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
Badakhshi, Harun, 2024

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The Consequences of a Sustainable Ideologic Strike\_ Part Two

In: The Journal of Taher Badakhshi Institute, V 2., No 4.

By TBI Academic Press



2024

# Journal of Taher Badakhshi Institute for Social Transformation

TAHER BADAKHSHI INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION

پژوهش کده طاهر بدخشی برای تحول اجتماعی

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همه حقوق نشر، تکثیر و الگو برداری این اثر به «پژوهشکده طاهر بدخشی» تعلق میگیرد

# What Afghan Ethnonationalism Caused in 20th Century

## The Consequences of a Sustainable Ideologic Strike\_Part Two

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# Introduction

Our scientific questions are specific, explicit and transparent, there is no ambivalence or ambiguity in it, and it is addressing a real-world issue for millions of folks in the country with the current name “Afghanistan” in terms of violent and exclusionary identity politics for almost a hundred years:

What did Afghan Ethnonationalism cause in 20<sup>th</sup> century Afghanistan? (Part two) To be precise, when exactly was the date in which the implicit cultural hegemony of the ruling Mosaheban family transformed into an explicit act of “law-backed” violence, and it renamed in a cogent and forcible act the main language of Afghanistan, the lingua franca for a millennium, the Parsi (Farsi, Persian) into dari. We examine those conditions of possibility of such an elemental atrocity against Parsi, the language of the vast majority and against their will, their history, tradition and customs. This violent act must be understood, interpreted and summed up in an adequate way with an accurate and clear-cut methodology. The war against Parsi had been a war against the Parsi speaker and their very cultural identity. The cataclysmic and damaging effects of this violent renaming act, though mantled as a law-based act covered by a law, are traceable till this day. This is about the sequelae of a callous strike of ideology that lasts till today and has been constitutive to a regime of oppressive hegemony, raw violence and aggression, tribal driven “Afghan ethnic supremacy” in 20<sup>th</sup> century and it is as vivid today under the unrelenting and inexorable Taleban militia’s regime as it was under the barbarous Mohammadzai clan rule between 1929 and 1978. This is about the sequelae of a ruthless identity politics, embedded in ideological cage, the ideology of “Afghanism”, in a period in which the term, as we know it today, identity politics did not even exist. This is about the sequelae of severe and unyielding violence, executed by the nobility from the royal palaces of the Mohammadzai clan of Afghan Barekzai tribe, as well, today by the ethnic Afghan militias of the “fundamentalist Afghani network”.

Much research has been carried out in the last years. Most questions asked were, though, not specific, never explicit, hardly transparent, persistently ambivalent and essentially ambiguous, ignoring, in almost all cases, the real need of large number of country’s populations, neglecting the in-depth intentions of those who have been asking questions. The last republic (2004-2021) was cultivating its ignorance, negligence, oblivion, and evident denial of the issue (and other related problems) by means of violence<sup>1</sup>. The recent scholarly literature referencing recent two decades, did not scrutinize this issue of raw violence, and indeed, of structural violence, with the necessary degree of epistemic attention be it in historical perspective of 20<sup>th</sup> century Afghanistan, ruled in an absolutist manner for the first 79 years of the century by the Mohammadzai clan of Afghan Barekzai tribe. Today, the legacy of these 79 years of raw physical violence and structural in-depth violence, works in the material and mental infrastructures of a tradition of oppression, as general oppressive system materialized by the name of nationalism.

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<sup>1</sup> Heiner Müller, 1998, *Werke, Gedichte, Band 1*, Gespräche Band 10-12, Suhrkamp Berlin, Heiner Müller, 2023 *Conversation with A. Kluge*, Cornell university, <https://kluge.library.cornell.edu/de/conversations/mueller/> (last access November 2023); Pierre Bourdieu, 1998, ‘Acts of Resistance: Against the New Myths of Our Time’ [translated by Richard Nice], Cambridge, Polity Press; Bourdieu, P., & Wacquant, L. J., 1992, *An Invitation to Reflexive sociology*. Chicago, IL...: University of Chicago Press. Pierre. Bourdieu, 1976, « Les modes de domination », *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, p. 126

Structural violence<sup>2</sup> and law-generated violence<sup>3</sup> must be the core of our academic understanding. As it was practiced in the 20th century by the ruling Afghan (thus, Pushtun) family of Mosaheban (1929-1978).

Questions asked in our specific context is, however, not merely an academic, reductive and theoretical issue but it is dealing with a social, political and cultural urgency.

The precise question asked in this focused constellation is, thus, not in need to be generalized, compared generally, and embedded in general theoretical mosaics. It is specific to Afghanistan and its inhabitants, and its large diaspora of more than six million people, it is completely and generally ignored by all, with no exception, Western experts and adepts, hence it needs, ultimately, an autochthone intrinsic perspective.

First and foremost, some necessary remarks: The term “Afghan” افغان is in first instance nothing more than an exogenic ethnonym for the ethnic group of Afghan, and it is astonishingly fuzzy, inductive, imaginative in its linguistic aspects, and simultaneously, violent and imperative in its social functioning since 1930s Afghanistan. The consistent usage of the exonymic Parsi word “Afghan” in this article, is allocated and assigned explicitly and implicitly to that social group calling themselves by the endonym “Pushtun”. I use “Afghan” for the sake of semantic precision, and of course, for avoidance of vagueness, for Pushtun rulers, dictators, regents, tribes, clans. The absolute majority of inhabitants of today’s Afghanistan (like Hazaras, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Aimaqs, Nuristani, Turkmen, Balushs, Pashais, Sadat/Arab etc) are not “Afghan” and, of a matter of fact, never being called “Afghan” before 1937. It is pivotal for understanding the line of my arguments and their predefined premises and, of course, of the evidence provided for a possible verification of arguments.

The term “Pushtun” پښتون, as the endogenic ethnonym used by the Afghan people increasingly since mid 1930s, refers as to a population that were living in an outlined and limited geographic area of Sulaiman mountains in Southern Asia till 17<sup>th</sup> century. In the following we will use the specific historical notion of “Afghan” and Afghan tribes, it is thus a descriptive terminus technicus stemming from general anthropology and area studies. Afghan tribal leader “are highly concerned with origin, descent, and genealogies.”<sup>4</sup> Pushtun tribal society is based on a format of kinship. The structure of this kinship is described as a “segmentary lineage system”. It is a principle of organization for the Pushtun triable relation, determining the character of the tradition, communication, transportation, therefore the material infrastructure, as well the collective mental status. This structure is the base of local economies and local polities within a segment, a clan, a tribe or even tribal confederations. And more important, the structure of “segmentary lineage system” is the key element in social interactions between Afghans and other populations in peace and, more frequently, in war<sup>5</sup>. Afghans did not play “any relevant active and decisive role in regional politics till mid 18<sup>th</sup> century. The Pushtun element enters the field of regional politics and power mid 18<sup>th</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Judith Butler, 2020, *The Force of Non-Violence: The Ethical in the Political*. Verso NY; Slavoj Žižek, 2007, *Violence: Six Sideways Reflections*, Picador NY; Mann, Michael. 1986. *The Sources of Social Power*, Cambridge University Press; Girard, René, 2005, *Violence and the Sacred*, Continuum London; Widom, C. S., 1989, *The cycle of violence*. Science, 244, 160–166; Mark Vorobej, 2016, *The Concept of Violence*, Routledge; Coady, C.A.J. *Violence*, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2023; Robert Fischer, Peter Sloterdijk, Klaus Theweleit, 1994, *Bilder der Gewalt*, Verlag d. Autoren; Peter Sloterdijk, 1994, *Wenn die Gewalt erscheint – Versuch über die Explosivität der Bilder*, TV-show. Peter Sloterdijk, 2006, *Zorn und Zeit*, Suhrkamp, Berlin.

<sup>3</sup> Walter Benjamin, 1921, *Kritik der Gewalt*, Online: <https://criticaltheoryconsortium.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Walter-Benjamin-Zur-Kritik-der-Gewalt-1.pdf> (Last access November 2th, 2023)

<sup>4</sup> Tainter, A & Mac Gregor, D (2011), Caroe, O. (1965). *The Pathans*. MacMillan, London

<sup>5</sup> *ibid.* And Sahlins, M. (1961), Lindholm, Ch. (1982), Barth, F. (1959)

century”<sup>6</sup>. To be more precise, it is about the first appearance of Afghan tribes in autonomous function in Central Asia civilization<sup>7</sup>, North, Central and West of Hindu Koh (spelled also: Hindu Kush). Before that time period, Afghans did, when they had a role or function outside their tribal areas and in social interactions with non-Afghan people or powers in recent history, documented and written, it was in the context of war. Afghan tribal men discover before 18<sup>th</sup> century the “other”, either by making war against them or work for them in their war against someone else as legionnaires. An eminent example, easy to demonstrate because of the quantity and quality of external historical evidence is the case of Mohammad Ahmad Khan, born in Multan India. He and his men worked as legionnaires for Nader Shah Afshar, the Persian king, from 1729 till 1747.

We do not know much about the older history of Afghans before 18<sup>th</sup> century in terms of exact science and evidence-based rational approaches of scientific methodology. The reason for that matter of fact, are twofold: A pathologic tendency for creating “constructs” by the Afghan intelligentsia and ruling class, to expressed it mildly, that means that the Afghan ruling family and court-dependent scholars were acting purposely against historical truth and scientific evidence by force and repetitively by new creations out of the blue, especially after mid 1930s. This is a period, as we will see some determining details in this article, the Mosaheban family took over the ruling, establishing the Hashemian despotism after November 1933 and building up a vigorous and unassailable machine for mensonge and distraction and an apparatus of blatant lie, falsehood and fabrications the country never experienced before. A state apparatus, dedicated to constructs and propaganda, has been established after mid 1930s by hashem Mohammadzai, the absolutist regent of the country. The court needed this apparatus for the deep state with its specific Afghan tribal foundational structure. The most ridiculous example has been the case that the Afghan state propaganda institution “Pashto Tolana” constructed a “New book of Afghans”, or Pota Khazana پټه خزانه, by invention it in 1944, out of sudden. The inventor was the notorious Afghan scholar Adul hai-Habibi, this is exactly the word he used “invention”. Astonishingly, in 2024, 80 years later, the original of the “New book of Afghans” has not been shown curam publicum. The pathologic tendency for “constructs” and fabrications by the ruling Afghan Mosaheban family (October 1929 till April 1978) and its dependent institutions are responsible for the lack of knowledge about the history of Afghans. The second obvious and impactful cause for the lack of knowledge about the history of Afghans is a main deep structure in the “collective tribal psyche of Afghans”<sup>8</sup> that seems to be an outspoken and classic ideology, Afghans name “Pushtunwali”<sup>9</sup>. Both reasons, one might call them with Gaston Bachelard, as determining “epistemic obstacles” regarding scientific knowledge about Afghan history before 1600, but they have been, disproportionately and violently, accompanied by a grand geste of exaggeration by the Afghan ruling family and its dependent scholars in creation of “constructs”.

Our single inquiry was inevitably followed by the question, what constituted the category “Afghan” as a term in the realm of jurisprudence, power and its institutions, as well in the entanglement of the political and the social in public spheres of Afghanistan since its

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<sup>6</sup> Taher Badakhshi wrote 1971, in his pivotal text “The National Question” that was written for an “educational workshop in Sociology” in Kabul. It will be published soon by “TBI academic Press”

<sup>7</sup> Harun Badakhshi in 2023, speech in “Berlin Literary Society” meeting

<sup>8</sup> A term Taher Badakhshi implanted into the vocabulary of progressive emancipatory movement of mid 1970s

<sup>9</sup> Roy, O. (1990), see reference 15 p. 19, p 35, p.36. Gopal, A. & von Linshoten, AS (2017), Naz, A. et al (2012), Tainter, JA & MacGregor, DG (2011), Bezhan, A (2017), Borthakur, A. & Kotokey, A (2020)

imperative implementation by an official edict by a despotic one-clan-regime in 1930s. This is the time of "Hashemian despotism", a term that was introduced by Dr. Harun Badakhshi in November 2023 at the Oxford Afghanistan conference for the first time<sup>10</sup>.

Our main focus in this text will be the notion of "Afghanyat" افغانستان as the leading momentum of the Afghan ethnonationalism and its corresponding ideology on Afghanistanism افغانيسم in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. We will examine the consequences of Afghan ethnonationalism in 20<sup>th</sup> century. We may frame the main notion and related varia in a specific scientific concept (C1), positioning it into a precise and logical context (C2) and, then one will attempt to capture the very content (C3) of this issue.

