹ Holocaust encyclopedia, <https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/alfred-rosenberg-biography>

²² Holocaust encyclopedia (Last access in February 2024)

²³ Input of Encyclopedia Britannica. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Alfred-Rosenberg>

²⁴ Farhang, MMS (1988, Parsi edition)

brutal, violent, and inhuman that transcended any threshold of the regents/kings before him²⁵.

The rigorous academic study of shift of the Hashemian rule toward fascism of German convenience” belongs to the scientific urgencies of an evidence-based history.

Worth to note that this despotic edict of renaming millions of non-Afghan peoples to “Afghan” happened without any public procedure or public referendum, without any consultations of the small national assembly (Shurai Mili) or any other etatical or traditional institutions. The regent decided by himself, and he announced it. It has also been showed that the population of the country in their entity has been called in a variety of names and labels but “Afghan” that was used explicitly for the ethnic Afghans (also Pushtun, Pakhtun, Pashton etc, but before mid 1930’s rarely in usage for this population).

To sum up P1: A despotic regime decides by a single person on 14th March 1937²⁶, the totalitarian ruler Hashem of the Mohammadzai Afghan clan, without any referendum, without any similar quasi democratic procedure, to call/name the inhabitants of a multiethnic country by the name “Afghan” that is the ethnonym of a single tribal confederation of Afghans (call by themselves also “Pushtuns”).

The secondary logical premise (P2), also epistemologically stable by its nature, is that we refer to the effects of the official prohibition of using the native language for the largest part of the country’s main population, namely non-Afghans like Uzbeks, Hazaras, Balochs, Tajiks, Aimaqs, Pachaiis, Turkmens, Nuristanis, Sadats, Arabs etc. The Afghan (Pushtu) language is only the native tongue of a specific part of the inhabitants that call themselves Afghan. This prohibition was posed in 1936 during a period we name the “Hashemian despotism” under the rule of Hashem Mohammadzai Barekzai, the ruler of the country between 1933 and 1953. This logical premise (P2) is a retro scenario in relation to the main question of our inquiry, namely the birth of Afghan-stan in 1890s. It is well-known that Hashem Mohammadzai Barekzai declared on 4th November of 1936 in the official newspaper of the state Eslah that the Afghan language must be expanded, and all people have to learn this language²⁷. In this very “state publication” Eslah²⁸, the opposition of Afghan versus Persian (Farsi/Parsi) language seems to be determining. Hashem ordered the country’s inhabitants of non-Afghan origin, thus the absolute majority, namely Uzbeks, Hazaras, Balochs, Tajiks, Aimaqs, Pachaiis, Turkmens, Nuristanis etc, to learn the language of the Afghan minority. It has been few well-performed research in this topic with the mandatory quality in data and in expression of the narration. The totalitarian despotism of the Hashemian era had, in retrospective, a limited effect in terms of expansion of the Afghan language in the minds if non-Afghan majority. It did not work.

²⁵ Ghobar, MGhM (1967, Parsi edition), Afghanistan in The Course of History

²⁶ First ever description and precise dating by in Badakhshi, H. (2024), see references.

²⁷ Dr Harun Badakhshi, “The Afghanisation of State and Country”. 2022, On YouTube

<https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCDOv4vQ3sGmP1Eogw4d4bKA/videos>

²⁸ Eslah, 4th November of 1936, Number 72. Available in www.afghandata.org

To sum up P2: A despotic regime orders on 4th November 1936 that the vast majority of country's non-Afghan inhabitants have learn the "Afghan" minority's language (Afghani, call by Afghans themselves additionally also Pushtu/Pakhtu).

One person, the totalitarian ruler Hashem Mohammadzai of the Barekzai tribe, decided, of course, without a poll, a referendum or any other democratic procedure, that this edict will be implemented by all means of repressive administrative force and stark policing.

Both logical premises (P1 and P2) in this part demonstrate, on a transparent and by usage of an evidence-based approach, that for the understanding the historical peculiarity and mandatory details, beyond ideological strikes by the very protagonists of "Afghan ethnonationalism"²⁹ and Pukhtun "tribal fascism"³⁰, not only the event X itself would be significant and determining but also, in a retro scenario, the factual consequences and ideological sequelae of the event X. The premises might clarify from today's perspective the notion that once the fundament is illegitimate and illegal the real-world consequences and ideological sequelae will be illegitimate and illegal.

We must understand that the birth of the new country Afghan-stan (aka Afghanistan) in 1896, was an illegitimate and illegal act accompanied by bloody mass killings, raw violence, repetitive wars against the native inhabitants like Uzbeks, Hazaras, Balochs, Tajiks, Aimaqs, Pachaiis, Turkmens, Nuristanis, Sadats, Arabs etc by the Pukhtun tribal men under the reign of Abdur Rahman Mohammadzai Barekzai (1880-1991). This birth of the new country Afghan-stan (aka Afghanistan) as an historical event will lead in the future, 20th century, to an endless chain of events of mass killings, raw violence, repetitive wars against the native inhabitants and of national oppression.