Anthony Smith<sup>11</sup> explained in 1981 nationalism as "an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential 'nation'". But "ethnic nationalism, also known as ethnonationalism, is a form of nationalism wherein the nation and nationality are defined in terms of ethnicity, with emphasis on an ethnocentric (and in some cases an ethnocratic) approach to various political issues related to national affirmation of a particular ethnic group... The central tenet of ethnic nationalists is that "nations are defined by a shared heritage, which usually includes a common language, a common faith, and a common ethnic ancestry". Those of other ethnicities may be classified as second-class citizens."<sup>12</sup>

Smith writes "ethnic nationalisms emphasised the importance of genealogical ties for national belonging, vernacular culture such as languages, customs and cults, a nativist ethno-history and shared folk memories, and popular mobilisation– the appeal to 'the people' as the 'authentic' voice of the nation. These motifs encouraged the diffusion of romantic sensibilities and gave them greater scope."<sup>13</sup>

In times, a pathologic, so Anderson in his paper, "irredentism to claim a common nation based upon ethnicity, or for the establishment of an ethnocratic (mono-ethnocratic) political structure in which the state apparatus is controlled by a politically and militarily dominant ethnic nationalist group or a group of several ethnic nationalist groups from select ethnicities to further its interests, power and resources."<sup>14</sup>

All one reads about ethnic nationalism or ethnonationalism will reappear as concrete verification in the extensive reports and demonstrations of this paper.

The research questions identified by the working group "Afghanistan revisited" within the "Taher Badakhshi Institute", have been the matter of fact that today's status of general popular information within and outside of Afghanistan, as well the current scholar knowledge on the ideology of Afghanistanism is indeed rudimentary<sup>15</sup>, indeed.

What is evident, is that it has been an obvious, solid, and manifest epistemic obstacle or, more likely, a large set of obstacles seem to be positioned to inhibit or delay a

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<sup>10</sup> Badakhshi, H, 2023, "Oriental despotism revisited, the notion of "Hashemian despotism", November 5th, 2023, Conference: Bringing Afghanistan into the Scale, Oxford University, UK

<sup>11</sup> Smith, A.D. (1981) *The Ethnic Revival in the Modern World*. Cambridge University Press. And Smith, A.D. (1988) *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*. Basil Blackwell.

<sup>12</sup> Muller, Jerry Z. (2008). "Us and Them: The Enduring Power of Ethnic Nationalism". *Foreign Affairs*. Yilmaz, Muzaffer Ercan (2018). "The Rise of Ethnic Nationalism, Intra-State Conflicts and Conflict Resolution". *Journal of TESAM Academy*. 5 (1): 11–33.

<sup>13</sup> Smith, A. D. (2009). *Ethno-symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach*. London and New York: Routledge

<sup>14</sup> Anderson, J. (2016). "Ethnocracy: Exploring and Extending the Concept". *Cosmopolitan Civil Societies*. 8 (3): 1–29.

<sup>15</sup> See also references nr. 68-96 for in-depth critical reading

methodologically certain and secure evidence-based knowledge accumulation on this very issue. The mechanism of political power, exerted violently by the Mosaheban family of Afghan Mohammadzai clan of Barekzai tribe between 1929-1978, made this manifestation and petrification of obstacles possible. Production of knowledge was sanctioned by the formation of discourses that were legitimizing violence and oppression of the Afghan ruling class.

We have conducted an extensive background literature review in February and March 2024 and refined afterward the research idea and considered new questions emerging on the horizon of contemplations. The consecutive determination of the research methods included the concise identification and precise location of primary and secondary data sources with the mandatory evaluation of the authenticity and accuracy of source materials. A database of plausible and valid sources after the literature review was designed. The result of the endeavor was a thorough and rigorous analysis of the data. Consecutively, was the designing and developing a narrative exposition of the findings at stake.

What precisely is structuring the trace of Afghanyat افغانستانیت, the main and most stable marker of Afghan ethnonationalism in Afghan-Stan, in the process of changing the law in 1964 that renamed Parsi (Farsi, Persian) in dari, would be our principal inquiry. The analysis would include a large array of academic implications and distinctive methodological criteria that are in need to reveal valid, reproducible, objectively derived and plausible answers for this eminent question people ask themselves.

The background of this scientific endeavor has explicitly been the above-mentioned inquiries of the young, educated generation of population and their recent cultural and political experiences.



# Method and Material

Our scientific enquiry, in this context, is merely an immediate consequence of epistemic restlessness and ideological irritations of intelligentsia, students, literati and academics and, on the other hand, of political and civil activists in Afghanistan.

Their questions, disputed in intensive round tables on TV and in heated discourses in scholarly conferences, were addressed on multiple levels of popular and scholar knowledge, namely the paradox of naming and labeling a multiethnic, pluricultural, polyphonic land of many people, many cultures, many languages and a long *durée*, thus a diverse country, after a single “Afghan ethnic group”. We discussed this issue, in detail and evidence-based, in another recent paper of Taher Badakhshi Institute for Social Transformation’s journal<sup>16</sup>.

Their questions, scrutinizing the very rationale of obscurantism of the state in 20<sup>th</sup> century’s Afghanistan about the origin and exact dates of the emergence of the same state. A century official historiography and well-paid state historians of Mosaheban family of the Afghan Mohammadzai clan, could not reveal the basic fact of facts, namely at what exact date the country with the name “Afghan-Stan” emerged on the surface of regional and global politics, in geopolitics discourses, in regional and international contracts, and, ultimately, on geographical maps and area cartography for academic and business implications. We discussed this issue too, in detail and evidence-based, in another recent paper of Taher Badakhshi Institute for Social Transformation’s journal<sup>17</sup>.

Their questions, acute and enduring till this day and lost in manyfold translations and transgressions, about the core and the essential meaning of Afghanyat will be discussed in this article.

And, of course, the most irritation and disturbing and against any basic human right and valid citizenship rights, people of the country were never asked about their perspectives and understandings or acceptance. We write for their sake.

It might seem like a facile nominalistic issue for the first question. It turns out, post hoc to be a pivotal social question mark in recent times. It also seemed to be an inquiry of minor importance to know when exactly your country entered the regional and global scene of small and great games. And again, it turns out, post hoc to be a relevant issue.

The corpus of scholarly literature reviewed and reread, had to undergo a rigorous structural analysis. The analysis, in its next step, had to be formed and structured to become logically firm, thus scientifically valid. For the sake of the logical structure of the paper, I am working with two premises (P1-2) that might be immediate, explicite and transparent, and make the concept (C1), the context (C2) and, first and foremost the content (C3) comprehensible.

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<sup>16</sup> Badakhshi, H. (2024) Who can be called an “Afghan”. TBI Academic Press  
[https://www.academia.edu/117697886/Who\\_can\\_be\\_called\\_an\\_Afghan\\_The\\_genesis\\_of\\_a\\_sustainable\\_ideo\\_logic\\_strike](https://www.academia.edu/117697886/Who_can_be_called_an_Afghan_The_genesis_of_a_sustainable_ideo_logic_strike)

<sup>17</sup> Badakhshi, H. (2024) The Birth of Afghanistan. TBI Academic Press  
[https://www.academia.edu/120220548/The\\_Birth\\_of\\_the\\_Country\\_Afghanistan](https://www.academia.edu/120220548/The_Birth_of_the_Country_Afghanistan)

The primary logical premise (P1), well-documented and stable, is that we refer to the country as a politico-juridical unit with the name Afghanistan (Afghan-Stan, the land of Afghan in Parsi). This politico-juridical entity of the geographic territory we know today as Afghan-Stan, was formally and by international law emerging in the 1890s as a sole entity with its current geographical demarcations and thus its consecutively political borders.

This formation was given the official name Afghanistan. The legal base for the naming this politico-juridical entity of geographic territory within its determined legal borders, that last till this day, “Afghan-Stan” was an agreement signed on November 12th of the year 1893 between the ruler of the kingdom of Kabul Abdur Rahman Mohammadzai Barekzai and the acting as the Foreign Secretary of British Raj Henry Mortimer Durand in Kabul<sup>18</sup>.

It is important to know that this “name” was not new and has been previously, precisely since 1815, allocated to the lands of Afghani (equal to “Pushtu”) speaking ethnic tribes of Junubi and Mashreqi on the Northwestern frontiers of British Raj by its colonial official Stuart Elphinstone<sup>19</sup>. He writes *Afghaunistaun* in book 1, made of 6 chapters. In book 2 Elphinstone attempts to construct a pre anthropological account on inhabitants of the region. The author is speculating about the term and about the name “Afghaun” without any knowledge. It is the classical orientalist’s approach: you have no valid information, just speculate. In this case he writes: “The origin...is entirely uncertain; but is, probably modern. It is known to the Afghauns themselves only by the medium of Persian language. Their own name for their nation is Pooshtoon; in the plural, Pooshtauneh. The Berdooraunees pronounce this word Pookhtauneh; whence the name of Pitan, by which the Aufghauns are known in India may probably derived.” (p. 151, Elphinstone 1815). He continues: “they have no general name for their own country; but sometimes apply the Persian in *Afghaunistaun*. Dr Lyder mentioned the name Pooshtoonkhau, as bearing this sense, but I never heard is used.... The name most generally applied to the whole country by its inhabitants is *Khorassaun*...” (p. 151 Elphinstone 1815)<sup>20</sup>. “For, on the one hand, the whole of the Afghaun country is not included in the strict limits of *Khorassaun*; and, on the other, a considerable part of that province is not inhabited by Afghauns.” (p. 152 Elphinstone 1815)<sup>21</sup>. Regarding the language of Aghauns, Elphinstone writes “...it will be well to give some account of their language, wish, as I have already mentioned, is called Pushtoo.” (p. 190, Elphinstone 1815)<sup>22</sup>. “The words connected with religion, government, and with science, are mostly introduced from Arabic through the Persian.” (p. 190, Elphinstone 1815). And furthermore “The Afghauns” use the Persian Alphabet, in general to write in Nushk character. As they have some sounds, which are not represented by Persian letters, they express them by adding some points or other marks to the nearest Persian letter.” (p. 191, Elphinstone 1815)<sup>23</sup>.

As he describes in book 3, chapter 1, on “particular account of Afghaun tribes”, he clearly is referring as to the inhabitants of today’s Pushtun tribes and reflects extensively on the tribal constellation of “*Afghaunistaun*”, that merely is encompassing the Eastern and Southern part of today’s politico-juridical unit we know today as Afghanistan. Specifically, in the page 325

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<sup>18</sup> November 12<sup>th</sup>, 1893, the agreement was signed in Kabul.

<sup>19</sup> Elphinstone, Mountstuart (1815). *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul, and its Dependencies in Persia, Tartary, and India*. London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown. Online: <https://www.loc.gov/item/14015132> (Last access in October 2023)

<sup>20</sup> *ibid*

<sup>21</sup> *ibid*

<sup>22</sup> *ibid*

<sup>23</sup> *ibid*

he notes “The tribes which inhabits the north-eastern part of the Afghaun country, enclosed between the range of Hindoo Coosh, the Indus, the Salt Range, and the range of Solimaun, are comprende in the general name of Berdooraunees, first giving them by Ahmed Shauh.” (p. 325, Elphinstone 1815)<sup>24</sup>. It is obvious and comprehensible to anyone that the northern boundary of Afghaunistaun had been Hindoh Kho (or Hindoo Coosh or Hindu Kush) and the North and Central part of the politico-juridical unit with the current name Afghanistan did not belong to it, not in 1815, as the author notes his concepts of Afghaunistaun. Astonishingly to read that the Mohammadzai clan, that determined the fate of the country in 20th century, was containing merely 8000 families at this time, as Elphinstone notes in the page 359 (Elphinstone 1815)<sup>25</sup>. The topographic division Elphinstone undertook in his book was based on tribe structures and tribal ruling region, in all his notes, till the page 461, the fact remains unchanged that the North and the West (inhabited by mostly Tajik, Turk speaking and Hazara and Aimaq populations) and broader Central parts (inhabited predominantly by Hazara population) of the politico-juridical unit with the current name Afghanistan did not belong to “Afghaunistaun”, observed by Elphisntone in 1815. In book 5, he describes the “Royal Government of Caubaul” as such.

The main message of Elphinstone’s book of 1815 regarding our focused and marcant scientific question could be summed up as such: Afghaun has been an exogenic ethnonym for those who call themselves (thus an endogenic ethnonym) Pooshtoon (or Pokhtoon, Pushtun, Pukhtun, Pashtun etc) in 1815 and they do so today. The language of “Afghauns” (Today Afghans) is called by themselves Pooshtoo, Pushtu, Pukhtu, Pakhtu (Today Pashto). The territory of “Afghaunistaun”, as received by Elphinstone in 1815, was explicitly the Eastern and Southern part of the kingdom of Kaubaul or Kabool (Today: Kabul) and the vast lands in the North, Central and West of Hindo Koh and Paropamisus was inhabited by other ethnicities than the Afghauns (Today Afghans). The book of Elphinstone of 1815 remained determinant, decisive and formative for the specific imperial discourse for the rest of the 19th century in different levels of actions such as inner-imperial spheres in the British commonwealth, British Raj’s communication and writings, and the perception of “Afghaunistan” as a region, of the kingdom of Kabul and its dependencies as a country, and as well for the region and globally. This is a matter of facts.

The revival of the word “Afghan-Stan” in 1893 by Mortimer Durand<sup>26</sup> had specific purposes in terms of sustainable imperial politics of the British Raj in Asia. The teleological line from Stuart Elphinstone (came 1809 to Kaubaul, wrote the book in 1815) to Mortimer Durand<sup>27</sup> (1893 in Kabul) contains its imperial connotation. A connotation that was accompanied by a massive quantity of dead bodies, blood and destruction of native cultures in the area, that will have the name “Afghan-Stan” in the 20th century.

The agreement between the ruler of the kingdom of Kabul Abdur Rahman Mohammadzai Barezai and the acting as the Foreign Secretary of British Raj Henry Mortimer Durand in Kabul between Abdur Rahman and Mortimer Durand was signed on November 12th of 1893. By this agreement the British Raj defined its Northwestern frontiers and its operational radius toward

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<sup>24</sup> ibid

<sup>25</sup> ibid

<sup>26</sup> Percy Sykes, 1940, A History of Afghanistan, MacMillan & Co, London, online <https://dn790005.ca.archive.org/0/items/historyofafghani031122mbp/historyofafghani031122mbp.pdf> (Last access November 2023)

<sup>27</sup> Percy Sykes, 1926, The Right Honourable Sir Mortimer Durand: A Biography, Cassell and company, London. Online: <https://archive.org/details/dli.csl.8412> (Last access November 2023)

Afghanistan. As expected, the work on border demarcation for the real-world definition and determination took its time.

The Afghan Boundary Commission (ABC) terminated its work on 13<sup>th</sup> May 1896, with the inscription of a stone pillar in the region of Kohe Malik Siah in the convergence of Persia, British Raj and the new country Afghanistan<sup>28</sup>.

In terms of local, regional and international law and jurisdictions, as well in 1896 and as today, the new politico-juridical entity of the geographic territory we know today as Afghan-Stan exists since 13<sup>th</sup> 1896<sup>29</sup>.

A new politico-juridical unit of the geographic territory we know today as Afghan-Stand emerged into existence exactly in this time. Not earlier. Hence, we are obliged to accept the fact that the entity exists merely for a century and two and half decades. Facts matter.

And yet, it took at least two decades that the country was evidently named and labeled itself as Afghanistan. This fact is also well documented that during the first two decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the country was mentioned, declared, named, labeled as "The Dominion of Kabul"<sup>30</sup> (Dar el-Sultana-e Kabul) by its own state, run by Habib Saraj from the Saraj family of Mohammadzai clan of Barezai tribe, the son of Abdur Rahman.

The primary logical premise (P1), well-documented and stable shown above, is that we refer to the country as a politico-juridical unit with the current name Afghanistan (Afghan-Stan, the land of Afghan in Parsi) as a new historical product created in a process of institutionalization in 1890s under the reign of Abdur Rahman Mohammadzai Barezai (1880-1901), defined for the first time ever its Southern and Eastern boundary in legally in November 12<sup>th</sup> 1893 with three page agreement with the British Raj (responsible official was Mortimer Durand) and the last border pillar was pictured in 13<sup>th</sup> May 1896. This is the moment of the legal, historical, and geographical emergence of Afghanistan as a new country. The birth of Afghanistan<sup>31</sup>.

The secondary logical premise (P2), also well-documented and stable, would be that we refer to the evidently despotic rule of two families of the Mohammadzai-clan of the Barezai tribe in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, up to April 28<sup>th</sup>, 1978, this is the final day of this dynasty. The Saraj Mohammadzai family with Habib-ullah Saraj (October 1<sup>st</sup> 1901 until his assassination by his sons on February 20<sup>th</sup>, 1919) and Amanollah Saraj (February 28<sup>th</sup> in 1919 until his escape on January 14<sup>th</sup>, 1929) was the royal descendent of Abdur Rahman Mohammadzai Barezai (31<sup>st</sup> May 1880 until his death on October 1<sup>st</sup>, 1901). After a brief but significant disruption happened by Habib-ullah Kalakani (17<sup>th</sup> January 1929 until his escape on 12<sup>th</sup> October 1929), a Parsi speaking Tajik, the clan of Mohammadzai ruled with the family of

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<sup>28</sup> Mc Mohan 1896, Letters on The Baluch Afghan Boundary Commission Of 1896. Online: <https://ia802502.us.archive.org/1/items/1896-letters-on-the-baluch-afghan-boundary-commission-of-1896-by-mc-mahon-s/1896%20Letters%20on%20the%20Baluch-Afghan%20Boundary%20Commission%20of%201896%20by%20McMahon%20s.pdf>

<sup>29</sup> To our knowledge for the first time ever with this precision by Badakhshi, H. (2024).

<sup>30</sup> Books published by the court of Habib Saraj between 1901 and 1919 had been explicitly and implicitly named/labeled the country as "The Dominion of Kabul " (Arabic Parsi: Dar el Sultanata Kabul). hence, the state itself ignored the new status in terms of being named Afghanistan:

1916 الامر اولی کتابچہ حسب فرمان جنب نایب السلطنه 1914, مفتاح الصرف مفتاح الصرف 1915, اطاعت

, از هر دهن سخنی و از هر چمن سمن 1913

Even a book by Mahmoud Tarzi Afghan with the title "Afghanistan" was published 1912 in the "The Dominion of Kabul"

<sup>31</sup> Badakhshi, H. (2024)

Mosaheban for 49 years, namely with Nadir Mohammadzai Barezai, who called himself Nader Afghan (15<sup>th</sup> October 1929 until his assassination in 8<sup>th</sup> November 1933), Hashem Mohammadzai Barezai (9<sup>th</sup> November 1933 until his death in 26<sup>th</sup> October 1953), in this time the son of Nadir, Zaher Mohammadzai Barezai was nominally and symbolically the king due to the logic of blood genealogy, but with no real power, neither material nor immaterial, in this time period. Since 1946 the function of prime minister underwent a change, Hashem, tired of every day's state business appointed his brother Shah Mahmoud Mohammadzai Barezai (1946-1953) as a prime minister without power, as he determined in 1933 his nephew Zaher to be factually a Mr. nobody but play the theatric role a king, mostly in uniform or in shorts. As well as in a Shakespearean play, the Mosaheban court was in a way, a large-scale theater.

All first-degree historical evidence demonstrates the real constellations of power within the Mosaheban family' court and state. The structure of power was concentrated around one axis: The family<sup>32</sup>, especially the two main grand tyrants, Hashem from 9<sup>th</sup> November 1933, till his suicidal death on October 26<sup>th</sup>, 1953, and Daoud, factually from October 26<sup>th</sup>, 1953, till his suicidal death on 28<sup>th</sup> April 1978. Both starting points I mention are the factual dates of takeover of the despotic scepter, respectively. Hashem had been prime minister since the entrance of the Mosaheban families to Kabul with the aid of "young tribal men"<sup>33</sup> of the Eastern provinces (Mashreqi) and starting to rule on 17<sup>th</sup> October 1929, but he merely became "The One and Only", the absolutist hyper regent, after the mysterious assassination of his stepbrother Nader Afghan on 8<sup>th</sup> November 1933, at the royal palace. Surprisingly, Hashem was at the day of assassination of his stepbrother absent "because of traveling". He was, astonishingly absent in all relevant historical days during his absolutist reign of two decades "because of traveling" or "health issues". There might be a pattern hereby in his "tactical absences" that is under researched in Afghanistan historical studies.

He stayed four more days after the "spontaneous assassination" in Maimana and Mazar in the North, despite the large-scale crisis that happened again. His older (maternal) brother Mohammad Aziz was assassinated on 6<sup>th</sup> June 1933, in Berlin by Said Kamal under paradoxical circumstances.

Michel Foucault noticed in his text "les mots and les choses" in 1966, a function of the "essential void", in analogy, I would propose for understanding the underlying structures of the Hashemian despotism (Badakhshi 2023), the term essential absence for his eloquent and practice-oriented strategy of action in polity. The real-world functioning of power structure in regard to institutions and processes on the level of military (and police and intelligence), economy (and political economy of deletion and detention other players than the family), administration (raw violence, oppression of non-Afghans within the state apparatus) and

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<sup>32</sup> Formed by Yaya Mohammadzai, a Barezai elderly, his most relevant historical function was to act as the main negotiator of the Gandamak treaty with the British Raj on 26th May of 1879. His son Yusuf Mohammadzai Barezai, born in 1855, was living partly in the town of Dehra Dun in India/British Raj, where for instance his oldest son Aziz was born in 1877. This desired "exile" is to an unknown or under researched field in Afghanistan research.

<sup>33</sup> Young tribal men (YTM), an anthropological category Dr. Harun Badakhshi proposed 2022 for a specific, large and well-outlined violent group of tribal militias in Eastern and Southern Afghanistan, being operationable for money, privileges, women slaves and material merits, especially for war-like projects of ethnic supremacy of Afghans toward Kabul and the North. On October 13th of 1929 they were looting, stealing, raping and killing in Kabul for three days. Taleban as such has been a reference group of the YTM group in recent history. In November 2023 a large group of YTM is on the way toward the North of Afghanistan, precisely for the same motifs and reasons and for looting, stealing, raping and killing.

education (propaganda, lies, and systematic disinformation in schools and madrasas) was explicitly determined by Hashem<sup>34</sup>, the first tyrant who became a sort of “prime minister” (rather in an archaic mode than a modern time PM) at the end of October of the year 1929, but enhanced its absolutist power in November 8th of 1933 after the assassination of his step brother Nader Afghan by remaining a “prime minister”<sup>35</sup> by official labeling, cum the regent of his Nader’s son and successor Zaher, at this time 19 years old, immature. This regency has been, by all available first-degree evidence, published by official publications and published and unpublished archive materials, an absolutist *modus operandi* power exertion of a single person with the complacency of the family. The especial effect in this theatric scenery was the focus of Hashem’s efforts to generate his own “natural” successor Daud, his nephew, son of his older maternal brother Aziz<sup>36</sup> and Naiim, younger brother of Daoud. The two became the favorites of the regent immediately after their arrival in Kabul from France where Daoud lived since 1921 with his cousin Zaher.

All data, information and assumptions are well documented and what serves as the primary source, as we will see later in the text, is the Mosaheban family itself and its official publications.

A continuum of an extremely violent ruling of these two-families of Saraj family (1st October 1901 till 12th October 1929) and the Mosaheban family (15th October 1929 until 28th April 1978), both Mohammadzai clan from the Afghan Barekzai tribe, is a matter of fact. This continuum determined the fate of a new politico-juridical unit of geographic territory with the name “Afghan-Stan” during the 20th century substantially. Seventy-seven years of violence and lawlessness was accompanied by individual imprisonment of hundred thousand of individuals, normalcy and normativity of torture and unaccountable deaths, this the legacy of Mohammadzai clan ruling in Afghanistan of 20th century.

To sum up our premises (P1-2) before the start of our research work up the history of the word “Afghan-Stan”, back to 1815 and forth to 2024. The rule of Mohammadzai clan in 20<sup>th</sup> century, and therefore comprehending, analyzing, and concluding real world mechanisms and power structures of the two ruling families from 1901 to 1978, and, of course, focusing on the main research question what is the meaning of “Afghanyat” based on all objective scientific evidence we have today?

All those premises (P1-2) help the reader to understand the concept (C1) of the research, to determine the epistemic position in adequate historic context (C2) and to comprehend the content (C3) without prejudices and with full awareness that research must be performed in

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<sup>34</sup> Mohammad Hashem, born at Dehra Dun in British Raj/India in 1884, educated in British India by British teachers until 1900, after 1901: military training at Sar Saros in British Raj 1904-1907, Lt-Gen 1917, governor of Herat 1917-1919, Jalalabad 1919-1920, and of Nangahar 1920-1921, minister for war 1921, governor of Mashreqi (Eastern Province) 1919-1923, envoy to the USSR 1924-1926, prime minister 1929-1933, nominally prime minister 1933-1946, the absolutist regent 1933-1953. Death at Kabul, 26th October 1953.