²⁹ Oxford libraries. <https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/display/document/obo-9780199874002/obo-9780199874002-0232.xml>

Mishra, P, 2017, The Rise of Ethnonationalism and the Future of Liberal Democracy, 2017, at Council on Foreign Relations. Wafayezada, MQ, 2023, Hybrid Extremism: Ethnonationalism and Territorialized Islamic Fundamentalism in Afghanistan, Ibrahimi, N, 2023, Zaland, FM, 2023.

³⁰ Sahar, A and Sahar, A, 2015, also Sahar, A, 2014, Badakhshi, H, 2023

Results

The legal base for the creating the Afghanistan as a new “politico-juridical geographic entity”, a territory within its determined legal internationally recognized borders that last till this day in 2024, was an agreement signed on November 12th of the year 1893 between the ruler of the kingdom of Kabul Abdur Rahman Mohammadzai Barezai and the acting as the Foreign Secretary of British Raj Henry Mortimer Durand in Kabul³¹.

Main finding

The agreement between the ruler of the kingdom of Kabul Abdur Rahman Mohammadzai Barezai and the acting as the Foreign Secretary of British Raj Henry Mortimer Durand in Kabul between Abdur Rahman and Mortimer Durand was signed on 12th November 1893. By this agreement the British Raj defined its Northwestern frontiers and its operational radius toward the new politico-legal territorial entity giving the name Afghanistan.

As expected, and planned, the regular work on physical border demarcation by pillars took time. Generally, within three years the Durand line became physical reality and a border between two different countries. The very last step of demarcation between British Raj/India and Afghanistan by the Baluch Afghan Border Commission was exerted by the signage of an agreement on 13th May 1896³². The agreement was signed between captain McMohan, British representative, and Mohammad Umar Khan, representative of the Amir, contained a note on the last boundary stone pillar with the inscription “BAB No. 186”³³, which has already been erected on the top of the Koh-i-Malik Siah on 16th April 1896³⁴ at the exact triangle British Raj/India, Persia and “new country” Afghanistan.

The Baluch-Afghan Boundary Commission terminated its field work on 13th May 1896 with the inscription of a stone pillar in the region of Kohe Malik Siah in the convergence of Persia (today's Iran, new name: 1935), British Raj (today's Republic Pakistan and Republic India, after its division on 15th August 1947) and the new country Afghanistan³⁵.

³¹ Encyclopedia Britannica <https://www.britannica.com/event/Durand-Line>. Details in Badakhshi, H, 2022, Afghanization of state and country. November 12th, 1893, the agreement was signed in Kabul. Author's YouTube channel.

³² Prescott, J. R. V., 1975, Map of Mainland Asia by Treaty.

³³ Mc Mohan 1909, Letters on The Baluch Afghan Boundary Commission Of 1896

³⁴ Rehman, L, 2021, as well Mc Mohan 1909 and Prescott 1975 etc

³⁵ Mc Mohan 1909, Online: <https://ia802502.us.archive.org/1/items/1896-letters-on-the-baluch-afghan-boundary-commission-of-1896-by-mc-mahon-s/1896%20Letters%20on%20the%20Baluch-Afghan%20Boundary%20Commission%20of%201896%20by%20McMahon%20s.pdf>

Mortimer Durand created in November of the year 1893 in Kabul three commissions to demarcate the frontier between India and Afghanistan, Baluch Afghan, Asmar and Waziristan. The first left Kabul on 25th March 1894 with an army captain McMohan. The commissions reported regularly to Mortimer Durand and published reports. The commission terminated practical field work on 16th April 1896, and terminate the legal issue by an agreement on 13th May 1896, the moment of the birth of the new juridico-political entity on the global scene.

In terms of international law and jurisdictions, as well in 1896 and as today, the new politico-juridical geographic entity of a territory called today as Afghan-Stan exists since 13th May 1896.

This is the birth of Afghanistan as a country with its legal demarcated and recognized borders, as valid as certain in May 1896 till May 2024, thus exactly 128 years.

A new politico-juridical geographic entity in the territory we know today as Afghan-Stan emerged into existence exactly in this time.

Not earlier.

Hence, we are obliged to accept the fact that the entity exists merely for a century and two and half decades. Facts matter.

Additional findings

And yet, it took at least two decades that the country was evidently named and labeled itself as Afghanistan. This fact is also well documented that during the first two decades of the 20th century, the country was mentioned, declared, named, labeled as “The Dominion of Kabul”³⁶ (Dar el Sultanat-e Kabul) by its own state, run by Habib Saraj from the Saraj family of Mohammadzai clan of Barekzai tribe, the son of Abdur Rahman.