<sup>35</sup> The new cabinet was announced on November 27<sup>th</sup>, 1933. Seven ministers, all the inner circle of the Mohammadzai clan, especially Mohammad Gul Momand as the new interior minister to whom I would allocate the attribute “The Practitioner” (Badakhshi 2023, paper at Oxford university’s conference) and who executed Hashem’s absolutisms into the practice. News: Eslah Nr 5, November 27, 1933 (the government’s official propaganda medium)

<sup>36</sup> Mohammad Aziz, elder maternal brother of Hashem, born also at Dehra Dun in British Raj/India in 1877, educated in British Raj by British teachers until 1900, after 1901: assist. secretary to the ruler of the dominion of Kabul Habibullah Saraj, minister for foreign affairs 1917-1919, exiled to Europe by Ammanhollah Saraj in 1921, “inspector of Afghanistan Scholars” in Europe 1921-1926, envoy to the USSR 1929-1932, and Germany 1932-1933. Killed in Berlin Germany on June 6<sup>th</sup> 1933, by a student Said Kamal.

area where certain scientific knowledge does not exist and must be led by a basic and intensive curiosity for Erkenntnis.

Again, one more thing, the term “Afghan” افغان is in first instance nothing more than an exogenic ethnonym for the ethnic group of Afghan, and it is astonishingly fuzzy, inductive, imaginative in its linguistic aspects, and simultaneously, violent and imperative in its social functioning since 1930s Afghanistan. My usage of the exonymic Parsi word “Afghan” in this article, is allocated and assigned explicitly and implicitly merely to that social group calling themselves by the endonym “Pushtun”. I use “Afghan” merely for the sake of semantic precision, and of course, for avoidance of vagueness, for Pushtun rulers, dictators, regents, tribes, clans, but never for the absolute majority of inhabitants of today’s Afghanistan like Hazaras, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Aimaks, Nuristani, Turkmen, Balushs, Pashais, Sadat/Arab etc. It is pivotal for understanding the line of my arguments and their predefined premises and, of course, of the evidence provided for a possible verification of arguments.

For the sake of total comprehension, we could have included more detailed theoretical references referring as to the field of the sociology, cultural studies and anthropology of nationalism, ethnic nationalism/ethnonationalism. That would have transgressed the content of a sole paper that is already voluminous. Therefore, we provide merely one paragraph of basic theory and go ahead with our main focus

Some remarks on orthography in this manuscript:

In reference to the rules of standard romanization of Parsi (or Parsi Dari, Farsi, Persian) words into English or any other roman/Latin alphabet in the Western academic disciplines, there might appear a difference in this text. Normally, authors refer to DMG (1969), or ALA-LC (1997), or ALA-LC (1997), BGN/PCGN (1958), and currently more to the UN systematics of 2012. The inherent issues and academic discussions of transliteration and transcription are not the focus of this text. For instance, when I write a name like “Hashem” normally formulated as “Hashim” in the current scholarly literature and press jargon, it is not a complex issue. In Parsi, whatever the Western adepts and academics might guess and think, Hashem will be phonologically pronounced as Ha Sh “e” m, with a mild and weak “e” and not normally formulated with “i” and being sharper and enhanced. This is my decision and all Westerners’ rules determining the writing of my language Parsi will be ignored. Consider it as a new step in the process of necessary decolonization of West’s cultural hegemony that had always been ignorant, arrogant and determined.

All sources mentioned in the footnotes will not necessarily reappear in the reference section. Only when they are relevant according to the very concept (C1), context (C2) or content (C3), they will appear in reference section in the end of the paper. This might seem unusual for some purists of methodology, it is, though, unavoidable. There will a differentiation between relevant to C1-3 and not-relevant.



# Research results

## What is not the meaning of the notion “Dari”?

The language Parsi پارسی is the language of 150 million people living in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Iran, and also in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Pakistan and India. Western idioms as Persian (Eng), Persisch (Ger), Persan /(Fr), Persiano (It), Persa (Spa and Port), Persisk (Swe and Norw), персидский (Ru), Perski (Pol), Pershano پهلشیانو (Japan). You see the identical phonetic structure of P. Still, it is called also Farsi, Farsi Dari, Parsi Dari.

Dari is not a language. Dar is not a dialect. Dari is not accent. Dari is not an idiom. Dari could be positioned as an adverbial determination adjunct to the word “Parsi” that is the very name of the language.

Dari is an attribute of Parsi, mostly in the idiom of literature and poetry we call it Parsi dari or Farsi dari.

## Main finding

We have predefined our research questions in context of our approach I named “precision analytics of history”: clear-cut, implicit and transparent. We have explained our methodology, according to the basics of research inquiries in social and historical sciences and disciplines of humanity in the global south and in the West.

The extensive work-up in reference to our premises (P1-2) has been necessary for the prevention of senseless disputations and defamation I expect, anti-scientific behavior predominating the scene of demagogic Afghan ethnonationalists, and meaningless empty phraseology and, especially, in overall disadvantage of ideologues and demagogues.

Research revealed that for the first time in the history, the regional and civilizational lingua franca, namely **Parsi** was renamed to Dari in the Afghanistan constitution of 1964<sup>37</sup>.

The article three of the constitution 1964 explains:

In official English translation:

“From amongst the languages of Afghanistan, Pushtu and Dari shall be the official languages.”

In original Parsi:

ماده سوم: از جمله زبانهای افغانستان پښتو و دري زبانهای رسمی مياښد.”

This constitution contains eleven chapters and 128 articles<sup>38</sup>. We deal explicitly with the article three in this paper.

In relation to the textual form, correctness and formalities, few peculiarities of this document must be mentioned: The page that is signed by the King prior to the main chapters of decree text, contains an inaccurate calendar date for the description of the acceptance procedure by the so-called large assembly. The (wrong) date is 1309 ۱۳۰۹ which shows a date 44 years prior of 1964. The year 1964 is corresponding to 1343 ۱۳۴۳ and there an evident gap between

<sup>37</sup> [https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Afghanistan\\_1964](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Afghanistan_1964), multiple references

The old page of Justice ministry of Afghanistan is not accessible to date

<http://old.moj.gov.af/fa/page/1717/1797>

The new page is not accessible to date <https://www.moj.gov.af/dr/> قانون اساسي-نافذ-افغانستان

<sup>38</sup> Original text in Parsi, English translation. See: references chapter at the end of this manuscript



1964 and 1930 of 44 years. This mistake is apparent and visible in all available original and translated versions of the constitution text, no exceptions. The mistake seems to be surviving 58 years.

The word Pushto, the other language, is written in Pushto but with a letter that is recent implementation: ځ (or څ), /ɕ, ʧ, x, ʃ/. This letter is phonetically equal to “ch” in German, of hard “Kh” in English. The name of the letter is *ġin/ŝin*, corresponding to “chin” in German or “khin” in English, by phonetics. The usage of this letter is virtually limited in certain regions, so why the writing in the decree uses a in frequently used letter, is object of wondering too. The Parsi expression “از جمله زیانهای افغانستان”, officially translated to “from amongst” sounds more that unusual. It sounds unusual in Parsi. The English translation “from amongst” is even more unintelligible.

The reasons for this formal, but not insignificant, formal peculiarities are not known and rarely analyzed properly in semiology or related disciplines.

The constitution that is renaming for the first time in the history a language, the regional and civilizational lingua franca for more that 1000 years, namely **Parsi**, by the violence of a decree is written, astonishingly and paradoxically in Parsi (variation: Farsi, English name: Persian).

Here we witness in 1964 the emergence of an established version of Afghan ethnonationalism, alienated from its core modernistic ambitions, becoming solely an instrument of oppression and exclusion.

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## Additional corresponding findings

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An important additional finding, relating to the article three, had been article 35. The article 35 was not written in the original text version by the committee.

Article 35 contains:

English text: “It is the duty of the State to prepare and implement an effective programme for the development and strengthening of the national language, Pushtu.”<sup>39</sup>

Original in Parsi:

“ماده سی و پنجم: دولت موظف است پروگرام موثری برای انکشاف و تقویه زیان ملی پښتو وضع و تطبیق کاند.”<sup>40</sup>

A fraction of ethnic suprematists under the lead of Majid Zaboli (sometimes spelled as Zabuli), a former minister of Hashem Mohammadzai, businessman, a full Nazi with high affinity to Hitler’s Fascist state and intensive relationship with the German fascist state, especially between 1934 and 1940, was the promotor of the article 35. Not surprising. Majid Zaboli was the main connection not only between the regent Hashem Mohammadzai and his favorite nephew Daud with Nazi Germany during the 1930s. The affinity of Hashem and his nephews Daud and Naiim to fascist Germany during the reign of Hitler is well- studied. Zaboli was the principal Nazi, overtly propagating fascism in Afghanistan and he was working for Daud. What the group around Zaboli achieved with article 35, was explicitly the work of Daud and Naiim, his brother. Here we witness Duad’s and Hashem’s trace of ideology of Afghanism in an article of the decree. A discriminatory, unethical and excluding decree that became constitution.

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<sup>39</sup> See footnote 32, previous page.

<sup>40</sup> Original text in Parsi: <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1HQzgrybwn1lzsgHVtZsQDyourXaScceKN/view>

“It was pushed through at the last moment by Abdul Majid Zabuli and other pro-pashtunists”<sup>41</sup>

In historical perspective, as we examined the genealogy of the Afghan ethnonationalism by a detailed review of events, two figures played a pivotal role: Mahmud Tarzi Afghani, active between 1911-1928 and Hashem Mohammadzai, active as a regent 1933-1953.

It is factually well-known that the basic premise of Mahmud Tarzi Afghani in 1913 was a construct that he termed “Afghaniyya (plural Afghaniyyat) shall bear the notion of Afghaness or Afghanistanism”<sup>42</sup>. And it is not unimportant to know that Mahmud Tarzi Afghani, the principal initiator of Afghan ethnonationalism, was unable to speak the Afghan language in a proper way, with less ability to write it at all. He was the initiator of the ethnolinguistic nationalism around the Afghani language.

Research revealed further that Hashem Mohammadzai from the Mosaheban family revived the core of the Afghan ethnonationalism’s driven ideology, namely “Afghanistanism” افغانستانيسم and its core product, namely “Afghaniyat” افغانيت after 1935. He, as the principle promotor of Afghan ethnonationalism, published in “Eslah”, the official publication of the despotic Hashem regime, on 4<sup>th</sup> November 1936 an official royal edict about the duty of non-Afghan adults and especially for coworkers of the government and state, to learn “Afghani language” زبان افغانی<sup>43</sup>. This official and royal edict was mandatory and therefor was policed. The segment of non-Afghan population was at that time the absolute majority of inhabitants in 1936, as it is today in 2024. They had been forced by police and even intelligence to learn the “Afghani language” زبان افغانی of the ruling class of the Afghan Mohammadzai clan. This royal edict contains following: All adults working in government and state, civil servants and army, must learn the Afghani language within three years. They must learn this “national language”, otherwise they will be sanctioned by the government. For the first time the term “Pushtu” appeared in the short text in Eslah No. 79 and the term “national language” too, a language that all servants must learn and use in writing and oral communication. The decision was abruptly and without any precautions announced in Eslah Nr. 79, government’s official propaganda medium, and implemented rigorously and violently by the order of one man, the absolutist ruler Hashem. And it is not unimportant to know that Hashem Mohammadzai, the principal promotor of the violent and bloody Afghan ethnonationalism and of the Afghanistanism ideology, was himself unable to speak the “Afghani language” زبان افغانی in a proper way, with less ability to write it.

And, of course, he forced a large part of the population, namely non-Afghans, to learn it.

Research reveals that the allocation and assignment hence the usage of the term “Afghan” افغان for *all inhabitants* of the country, namely the politico-juridical entity with the name Afghanistan, was implemented for the first time ever on 14<sup>th</sup> March 1937,<sup>44</sup>.

This official royal edict was formulated during the absolutist despotic reign of Hashem Mohammadzai Barekzai. It has been shown that that there were no public discussions, neither disputations within the Hashem government nor any hearings before national counsel prior to the announcement of this edict. We did not find any evidence of a public or intra-governmental survey for the announcement of this decision. The decision was abruptly and without any precautions announced in Eslah Nr. 180, government’s official propaganda

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<sup>41</sup> Saikal, A. (2004)

<sup>42</sup> Li, J, 2018

<sup>43</sup> Eslah Nr 76, November 4th, 1936 (the government’s official propaganda medium)

<sup>44</sup> Eslah Nr 180, November 14th, 1937 (the government’s official propaganda medium)

medium, and implemented rigorously and violently by the order of one man, the absolutist ruler Hashem. I wrote an extensive and evidence-based article on this topic recently.<sup>45</sup>

Research reveals that in the process of Afghanization سازی افغانی of the absolutist despotic reign of Hashem Mohammadzai Barezai, a next step was undertaken to complete the Afghan ethnonationalism's totalitarianism. The foundation of an "Afghan academy" اکادمی افغان by the regime. This event took place on 20<sup>th</sup> April 1937<sup>46</sup>. The core idea was, again, and in the very identical ideological stream of Afghan ethnonationalism's recent activisms, the spread of "Afghani language" زبان افغانی with corresponding literature and linguistics. This academy changed its name slightly fast after its foundation to "Pashto Tolana" پشتو تولنه, this nominal change was related to a simultaneous ideological process that one might call the "Pashtunization" of the Afghan populations in the country.

All these exclusionary and oppressive actions of the Afghan ethnonationalism of Mohammadzai clan, first by the initiator Mahmud Tarzi Afghani from 1913 till 1928 and then by its most violent promotor, the absolutist regent Hashem Mohammadzai from 1933 till 1953, resulted in a peak that is the article three of the new constitution of 1964 to rename Parsi پارسی (Farsi, Persian) to dari.

## Interpretation and contextualization of the main finding

The localized Afghan ethnonationalism in mid 1960s, colored by provincialism of its determining actors, was a massive aberration of modern nationalisms of the global South at that time, while one compares it with the liberation movements against colonialism in Asia and Africa. It was also a format of essentially provincial larger-tribe phenomenon, while one compares it with tribal tectonics and irritations in the periphery of the global South. Although the initiator Mahmud Tarzi Afghani and the promotor Hashem were noble men from noble families, the active actors of Afghan ethnonationalism in the state administration were spreading its hypertoxic ideology accompanied by real material atrocities and raw and structural violence. This paradoxon was born in those minds, imprisoned in the cage of the Afghan segmentary tribe structure, and, simultaneously had some contact with the glimpses of Western modernité. A challenge that was not culturally well understood and mentally resolved. For these administrative actors, foot soldiers of ideology, being factually descendants of folks housing in villages of mountainous regions of Sulaiman ranges in today's Pushtunistan (spaces of Afghan tribes), the contact with the Western modernité did not have positive, constructive, productive or intelligible results, but a reactionary clan-based tribal despotism. The label Afghan ethnonationalism we used for this manuscript, might be even too much of substance. The correct and adequate label would be "Afghan ethnic supremacy" cum state structures. While the initiator Tarzi Afghani, unable to speak or write his Afghani mother tongue, became the degree zero demagogue, the promotor Hashem Mohammadzai, also weak in speaking or writing his Afghani mother tongue, formatted the main streams of "Afghanism" ideology and completed it by violence, prisons, torture, exclusion and execution. Mostly against non-Afghan majority inhabitants of today's Afghanistan (like Hazaras, Uzbeks,

<sup>45</sup> Badakhshi, H. (2024). Who Can Be Called an "Afghan". TBI Academic Press. See references section.

<sup>46</sup> Sal Nahma Kabul 1337 سال نامه کابل, website of Afghanistan Science Academy <https://asa.gov.af/en/history> (last access May 2024), in one part of this Almanac the deputy of society explains the goals highly detailed.

Tajiks, Aimaqs, Nuristani, Turkmen, Balushs, Pashais, Sadat/Arab etc). The nephew of Hashem Mohammadzai, king Zaher and his entourage, as the protagonists of Afghan ethnonationalism, undertook in 1963 an ultimate step for the completion of a mission that Mahmud Tarzi Afghani (1913 till 1928), the intellectual initiator, and Hashem Mohammadzai (1933-1953), the brutal promotor, started amateurlly and promoted professionally. That was the design of a paperwork they called “constitution” that covered basic parameters of a common law toward a constitutional monarchy that never became constitutional. The project was terminated in October 1964. The king, Zaher Shah Mohammadzai, was for the first time in real political action, had created a pressure against his cousin and old-time buddy Daoud Mohammadzai, with whom he spent 7 years in France between 1924-1930 pretending to go to the school. This time, and for the first time, the king had found some allies within the court system, although had virtually been a king since 9<sup>th</sup> 1933, a day after his father was killed in the realm of the royal palace Arg by a young student, Abdul Khaleq. He could make Daoud to resign from his decade long time as an absolutist regent (proclaimed as “prime minister”, in real world merely a “one-man-show”) in 1963. In 1964, after the liberation of Zaher Shah from his long-term prison, arranged by his uncle Hashem Mohammadzai and his cousin Daud, he had an initiative, his first ever political initiative.

For a proper, academic, evidence-based contextualization of the matter, we discuss in the following an article of Tufts University’s professor Elisabeth Leake who is the Lee E. Dirks Professor in Diplomatic History and Associate Professor of History at the Fletcher School. She writes “Ironically, Daoud’s demand for Pashtun self-determination helped lead to his ousting in 1963. Enflamed tensions with Pakistan over Pashtunistan led his government to close the Afghan–Pakistan border and its trade routes in 1961. After two disastrous years of economic blockade, Daoud was impelled to resign, and Zahir Shah assumed power, announcing the establishment of a new Afghan constitution. He initially tasked a small group of government ministers with revising the 1931 constitution, but they ultimately drafted a new one, with input from constitutional experts from France, Egypt, and India. Notable features included articles preventing members of the ruling family from participating in politics (seen by many as an attempt to restrict Daoud and his supporters from returning to power), its articulation of constitutional monarchism, and the processes that legalized the constitution. The constitution was publicly debated and voted upon by a 455-member loya jirga (national assembly) in September 1964.”<sup>47</sup>

On the 28<sup>th</sup> September 1963, the king, appointed this small group of government ministers. The mission of the seven member group was to replace the constitution of 1931, written by the king’s father, Nader Afghani. Saikal writes “although he placed one of Daud’s allies, Sayyid Shamsuddin Majrooh (the minister of Justice in Yusuf’s cabinet), to chair the committee, the remaining members came from king’s entourage. They were: Sayyid Qasem Reshtia (Yusuf’s Minister of Press and Information until December 1963 and Minister of Finance, July 1964-October 1965), Reshtia’s radical liberalist brother, Mir Mohammad Seddiq Farhang (Head of Planning, Ministry of Mines and Industries), Mohammad Musa Shafiq (Director of the Law Department, Ministry of Justice), Dr. Abdul Samad (Head of Secondary Education, Ministry of Education), Hamidullah (Professor of Law and Political Sciences, Kabul University and son of the veteran politician, now Minister of the Royal Court, Ali Ahamad Khan); and Mir Najmuddin

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<sup>47</sup> Leake, E. (2023) *Constitutions and Modernity in Post-Colonial Afghanistan: Ethnolinguistic Nationalism and the Making of an Afghan Nation-State*.

Ansari (Advisor to the Ministry of Education)."<sup>48</sup> It is important to add some detail information:

Sayyid Shamsuddin Majrooh, an Afghan by ethnicity (Pushtun) from Pushtun-populated Kunar district, the chairman of the commission, was an absolute loyal man to the king and his Afghan dynasty. The intentions of implementation reforms and bring change by the king and his entourage might sounded (and still sound for the fraction of simplifiers) good. Appointing an Afghan ethnic suprematist, conservative historian, Pushtu language author with an overt hatred for Parsi and Persianate, for "reform" and "constitution" is less than convincing. More than that, he served in the cabinet of Daud Mohammadzai (a regent, pretended to be "prime minister"), the driver and the demagogue-in-chief of Afghan ethnonationalism, as a minister for tribal affaires (!) and being personally close to Daud's family make this affair less and less convincing. One wishes to clean-up the traces of despotism (in this case: of his father Nader Afghan and, more ever, of his step uncle's Hashem Mohammadzai, and recent Daud absolutist despotism), and, surprisingly, one appoints a pro despotism severe ethnic suprematist. Not a convincing act. Not a convincing intention.

Musa Shafiq, an Afghan by ethnicity (Pushtun), from Pushtun-populated Nangarhar area, secretary of the commission, was also a loyal man to the king and his Afghan dynasty. Musa Shafiq was educated in the "Arabic Religious High School". He earned a master's degree from Al-Azhar School for religious studies in Cairo in Egypt. Later, he earned an additional degree from Columbia University in New York USA. He was oscillating between a moderate and slow-paced opening toward a partially secular law and solid and constant preservation of Afghan dominance, namely preservation of the Afghan Barekzai dynasty's bloody dominance.

Saikal writes "during its first meeting, on 31 March 1963, the committee assigned Shafiq, Hamid, Hamidullah and Farhang to research and draw up the new basic law of the country. Assisted by a French expert, M. Louis Fougère (who had had past experience with constitutional reform in Morocco), they authored the first draft of the Constitution, which was approved by the full committee in February 1964.

The draft was by no means finalized independently of the King. While it may have been an exaggeration to call Zahir Shah 'chief innovator of the 1964 constitution', there is little doubt that the committee members, although not immediately controlled by the royal family, were sensitive to the monarch's view and preference."<sup>49</sup> The author adds "in order to put the draft Constitution to a wider test, and secure public legitimacy for it, Zahir Shah convened the Constitutional Advisory Commission (CAC), which worked between 1 March and 1 May 1964, to be followed by a Loya Jirgah. The 29-strong CAC, which claimed to represent different Afghan social strata and ethnic groups, was carefully hand-picked by the King in such a way as to give both liberal and conservative opinions utterance, without risking substantial changes to the draft. Dr Abdul Zahir, President of the National Assembly, Zahir Shah's personal physician and confidant, and later Prime Minister (1971-1972), chaired the CAC. In addition to a handful of intellectuals and religious scholars, the Commission included several collateral members of the royal clan, including Noor Ahmad Etemadi, a Mohammadzai protégé of Mohammad Naim, then Director-General of Political Affairs in the Foreign Ministry, and subsequently Prime Minister (1967-1971). The commission's deliberations on one constitutional issue proved less harmonious than might have been expected. It was the controversial question of the royal family's future participation in politics. The reform advocates, ostensibly with the King's consent, argued that: the removal of royal family

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<sup>48</sup> Saikal, A. (2004)

<sup>49</sup> Ibid. P. 143

members from the government benefited the monarchy by placing responsibility for policy and its implementation on the officials of the civil government. This would leave the royal bouse less exposed to attack and to the vicissitudes of politics... At the end of the day, Zahir Shah's version prevailed: the King's supreme power was preserved, while the immediate members of the royal family were barred from the highest positions in the legislative, executive and judicial branches of power"<sup>50</sup>.

We must gather detailed information about the constellations of the seven-member committee and about the larger groups in order to find an answer about possible motifs for the renaming Parsi into dari.

Saikal writes "The ninth Loya Jirgah in Afghanistan's history was convened in Kabul on 9 September 1964, in order to endorse the Constitution. Its 452 delegates (103 of them appointed by the King) 'appeared to represent the full range of social, political, and religious opinion'\$8 and treated their duties seriously, discussing each provision of the new fundamental law with great vigour and skill. The debate generally centred on three main issues: the Constitution's compatibility with Islam; the equitable representation of diverse ethnic interests; and the role of the Royal House in politics. Although at times the exchange of opinions was quite heated, since the Loya Jirgah had historically functioned not as a decision-making but as a legitimising body, the Jirgah's work went smoothly for ten days. The delegates approved the essential framework of the draft Constitution, albeit with some additions."<sup>51</sup>

"Article 3, which identified Pashtu and Dari (a dialect of Persian) an Afghanistan's two official languages, raised objections from Uzbeks, Hazaras, Baluchis and representatives of other ethnic minorities. The edited version, which read "From amongst the languages of Afghanistan, Pashtu and Dari shall be the official languages", was acceptable to them only because it implicitly recognised the existence of other languages. Encouragement of the use of Pashtu, a consistent policy of all Musahiban rulers since the early 1930s, was reflected in Article 35, which obliged the state to carry out a special programme to develop and strengthen Pashtu as the 'national' language. In the mid 1960s, feverish attempts were made to hammer out a literary Pashtu based on its southern (Paktiya) dialect (N.A. Dvoriankov, 'Literaturnyi iazyk i dialekty pashto v Afganistane', *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 2, 1964, p.146., addes by the author). A flurry of publications in the influential journal of the Afghan Academy, Kabul, authored mainly by an inveterate Pashtun chauvinist Rishtin, extolled Pashtu as the language that had matured on the territory of Afghanistan long before the advent of Islam, but was subsequently suppressed by various conquerors and despots (A.S. Gerasimova, 'Zhurnal "Kabul" v 1966-1969 godakh', *Narody Azi i Afriki*, No. 1, 1971, p. 170., added by the author). According to a Soviet author (Logashova, 'Etnokulturnaia situatsiia v Afganistane', p. 135., added by the author): In the conditions of multiethnic Afghanistan, establishment of Pashtu as the official language was used as a means towards strengthening the political hegemony of the Pashtuns, which led to the exacerbation of ethnic tension. The policy of Pashtunisation... gave definite advantages first of all to Pashtuns, and then to those who had mastered the languages.