Interpretation and contextualization

It is important to know that this “name” was not new and has been previously, precisely since 1815, allocated to the lands of Pushtu speaking ethnic tribes of Junubi and Mashreqi on the Northwestern frontiers of British Raj by its colonial official Stuart Elphinstone³⁷. He writes Afghaunistaun in book 1, made of 6 chapters. In book 2 Elphinstone attempts to construct a pre anthropological account on inhabitants of the region. The author is speculating about the term and about the name “Afghaun” without any knowledge. It is the classical orientalist’s approach: you have no valid information, just speculate. In this case he writes: “The origin...is entirely uncertain; but is, probably modern. It is known to the Afghauns themselves only by the medium of Persian language. Their own name for their nation is Pooshtoon; in the plural, Pooshtauneh. The Berdooraunees pronounce this word Pookhtauneh; whence the name of Pitan, by which the Aufghauns are known in India may

³⁶ Books published by the court of Habib Saraj between 1901 and 1919 had been explicitly and implicitly named/labeled the country as “The Dominion of Kabul ” (Arabic Parsi: Dar el Sultanata Kabul). hence, the state itself ignored the new status in terms of being named Afghanistan:

1916 الامر اولی کتابچه حسب فرمان جنب نایب السلطنه 1914, مفتاح الصرف مفتاح الصرف 1915, اطاعت

, از هر دهن سخنی و از هر چمن سمن 1913

Even a book by Mahmoud Tarzi Afghan with the title “Afghanistan” was published 1912 in the “The Dominion of Kabul”

³⁷ Elphinstone, Mountstuart (1815). An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul, and its Dependencies in Persia, Tartary, and India. London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown. Online:

<https://www.loc.gov/item/14015132> (Last access in October 2023)

probably derived.” (p. 151, Elphinstone 1815). He continues: “they have no general name for their own country; but sometimes apply the Persian in Afghaunistaun. Dr Lyder mentioned the name Pooshtoonkhau, as bearing this sense, but I never heard is used...The name most generally applied to the whole country by its inhabitants is *Khorassaun*...” (p. 151 Elphinstone 1815)³⁸. “For, on the one hand, the whole of the Afghaun country is not included in the strict limits of Khorassaun; and, on the other, a considerable part of that province is not inhabited by Afghauns.” (p. 152 Elphinstone 1815)³⁹. Regarding the language of Afghauns, Elphinstone writes “...it will be well to give some account of their language, which, as I have already mentioned, is called Pushtoo.” (p. 190, Elphinstone 1815)⁴⁰. “The words connected with religion, government, and with science, are mostly introduced from Arabic through the Persian.” (p. 190, Elphinstone 1815). And furthermore “The Afghauns use the Persian Alphabet, in general to write in Nushk character. As they have some sounds, which are not represented by Persian letters, they express them by adding some particular points or other marks to the nearest Persian letter.” (p. 191, Elphinstone 1815)⁴¹.

As he describes in book 3, chapter 1, on “particular account of Afghaun tribes”, he clearly is referring as to the inhabitants of today’s Pushtun tribes and reflects extensively on the tribal constellation of “Afghaunistaun”, that merely is encompassing the Eastern and Southern part of today’s politico-juridical unit we know today as Afghanistan. Specifically, in the page 325 he notes “The tribes which inhabits the north-eastern part of the Afghaun country, enclosed between the range of Hindoo Coosh, the Indus, the Salt Range, and the range of Solimaun, are comprehended in the general name of Berdooraunees, first giving them by Ahmed Shauh.” (p. 325, Elphinstone 1815)⁴². It is obvious and comprehensible to anyone that the northern boundary of Afghaunistaun had been Hindoo Kho (or Hindoo Coosh or Hindu Kush) and the North and Central part of the politico-juridical unit with the current name Afghanistan did not belong to it, not in 1815, as the author notes his concepts of Afghaunistaun. Astonishingly to read that the Mohammadzai clan, that determined the fate of the country in 20th century, was containing merely 8000 families at this time, as Elphinstone notes in the page 359 (Elphinstone 1815)⁴³. The topographic division Elphinstone undertook in his book was based on tribe structures and tribal ruling region, in all his notes, till the page 461, the fact remains unchanged that the North and the West (inhabited by mostly Tajik, Turk speaking and Hazara and Aimaq populations) and broader Central parts (inhabited predominantly by Hazara population) of the politico-juridical unit with the current name Afghanistan did not belong to “Afghaunistaun”, observed by Elphinstone in 1815. In book 5, he describes the “Royal Government of Caubaul” as such.