By the mid 1970s, Pashtuns occupied up to 70 per cent of top and middle-level positions in Afghanistan's civil and military hierarchies (Korgun, *Intelligentsia v politicheskoi zhizni Afganistana*, pp. 10-11. Practically all cadets in the Military High School (Harbi Shmonzai) - an

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<sup>50</sup> Ibid, p. 143

<sup>51</sup> Ibid, p. 144

establishment which trained officers for command duties - were Pashtuns. Added by the author)".<sup>52</sup>

The notorious article 35, a kind of affirmative action for Afghans (Pashtuns) and their language as a state protectorate was not present in the original draft. "It was pushed through at the last moment by Abdul Majid Zabuli and other pro-pashtunists".<sup>53</sup>

The King initialed the final instrument on 1 October 1964, and the country acquired a constitution.

Professor Leack states furthermore in her manuscript that "the history of language within Afghanistan is rich. Persian (known also as Farsi...) was Afghanistan's chief administrative and political language for centuries, while Pashto had a long literary tradition in South Asia, with extant texts from the sixteenth century. Pashto speaking became affiliated with "Afghan" identity in South Asia by at least the fifteenth century, leading to subsequent centuries in which being "Afghan" was often synonymous with being Pashtun"<sup>54</sup>. She interprets the conditions of possibility for the Afghan ethnonationalism with a microscopic attention to details, the method I prefer too. She writes further "in the early twentieth century, state leaders increasingly sought to reconcile the label "Afghan" and its Pashtun connotations with embodying all those living within the state's geographical perimeter. The 1923 constitution made no mention of language or ethnicity but confirmed that "all persons residing in the Kingdom of Afghanistan ... are considered to be subjects of Afghanistan." This foregrounded, in state leaders' perspective, the primacy of a shared locational history in determining citizenship and national belonging. As it was shown in results section, she states that "Tarzi exhorted Afghan readers of the need for national unity and a shared love of homeland (watan). He also advocated learning Pashto, describing Persian as Afghanistan's official language but Pashto as its "national" one, declaring, "A nation will not survive without its language and a language will not survive without its literature." Amanullah and his supporters followed in Tarzi's footsteps. The king, while not a Pashto speaker himself, supported new Pashto societies and institutions, particularly around Kandahar, using Pashto-language literary publications to legitimate the Afghan state."<sup>55</sup> She describes the time period between Tarzi Afghani's emergence and the manifestation of Hashem Mohammadzai despotism, as follows "ethnolinguistic nationalism proved a source of continuity during and after the downfall of Amanullah and the rise of the Musahiban dynasty under Nadir Shah (1929–33). Nadir Shah's government, as well as ambitious Afghan intellectuals around Kabul and the eastern provinces, expanded upon many of Amanullah's initiatives. The king established the Anjoman-i-Adabi (Literary Society) to promote Persian and, more specifically, Pashto language and literature, alongside Afghan culture... Nadir Shah and his successors co-opted Pashto-speaking intellectuals, who participated in *musha'ira*, poetic exchanges, to present and praise the ruling family and their government. State-backed intellectuals sought to rewrite the history of Pashto"<sup>56</sup> and "in this regard, attempts by some Afghan elites and the ruling family to define Afghanistan in terms of an ethnolinguistic nationalism were unsurprising, and the choice to focus on Pashto as an indigenous language and one affiliated with a large Pashtun community (including the ruling dynasty) was even less so. Nadir Shah,

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<sup>52</sup> Ibid, p. 145

<sup>53</sup> Ibid, P. 294

<sup>54</sup> Leak, E. (2023), *ibid*

<sup>55</sup> *ibid*

<sup>56</sup> *ibid*

his successor Zahir Shah (1933–73), their kinsmen, and many government advisors saw Pashtun nationalism as a tool to assert their legitimacy.”<sup>57</sup>

To contextualize it for the first instance, we must know that “in order to consolidate their monopoly on power and to mobilize people around their internal and external policies in a changing world, the Musahiban rulers transformed Pashtun nationalism into a collective national ideology.” As Faridullah Bezhan states in his 2017 article<sup>58</sup>.

Professor Leake states furthermore that “Pashtun ethnolinguistic nationalism manifested in several ways. The government declared Pashto the official language of Afghanistan in 1936, attempting to force Pashto-language schooling across Afghanistan. The government mandated that all civil servants and military officials learn Pashto. Meanwhile, the titles of some journals and publications were switched to Pashto (although much content remained in Persian) to further express the state's backing for Pashto and its implicit Afghan-ness. As Prime Minister Hashim Khan told to a Swiss reporter in 1937, “our legends and our poems will be understood by everyone. We shall draw from them a pride in our culture of the past which will unite us.”<sup>59</sup> Unfortunately and interestingly, the turn to Afghan ethnonationalism by the royal family did not translate into more speakers of Afghani language in the same Afghan royal court. The project of Afghanization was born dead.

In year 1937, Hashem Mohammadzai, the cold-blood despotic ruler, gave an interview to Ella Maillart, a reporter of Journal of The Royal Central Asian Society (Volume 27, 1940 - Issue 2), in which he states “our legends and our poems will be understood by everyone. We shall draw from them a pride in our culture of the past which will unite us.”<sup>60</sup> I will add that exactly this is the nonsensical core of Hashem’s statement, because he by himself never understood Afghan legends and poems because of the lack of language skills stemming from his Indian upbringing and education. He even rarely understood the vox populi in Kabul and somewhere else. The Afghan dictator says much more in this paradoxical interview that took place after his return from his five months stay in Hitler’s Berlin.

Hashem states “then, again, who knows if our mountain climate which is so harsh may not give us a common character, as in Switzerland, independently of race? Then you have mentioned Pushtu... From next year it is to become the language of our officials, doing away with Persian.”<sup>61</sup>

To put this statement in an adequate and comprehensive civilizational context of long durée, Parsi<sup>62</sup> (or Farsi, Persian in English/Persan in French/Persa in Spanish/Portuguese, Persiano in Italian) has been the lingua franca<sup>63</sup> in the Persianate worlds for the last millennium, to say the least. The Persianate world from extended from Balkan to Bangal, and from Southern Russia to the coasts of the Indian Ocean. It contained in its civilizational nucleus of course of Persia (renamed to Iran in 1935), today’s Afghanistan (emerged as a new colonial construct late in 1896<sup>64</sup>, substantially of Central Asia lands (to this date, the new soviet republics Tajikesten, Usbekestan and Turkmenistan ) as well explicitly of India<sup>65</sup> (from

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<sup>57</sup> *ibid*

<sup>58</sup> Bezhan, F. (2017)

<sup>59</sup> Leake, E. (2023) *ibid*.

<sup>60</sup> Afghanistan Rebirth: An Interview H.R.A. Hashim Khan in 1937. Journal of the Royal Asian Society, 27:2, (April 1940), P. 224

<sup>61</sup> *ibid*

<sup>62</sup> Kia, M. (2020), Jabbari, A. (2023), Green, N. (2019)

<sup>63</sup> Multiple articles in Green, N. (2019), see references 45-50.

<sup>64</sup> Badakhshi, H. (2024)

<sup>65</sup> Eaton, RM, (2019), India in the Persianate Age, University of California Press



1025 AD, Delhi Sultanat till Moghul empire 1526 till 1857<sup>66</sup>, British colonialism, after 1947 division to three countries as India and East and West Pakistan), and it extended to far East Asia, China<sup>67</sup>, Russian lands<sup>68</sup>, Caucasus and relevant parts of Ottoman empire, till Balkans. The language Parsi has been a lingua franca and a shared sphere of cultural experiences<sup>69</sup>. Hashem's statements on "doing away with Persian" is the result of a totalitarian fascist ideology, to what he tended as an authoritarian absolutist regent and dictator, stemming from the Afghan Barekzai tribe's Mohammadzai clan. He imported the main streams of pseudo-scientific ideas principally from Hans Günther, a totalitarian fascist historian<sup>70</sup>, positioned by the fascist Führer Adolf Hitler himself onto the chair of history at the university of Jena in Fascist Germany in 1934. We remember that Hashem stayed five months in Hitler's Berlin and was educated in demagoguery and skills for dictatorship. It seemed that his "deutsche Erwachsenenbildung" (in English: German adult education) resulted in first instance into a genocidal concept of "doing away with Persian". However, it did not work.

Professor Leake states furthermore under the title of "Pashto and the 1964 Constitution" that "the constitution's drafters included an article indicating that Pashto and Persian (sic! Dari in original text) would be Afghanistan's two main languages, a point that caused controversy throughout the ratification process. Even with Daoud gone, many supporters of Pashtun nationalism remained in positions of power, and their influence was felt in the constitutional advisory commission tasked with the initial review. The commission was composed of Afghan elites and reformers of long standing, such as Abdul Majid Zabuli, the former minister of the economy, renowned entrepreneur, and founder of the Afghan National Bank. Zabuli had previously fallen in and out of favor with the royal family, due to his influence and political ambitions, and, while not Pashtun himself, he had enduring ties with various Pashtun nationalists, having also advocated a more robust Afghan national consciousness and a strong central state. He had played a significant role in the founding of the AYP and worked with Daoud in January 1950 to establish the *Itihadiya-i-Azadi-i-Pashtunistan* (Union for Freedom of Pashtunistan) before being sidelined from government."<sup>71</sup>

Regarding details of the process the work-up and formation of the constitution, she analyzes furthermore "as a member of the constitutional advisory commission, according to Sayed Qassem Rishtya, one of the constitution's drafters and a government minister, Zabuli coalesced a faction to demand a more prominent place for Pashto. This group insisted that the constitution give clear preference to Pashto over Persian to reflect Pashto's Afghan heritage and history. In the eyes of Pashtun nationalists, Pashtuns had created the state of Afghanistan; for modernizers like Zabuli, Pashto provided a potential source of Afghan unity (particularly against a backdrop of Iranian insistence, over past decades, that Persian was a specifically Iranian national language). The inclusion of such a mandate also would manifest the ostensible power of the Afghan center (Kabul under the royal family and its elite allies) and its intentions to take charge of Afghan nation-statehood. An Uzbek member of the

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<sup>66</sup> Encyclopaedia Britannica, Oxford Research Encyclopedias

<sup>67</sup> Ford, G (2019), Brophy, D. (2019)

<sup>68</sup> Bustanov, A (2019)

<sup>69</sup> Amanat, A., Asharafi, A. (2018) The Persianate World: Rethinking a Shared Sphere.

<sup>70</sup> Hans Günther in „Deutsche Biographie“. See reference in No. 55 his main text inducing an Afghan-style fascism in the ruling Mosaheban family of Mohammadzai clan of the Afghan Barekzai tribe

<sup>71</sup> Leake, E (2023)

commission reportedly stormed out of proceedings in protest, and Rishtya recalled, “dissension over this matter visibly strained the atmosphere of the meeting for a few days.”<sup>72</sup> The main issue though, the renaming of Parsi to dari, she states “while some compromise occurred, Pashto-language advocates ultimately won this challenge. The draft of article three debated in the *loya jirga* stated that Afghanistan's “official languages [*zabunha-i-rasmi*] are Pakhtu and Dari,” with Pashto noticeably listed first. The constitution also called Afghan Persian “Dari,” indicating the “language of the court,” rather than “Farsi,” which signified the “language of Fars” (a province in southern Iran), intentionally de-nationalizing Afghan Persian from any Iranian roots and indicating its administrative purposes. Finally, the advisory commission added article thirty-five, making the Afghan state responsible for strengthening and developing the “national” language (*zabun-i-milli*) of Pashto. Rishtya observed, “The insertion of the word ‘national’, in the opinion of the Drafting Committee, was indeed a blatant deviation from the main principles of the new constitutional regime. But, sadly, lacking cooperation from both within and outside the Committee as well as public support, we tried in vain to prevent this development within the means at our disposal.” In a subsequent press conference, Prime Minister Muhammad Yusuf justified the articles by arguing that Pashto had always been Afghanistan's national language...In advance of the *loya jirga*, the draft constitution was published in Pashto, Dari, English, and French, and when the national assembly convened, article three caused immediate controversy. According to Louis Dupree's contemporaneous report, “Immediately after the Secretary read this Article, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Aimaks, Baluchis, Turkomans, Kirghiz, Wakhi, Nuristanis, etc., clamored to be heard. All wanted some sort of amendment to recognize the existence of other languages in Afghanistan.” However, “an attempt to introduce the article with ‘From among the national languages of Afghanistan’ failed, because the Loya Jirgah reasoned that only one national language can exist.” Compromise was finally reached with a revision: “From among the languages of Afghanistan, Pashto and Dari shall be the official languages.” “The purpose of the changed wording,” reported the state-aligned *Kabul Times*, “was to recognize the existence of the other language [sic] in nation.” While opponents of the article won an acknowledgment of Afghanistan's fundamental multilingualism, they failed to divorce Pashto from official rhetoric about the Afghan nation. This was further demonstrated as debate moved straight from articles three to thirty-five. Again, some delegates “objected to the term *zabun-i-milli* (national language) with reference to Pashto,” but the article was unanimously approved. Dupree reported, “A nation should have a national language, argue the Advisory Commission ... and since Afghanistan, Pushtuns, and Pashto readily link together in the minds of outsiders, Pashto was the logical choice, in spite of the fact that Persian (or Dari) has long served as the lingua franca in Afghanistan...This observation raises the question of whom this article was intended for: was it for foreign audiences, to demonstrate that Afghanistan adhered to current debates about modern nationalism? Or was it intended to have domestic impacts? In practice, the multilingualism of the constitutional discussions highlighted the difficulties facing Afghan state leaders in spreading usage of Pashto. Throughout *loya jirga* debates, participants could voice their opinions “in either Persian or Pashto,” yet “seldom did the Secretary bother—or, indeed, have time—to translate one into the other,” ensuring that “some, though not many, of the delegates missed part of the discussions.” Nevertheless, further activities demonstrated that the *loya jirga*'s organizers clearly saw a link between language and ethnic nationalism and between Afghanistan's

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<sup>72</sup> *ibid*

domestic and regional affairs. The assembly concluded with a resolution reaffirming Afghan support for Pashtunistan, while noticeably, the language controversy was almost entirely ignored in the 1964 government yearbook. Instead, state observations on Pashto and Pashtunness in the constitutional debates focused on *loya jirga* support for the “people of Pashtunistan...The inclusion of language provisions in the 1964 constitution demonstrated the ambitions of some politically powerful Afghan elites to root Afghan nationalism in ethnolinguism. This was a form of modern nationalism that could sit alongside alternative iterations of Afghan modernity, whether framed through religion or territoriality, and was highly legible to regional and international audiences. It was clear that the Afghan government was intent on selling this vision of Afghan nationalism both at home and abroad. In the run up to the debates, an editorial in the semiofficial daily, *Islah*, declared, “Today, when we are endeavouring to develop our culture and bring it to light it is necessary that the Pakhtu language should also be given impetus to develop more...

But the extent to which the government meant to act on these new policies remained unclear. That the constitution was made readily available in multiple languages and the Afghan English-language press publicized language reforms indicated that this was an aspect of the constitution that Afghan state leaders wanted to highlight to both domestic and foreign audiences. At a time when relations with Pakistan were relatively peaceful (Afghanistan stayed neutral during the 1965 Indo–Pakistan war, despite Indian pleas), it provided a reminder that Afghan elites around the king still supported a form of Afghan nationhood heavily interconnected with transborder Pashtun nationalism. Indeed, the London *Times*’s correspondent pointed to the government’s “need to promote the status of Pushtu” in the constitution to satisfy the “Pushtu-speaking tribes of Pakistan ... desirous of becoming part of Afghanistan.” In this instance, much as Afghan officials’ demands around Pashtunistan blurred Afghanistan’s territorial boundaries, so too did the installation of Pashto as Afghanistan’s “national” language muddle the lines of citizenship: where did non-Pashto speakers fit in?”<sup>73</sup>

On the field, during the decision-making phase prior to ratification of the constitution, in September 1964 the morbid Afghan ethnonationalism stroked again. An unholy alliance was built up to preserve Afghan ethnic power. The heterogeneity of the political and economic classes seemed to vanish for the sake of the greater issue, the “Pushtun Question”.<sup>74</sup> The unholy alliance of morbid Afghan ethnonationalism was fighting against the rest. That means the Afghan power elite in the search for the preservation and stabilization of ethnic Afghan power fought against the non-Afghan majority of a polyphonic, multicultural and pluriethnic country, a cultural war was, again, on the agenda. In the first row of the fight Afghan elite against non-Afghan majority, there are men who had already a history of discrimination, hatred, propaganda, and fascism and new men. Here we name few of the main protagonists of Afghan ethnic supremacy: Ghulam Mohammad Farhad (1901–1984), at that time appointed as the mayor of Kabul by the king, well-known for his notorious hate speeches against all non-Afghan majority and for his ambitions for great games in the politics. Ambitions that did not succeed. He was trained in Germany between 1921–1928. Later, in 1966, he will create the first fascist party in Afghanistan under the name “Afghan Melat” (English: Afghan nation). Farhad ideologically joins with another suspect personage of the polity, Abdul Majid Zaboli (mostly misspelled as “Majid” and “Zabuli” with u), at that time a banker and businessman, a former minister under the principal promotor of Afghan

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<sup>73</sup> Leake, E. (2023), *ibid*

<sup>74</sup> Siddique, A. (2014),

ethnonationalism Hashem Mohammadzai. Zaboli is leading a diverse fraction of ethnic supremacists under the lead of Daud. He was a full Nazi with high affinity to Hitler's Fascist state and intensive relationship with the German fascist state, especially between 1934 and 1940, was the promotor of the article 35. Not surprising. Majid Zabuli was the main connection not only between the regent Hashem Mohammadzai and his favorite nephew Daud with Nazi Germany during the 1930s. The affinity of Hashem and his nephews Daud and Naiim to fascist Germany during the reign of Hitler is well- studied. Zaboli was in Afghanistan the principal nazi, overtly propagating fascism in Afghanistan and he was working for Daud. These two men drive the disputations in September 1964 within and outside of the general assembly that deals with the draft of the constitution. The unholy alliance of morbid Afghan ethnonationalism was fighting against the rest of the country with the goal of legalizing discrimination of the non-Afghan majority of the country by the new decree, and to legitimize national oppression. A vast group of the Afghan coworkers of the institution of "Afghan Academy" (or Pashto Tolana) contributed to this battle against the rest. What the group around Zabuli and Farhad achieved with article 35, was explicitly the work of Daud and of course, his brother Naiim.

The King initialed the final instrument on 1 October 1964, and the country acquired a constitution.

Professor Leake added to this field regarding problems of implementation that "writing Pashto and Dari into the basic principles of the Afghan constitution and asserting Pashto as Afghanistan's national language, the 1964 framers created an aspirational, foundational text ostensibly meant not only to outline Afghanistan's laws and governing structures but also to assert a clearer definition of Afghan nationhood. However, a fundamental mismatch became immediately apparent between the stated aspirations of Zahir Shah's government and the polyglot realities of Afghanistan. Even while state performances of Pashtun nationalism continued to take place, "Pashto-ization" largely failed to extend beyond educational and cultural reforms. Despite the constitution's implications—that Pashto would become universal to reflect its national character—in practice, this was not the case.

Following the constitution's ratification, the Afghan state made only limited efforts to back up the new language policy, rather than engaging in widespread political reform. Support for Pashtunistan continued prominently in the pages of the government almanacs, notably in Pashto-language articles interspersed in an increasingly bilingual yearbook; titles of officials also were given in Pashto, rather than in Dari. Multilingual education was extended, with Pashto added to the curriculum in Persian-speaking regions from the fourth grade onwards. *Islah* and *Anis*, another state-run paper, carried pieces on various means for developing Pashto across Afghanistan, including suggestions for compiling and producing pocket-sized dictionaries, philological research to "find and record some of the old words and the relation with the Pakhtu with other existing and dead languages," and incentives for Pashto-language books and translations.

By December 1964, the Ministry of Education had formed a committee to develop Pashto, while the requirement that Dari-speaking civil servants learn Pashto was reinstated. The spread of Pashto, according to government reporting, was left largely to the Ministry of Information and Culture, in collaboration with the Pashto Academy. In 1965, Minister Mohammad Usma Seddiqi pledged that his department would translate the Quran into Dari

and Pashto and explore linking the Pashto Academy to Kabul University. In 1966, the ministry further established a department for “the general management of the popularization and strengthening of the development of the Pashto language.” This department, working with the Pashto Academy, appeared to largely focus on translation and publishing. A 1971 report pointed to the publication of works by the renowned poet, Khushal Khattak, other Pashto poetry collections, and the biographies of famous Pashto poets; development of a Pashto-Persian and a Pashto-Russian dictionary; and the expansion of Pashto holdings at various libraries. Other activities, mirroring national policies undertaken in countries like Iran and Turkey, also focused on Pashto-izing Afghan language and institutions. At least 100 English words were translated into Pashto, while numerous schools and institutions were given new historical names written in Pashto. That same year, the Ministry of Information and Culture reported that 100% of the ministry's schools used written Pashto, while 50% of its affairs were “carried out in the national language.” It also revealed a series of general recommendations for further developing Pashto, although these remained in the realm of education, translation, and publishing. While these steps revealed government interest in Pashto culture and literacy, they certainly did not represent sweeping reforms that would make Pashto a truly national language.

Afghanistan's bureaucratic realms remained overwhelmingly Persian or required expertise in languages other than Pashto. Afghanistan's legal system was a case in point. The practice of law in Afghanistan was fundamentally polyglot. Jurists training in Kabul University's faculty in Islamic law were taught in English and Arabic and used Persian and Arabic texts; those in the faculty of law and political science were lectured in Persian and studied mostly European textbooks. Pashto-language classes were offered in the latter faculty, but many law students focused on foreign languages to pursue international fellowships and education. To this end, the Ministry of Justice established a foreign-language training center in 1964. While legal reforms in the 1960s sought to make statutory enactments available in “vernacular language”—whether this meant Persian or Pashto (or both) was unclear—this was not obviously acted upon. Afghanistan's new statutory laws were not made available throughout the country, and as late as 2001 neither the Ministry of Justice nor Kabul University held complete sets of Afghanistan's regulations and statutory laws. As such, for at least one milieu of educated Afghans, Pashto competed with numerous other language requirements. The polyglot realities of Afghan legal culture stood in stark contrast to the state's declared focus on Pashto-ization, revealing tensions between Afghan law as defined in the constitution and Afghan law as practiced across the state.

The success of other state efforts to Pashto-ize were limited at best, although they accompanied initiatives clearly intended to further strengthen the central government. The 1964 constitution restructured the state's administrative and electoral units, creating twenty-eight smaller provinces and sub-districts (*wuluswali*). These not only divided non-Pashtun-majority regions like Hazarajat, Turkestan, and Qataghan but also created “a more favourable administrative structure for the allocation of developmental resources and an electoral environment favouring the Pashtuns.” In a nod to Pashto, the names of local geographies were switched from local dialects.”<sup>75</sup>

What we read here, as a cold dry and emotionless academic narration, was in reality, for a vast collective of folks of the non-Afghan majority a life-worldly experience in its worst form that was and is imaginable. Writing history is in need at this abstract form of reasonable

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<sup>75</sup> Leake, E. (2023), *ibid*

description. Meanwhile, for those who suffered the reality of the above-mentioned events and restrictions, the undeniable favoritism of ethnic Afghans, or as the author writes of “Pashtuns”, is traceable till these days. I, by myself, had a large number of conversations and less structured interviews with individuals being in their late teenage or in their 20s in that time who witness the mercilessness and violence the Afghan state of Mosaheban family pose on its citizens, especially those large non-Afghan majority of the absolute majority of inhabitants of today’s Afghanistan (like Hazaras, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Aimaqs, Nuristani, Turkmen, Balushs, Pashais, Sadat/Arab etc) that are not “Afghan” and, of a matter of fact, never being called “Afghan” before 1937.

“In Afghanistan's northern and central provinces, reportedly “almost all leading officials [were] Pashto-speaking Afghans from Kabul, Kandahar, and the Eastern Province.” While for these officials Pashto was “the language of authority that the government, several times, tried to impose on the local employees,” disconnect persisted. Many locals spoke Persian, although their local dialects additionally differed from “the urban Dari of the officials.” This did not, however, halt other performative acts of Pashtun nationalism. In fieldwork in Tashqurghan (in northern Balkh province) in 1966, anthropologist Pierre Centlivres witnessed the local official *jashn* (Afghan national independence) celebrations. He later wrote, “The performance and its Pashtun symbols hark back to what was then regarded as the Pashtun essence of the nation and attempted to identify Pashtun culture with Afghan national culture. The *atan* dance [a Pashtun warrior dance], the recitation in Pashto, the *kandahari* dress of the little girl, the band from Jalalabad, were the expressions of this endeavour.” These *jashn* celebrations epitomized the performative nature of this state-led Pashtun and Pashto nationalism: a moment of vivid celebration rather than a long-term administrative effort to implement change.

The Afghan state's limited attempts to nationalize Pashto clearly did not match the stated ideals of the new constitution, but they nevertheless point to a key issue. While the reign of Zahir Shah and the constitutional decade of the 1960s have often been framed as a period of liberalization and more representative politics, aspects of the constitution itself—particularly the language question—reveal a more restrictive element. The constitution offered a narrow view of who was Afghan, using language as a key identifier.