The main message of Elphinstone’s book of 1815 regarding our focused and marcant scientific question could be summed up as such: Afghaun has been an exogenic ethnonym for

³⁸ ibid

³⁹ ibid

⁴⁰ ibid

⁴¹ ibid

⁴² ibid

⁴³ ibid

those who call themselves (thus an endogenic ethnonym) Pooshtoon (or Pokhtoon, Pushtun, Pukhtun, Pashtun etc) in 1815 and they do so today. The language of “Afghauns” (Today Afghans) is called by themselves Pooshtoo, Pushtu, Pukhtu, Pakhtu (Today Pashto). The territory of “Afghaunistaun”, as received by Elphinstone in 1815, was explicitly the Eastern and Southern part of the kingdom of Kaubaul or Kabool (Today: Kabul) and the vast lands in the North, Central and West of Hindu Koh and Paropamisus was inhabited by other ethnicities than the Afghauns (Today Afghans). The book of Elphinstone of 1815 remained determinant, decisive and formative for the specific imperial discourse for the rest of the 19th century in different levels of actions such as inner-imperial spheres in the British commonwealth, British Raj’s communication and writings, and the perception of “Afghaunistan” as a region, of the kingdom of Kabul and its dependencies as a country, and as well for the region and globally. This is a matter of facts.

The revival of the word “Afghan-Stan” in 1893 by Mortimer Durand⁴⁴ had specific purposes in terms of sustainable imperial politics of the British Raj in Asia. The teleological line from Stuart Elphinstone (came 1809 to Kaubaul, wrote the book in 1815) to Mortimer Durand⁴⁵ (1893 in Kabul) contains its imperial connotation. A connotation that was accompanied by a massive quantity of dead bodies, blood and destruction of native cultures in the area, that will have the name “Afghan-Stan” in the 20th century.

⁴⁴ Percy Sykes, 1940, A History of Afghanistan, MacMillan & Co, London, online <https://dn790005.ca.archive.org/0/items/historyofafghani031122mbp/historyofafghani031122mbp.pdf> (Last access November 2023)

⁴⁵ Percy Sykes, 1926, The Right Honourable Sir Mortimer Durand: A Biography, Cassell and company, London. Online: <https://archive.org/details/dli.csl.8412> (Last access November 2023)

Conclusion

Afghanistan as a juridico-political entity with its current specific territory and with its explicitly legal and implicitly internationally recognized current borders exist since 13th May 1896.

This date marks the last activity of the Afghan Border Commission to define legally the frontier between British Raj/India and a country that is called now Afghanistan.

Although the new political geography emerged on the scene of regional and global politics and on the cartographic maps, it still takes another 25 years that the country itself call itself Afghanistan in its own official publications. From 1896 till 1921 the country is named “Dar Ul Sultana Kabul” the kingdom of Kabul.

The country that holds today the name Afghanistan (Afghan-stan, land of Afghan) is not the land of Afghans only, it is a multiethnic, pluricultural, polyphonic land of many people, many cultures, many languages and a long durée. Therefore is this name illegal and illegitimate.

The term “Afghan” relates, seen from a scientific perspective and evidence-based methodological approach to a confederation of nomadic pastoral tribes wandering northward just few centuries ago from Solaiman mountains in today’s Pakistan (since mid 1947), former British Raj/India (before mid 1947). These Mountains are also known as Kōh-e Sulaymān or Da Kasē Ghrūna (Pashto: د کسې غرونه) are part of the southern Hindu Kush Mountain system.⁴⁶ The occupation and inhabitation of the northern lands by the Pushtuns took few centuries. These tribal structures call themselves Pushtun (endogenic ethnonyms), the term “Afghan” has merely been an exogenic ethnonym that was predominant in self-descriptive and other narrative during 19th century.

⁴⁶ Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sulaiman_Mountains

Some important side notes

In reference to the rules of standard romanization of Parsi (or Parsi Dari, Farsi, Persian) words into English or any other Roman/Latin alphabet in the Western academic disciplines, there might appear a difference in this text. Normally, authors refer to DMG (1969), or ALA-LC (1997), or ALA-LC (1997), BGN/PCGN (1958), and currently more to the UN systematics of 2012. The inherent issues and academic discussions of transliteration and transcription are not the focus of this text. For instance, when I write a name like “Hashem” normally formulated as “Hashim” in the current scholarly literature and press jargon, it is not a complex issue. In Parsi, whatever the Western adepts and academics might guess and think, Hashem will be phonologically pronounced as Ha Sh “e” m, with a mild and weak “e” and not normally formulated with “i” and being sharper and enhanced. This is my decision and all Westerns' rules determining the writing of my language Parsi will be ignored. Consider it as a new step in the process of necessary decolonization of West's cultural hegemony that had always been ignorant, arrogant, and determined. This is the end.

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