Even while it stated that “Afghan” would apply to “all those individuals who possess the citizenship of the State of Afghanistan in accordance with the provisions of the law,” articles three and thirty-five brought into question the place of non-Pashto speakers or non-Pashtuns. The constitution implied hierarchies of Afghanness, based at least partly on language.”<sup>76</sup>

The notion of nationalization of “Pashto”, as the author narrates, had to be a mismatch in relation to the text of the constitution 1964. Once we reread the text of the constitution with a proper analytical approach, once we review the ground realities in mid 1960s Afghanistan, and once we rethink the complex nature of text (of the constitution) and the real (of every day’s life at that time), we might come closer to the identical result as the author, but more realistic and from first or secondhand experiences of people. As I abstract from all stories told to me and to others, I was told later, in conversations with grandchildren, children of the generation suffered those periods and I was told directly by experiences of the people themselves, and also and not less worthy, from those large number of documentaries, fictions, poems; the suffering of humans was real, and It damaged the psyche of many

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<sup>76</sup> *ibid*

individuals irreversibly and substantially until today and through generations. The systematic oppression by the governing actors of Afghan ethnonationalism had a name: The national oppression. This term came up, mid of 1960s by Taher Badakhshi<sup>77</sup>. The term national oppression ملی ستم emerged as a result of extended field work and in-depth theoretical endeavors, Taher Badakhshi undertook since end 1950s in the university of Kabul and in thorough sociological studies in Kabul and different parts of the country, especially where, as Elisabeth Leake describes as “Hazarajat, Turkestan, and Qataghan”, thus the North, Northeast, Central parts and of course in the West of Hindokosh (also spelled: Hindukush) mountain ranges. He analyzed the structures of power, the general structure power and the structure of Afghan ethnic supremacy, and he interpreted the objective conditions of life in economic, cultural and educational dimensions and the result was the concept of national oppression ملی ستم, first time proposed by Taher Badakhshi mid 1960s. Till today, we do not encounter any other groundbreaking concept than of national oppression ملی ستم.

The process of liberalization after 1963, so Professor Leake “was a fundamentally uneven process, one that had the potential to constrict the rights and opportunities of some Afghans. Even while the constitution clearly came up against the bureaucratic, political, and social realities of a multicultural, multilingual Afghanistan—and Pashto was never implemented as a national language—the inclusion of a language provision revealed that a certain milieu of Afghan elites sought to read Afghan nationhood through the lens of linguistic nationalism. In turn, it fed into enduring questions about the relationship between Afghan and Pashtun nationalism and internal ethnic power hierarchies in ways that have helped complicate broader narratives about Afghan history. In this regard, the language provision remains significant despite its failed implementation.”<sup>78</sup>

Here in this short paragraph, one sees some minor but significant issues. She describes, again in a calm impartial academic manner, that the process was not even, and the rights had been constricted. Again, the scale of violence, exerted and sustainably operationalized by the state of Mosaheban court, namely by the “liberal” Zaher Shah, might be softened by the verb “constrict” by the author. At this time, the main prison of Kabul called Dehmazang was full. Beside of the basic right of group manifestation that was giving in times, no other basic democratic right was applied to the society. Police and military were abused for the sake of protection not only of the court, but protection of privileges of the ruling Mosaheban Mohammadzai family and its large Mohammadzai clan entourage, all of Afghan Barekzai tribe. The king Zaher Shah and his ceremonial and non-ceremonial activities had no relevant difference to any other absolutist royal of the Global South at this time. The adjective “constitutional” for this monarchy is not applicable, in case we observe and study details of the royal court and implicit and explicit events, processes and institutions. Of a matter of fact, “even while the constitution clearly came up against the bureaucratic, political, and social realities of a multicultural, multilingual Afghanistan”, this true. The author adds that “Pashto was never implemented as a national language”, but she does not explain why. One possible explanation could be that the implementation of the Afghani language (she takes the endonym Pashto) as national language was difficult if not almost impossible because of absolute lack of production of texts (literature, poetry, fiction, non-fiction, or even science), books (literature, poetry, fiction, non-fiction, or even science), relevant translations or any other significant production of Geist. What should be implemented at all?

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<sup>77</sup> Taher Badakhshi wrote in 1963, 1966, 1971, and 1973 in different texts, i.g. in his pivotal text “The National Question”. The writings of Taher Badakhshi will be published soon by “TBI academic Press”

<sup>78</sup> *ibid*

The author, astonishingly and paradoxically, seems to ignore the absolute identity of “Afghan” (exogenic endonym for this ethnic group) and “Pashtun” (exogenic endonym for this ethnic group). There is sufficient data and a large body of academic writing analyzing that fact. I explained that issue extensively in other recent articles.<sup>79</sup>

Jonathan Lee, a British-born social and cultural historian and a significant authority on the historiography of Afghanistan, writes in his opus magnum “Afghanistan, A history from 1260 to the present” of 2018<sup>80</sup> on Mosaheban family and Pushtun nationalism explicitly that “Muhammad Da’ud and Muhmmad Na’im. Actievly promoted closer ties with the Third Reich.”<sup>81</sup>

On Daud’s in-depth sympathy with Hitler’s fascist Germany that caused two global wars, the second one with 70 million death people and the maximization of violence against all European humans, he writes, “national Socialism ran deep within the ruling elite, due in part to the government’s active promotion of Pushtun nationalism, which was increasingly conflated with ideas of racial and cultural superiority and Aryanism. One reason for the adoption of this more hard-edged version of Tarzi’s Afghaniyya was an attempt by the Musaheban to appeal to its primary support base, the Pushtun tribes of the Afghan Indian frontiers.”<sup>82</sup> In my opinion, J. Lee is formulating here the most comprehensive and, simultaneously, the simplest predefinition of the term Afghan ethnonationalism. It is anything else than obscure when compared with highly complex and less intelligible definitions scholars usually give.

He writes further that “the government took its version of Pushtun nationalism to the illogical conclusion and decreed Pushtu henceforth to be the only official language of Afghanistan.”<sup>83</sup> The scholarly and political insight Dr. Lee is expressing by his clear-cut statements here is astonishing. The vast Western adepts, specialized in Afghanistan and its issues and complexities, have, concerning this format of short, compact, true, and, if course, highly evidence-based statements of Jonathan Lee, difficulties of formal and substantial nature. They have not the high degree of information, data, knowledge and contextual overview on heterogenous cultures and hyperdynamic history Afghanistans as Dr Lee shows in his academic and non-academic publications. The experts on Afghanistan stemming from Afghanistan, educated in suspect curricula of notorious universities in Afghanistan, and sometimes having continuous education in Western institutes and think tanks run by those Western adepts I mention above, have a different educational background, but aberrant by political relations (leftist or extreme right wing ideologies) and kinship conditions (members of the same ethnic group seeking and believing in their ethnic supremacy as Afghans do, with the exception of a scarcely number). Both groups suffer under a serious issues of comprehension evident events, processes, institutions and discourses.

In this specific context, I rarely mentioned Zaher Shah, the king of Afghanistan. Despite his intronization as the king after the assassination of his father Nader Shah on 8<sup>th</sup> November 1933, he was an absentee beyond ceremonies and symbolic acts. The power has always been in the body of Hashem, the stepbrother of Nader Shah and Zaher’s step uncle. Amin Saikal wrote in his book “Modern Afghanistan” of 2004 with an anecdotic manner that the “domineering and dictatorial Hashim... made sure that Zahir remained a figurehead for a long

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<sup>79</sup> Badakhshi, H (2024) 3 different manuscripts.

<sup>80</sup> Lee, J, (2018). See for details reference No. 35.

<sup>81</sup> ibid

<sup>82</sup> Ibid

<sup>83</sup> ibid



time to come”<sup>84</sup> He continues “”His (Hashem’s) efforts at isolating Zahir were so successful that at one stage the King had to seek his uncle’s permission and advice for almost everything, including when and where to hunt or to eat.”<sup>85</sup> So far, professor Saikal describes on a detailed level the weird dichotomy of Zahir and his step uncle, the regent. And he leaves out, due to the anecdotic style of storytelling, the character and the very ideologic nucleus of Hashem’s attitude. The traditional historiography is unable to grasp traces of discourses and effects of ideology as such, so does professor Saikal. He does not understand the genocidal connotation of Hashem’s “doing away with Persian” and its consequences, till today. And of course, there is the format of storytelling of many Western high experts with no clue at all. For instance, Ralph H. Magnus (joint with Eden Naby), who made an economically well-paid practical endeavor in Kabul during the last republic. He writes on this period of Hashem’s absolutist despotism, while calling him an iron-fisted uncle, “the proliferation of newspapers and journals...nonetheless allowed for the impassioned exchange of ideas among Kabul elites on the problem of modernization and the relationship of Islam to society and the individual as well as Islam and modernization.”<sup>86</sup> The traditional historiography is unable to grasp traces of discourses and effects of ideology as such, so does professor Magnus, too.

Today in 2024, the extremist Taleban militia, another Afghan ethnonationalist group, made of 90% Afghans, thus Pushtuns, ruling in Afghanistan, attempt to “doing away with Persian”. The structural similarities between Hashemian despotism, an Afghan ruler against all other people living in the country, all non-Afghans, and the terrorist Taleban militia is intriguing. The Taleban tyranny, infra structured by their version of Afghan ethnonationalism, seems to have explicitly the identical goals of Tarzi Mohammadzai (1913-1928) and Hashem Mohammadzai (1933-1953) of puritanic ethnic supremacy of Afghans über alles<sup>87</sup>.

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<sup>84</sup> Saikal, A. (2004)

<sup>85</sup> ibid

<sup>86</sup> Magnus and Naby (2002), this book is certainly one example for the worse Western adepts attempt to publish on Afghanistan. Read it and enjoy the maximization of Western nonsense.

<sup>87</sup> “Über alles” is part of the main fascist parole of “Deutschland über alles” (English: Germany above all)

# Conclusion

Our main finding has been clear-cut and free of any ambiguity: For the first time in the short history of the country Afghan-Stan (foundation in 1896<sup>88</sup>), the court of Mosaheban family, Mohammadzai clan of Afghan Barekzai tribe, attempted to rename the canonic language of the country, the lingua franca, Parsi (Farsi, Persian) into dari in 1964. This happened in the context of a new constitution within the system of a monarchy of one-clan of one-ethnic-group that remained unchanged afterward. The article three of the constitution 1964 contains the new name for Parsi.

Parsi, a language that is alive for the last 2500 years and for 1300 years in its current version, thus exactly the language people in the country are speaking, reading and writing; has been the lingua franca in Persianate, from Balkan to Bangal and from Russian steps to the Arabian sea of the Indian Ocean for a millennium. Inhabitants of Afghanistan (North, Central area, and West of Hindokosh mountains, and of course in Kabul), Iran and Tajikistan are at home in this language. Nile Green specified, summing up the current scientific knowledge, Parsi as a Eurasian Lingua Franca<sup>89</sup>. The tremendous academic knowledge about the Persianate and Parsi we have access now, demonstrate this act of cowardness by the Mohammadzai clan of Afghan Barekzai tribe as an act of deep inferiority complex of the Afghan (endonym: Pushtun) court and state in mid 1960s. There is no other option to interpret this act of collective Pushtun despair. Today in 2024, the terror militia of Taleban, an Afghan (endonym: Pushtun) group, intensify the war against Parsi with all means. The consequences of the Afghan ethnonationalism were bloody, disastrous, ferocious, obscene and deadly for millions of people, especially for non-Afghan majority.

Our research method would be called “precision analytics of history”. We attempted to find a precise and concise answer to the primary questions, what caused the Afghan, thus Pushtun, ethnonationalism in the country Afghanistan. A country that is named after one ethnic group of “Afghan”. We found the answer by a systematic approach in which we perform a systematic literature review, gathering all relevant data and information into a database. The next step was to scrutinize and to analyze the database. During this phase of the study, at least two additional inquiries emerged. Driven by the sheer density of the data and information.

I find that the discussions around this issue and this term, which has been astonishingly fuzzy, inductive, imaginative in its linguistic aspects, and simultaneously, violent and imperative in its social functioning, might ultimately have an end.

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<sup>88</sup> Badakhshi, H. (2024). *The Birth of Afghanistan*. TBI Academic Press

<sup>89</sup> Green, N. (2019), *The Persianate World: The Frontiers of a Eurasian Lingua Franca*. University of California Press.

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Badakhshi, Harun, 2024

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The Consequences of a Sustainable Ideologic Strike\_ Part Two

In: The Journal of Taher Badakhshi Institute, V 2., No 4.

By TBI Academic Press