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
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What Afghan Ethnonationalism caused in 20<sup>th</sup> Century

The Consequences of a Sustainable Ideologic Strike\_ Part One

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پژوهش‌کده طاهر بدخشی برای تحول اجتماعی

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همه حقوق نشر، تکثیر و الگو برداری این اثر به «پژوهشکده طاهر بدخشی» تعلق میگیرد

# What Afghan Ethnonationalism Caused in 20th Century

## The Consequences of a Sustainable Ideologic Strike\_Part 1

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# Introduction

Questions are specific, explicite and transparent, there is no ambivalence or ambiguity in it, and it is addressing a real-world issue for millions of folks in the country with the current name “Afghanistan” in terms of identity politics for almost a hundred years:

What did Afghan Ethnonationalism cause in 20<sup>th</sup> century Afghanistan?

Much research has been carried out in the last years. But the questions asked somewhere else were not specific, and in no way astonishing, never explicite, hardly transparent, persistently ambivalent and essentially ambiguous, ignoring, in almost all cases, the real need of large number of country’s populations, neglecting the in-depth intentions of those who have been asking questions. The last republic (2004-2021) was cultivating its ignorance, negligence, oblivion, and evident denial of the issue (and other related problems) by means of violence<sup>1</sup>, hence structural violence<sup>2</sup> and law-generated violence<sup>3</sup>. As it was practiced in the 20th century by the ruling Afghan (thus, Pushtun) family of Mosaheban (1929-1978).

Questions asked in our specific context is, however, not merely an academic, reductive and theoretical issue but it is dealing with a social, political and cultural urgency.

The precise questions asked in this focused constellation are, thus, not in need to be generalized, compared generally, and embedded in general theoretical mosaics. It is specific to Afghanistan and its inhabitants, and its large diaspora containing more than six million people, it is completely and generally ignored by all, with no exception, Western experts and adepts, hence it needs, ultimately, an autochtone intrinsic perspective.

The term “Afghan” افغان is in first instance nothing more than an exogenic ethnonym for the ethnic group of Afghan, and it is astonishingly fuzzy, inductive, imaginative in its linguistic aspects, and simultaneously, violent and imperative in its social functioning since 1930s Afghanistan. My usage of the exonymic Parsi word “Afghan” in this article, is allocated and assigned explicitly and implicitly to that social group calling themselves by the endonym “Pushtun”. I use “Afghan” for the sake of semantic precision, and of course, for avoidance of vagueness, for Pushtun rulers, dictators, regents, tribes, clans. The absolute majority of inhabitants of today’s Afghanistan (like Hazaras, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Aimaqs, Nuristani, Turkmen, Balushs, Pashais, Sadat/Arab etc) are not “Afghan” and, of a matter of fact, never being called “Afghan” before 1937. It is pivotal for understanding the line of my arguments and their

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<sup>1</sup> Heiner Müller, 1998, *Werke, Gedichte, Band 1,, Gespräche Band 10-12*, Suhrkamp Berlin, Heiner Müller, 2023 *Conversation with A. Kluge*, Cornell university, <https://kluge.library.cornell.edu/de/conversations/mueller/> (last access November 2023); Pierre Bourdieu, 1998, ‘Acts of Resistance: Against the New Myths of Our Time’ [translated by Richard Nice], Cambridge, Polity Press; Bourdieu, P., & Wacquant, L. J., 1992, *An Invitation to Reflexive sociology*. Chicago, IL...: University of Chicago Press. Pierre. Bourdieu, 1976, « Les modes de domination », *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, p. 126

<sup>2</sup> Judith Butler, 2020, *The Force of Non-Violence: The Ethical in the Political*. Verso NY; Slavoj Žižek, 2007, *Violence: Six Sideways Reflections*, Picador NY; Mann, Michael. 1986. *The Sources of Social Power*, Cambridge University Press; Girard, René, 2005, *Violence and the Sacred*, Continuum London; Widom, C. S., 1989, *The cycle of violence*. Science, 244, 160–166; Mark Vorobej, 2016, *The Concept of Violence*, Routledge; Coady, C.A.J. *Violence*, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2023; Robert Fischer, Peter Sloterdijk, Klaus Theweleit, 1994, *Bilder der Gewalt*, Verlag d. Autoren; Peter Sloterdijk, 1994, *Wenn die Gewalt erscheint – Versuch über die Explosivität der Bilder*, TV-show. Peter Sloterdijk, 2006, *Zorn und Zeit*, Suhrkamp, Berlin.

<sup>3</sup> Walter Benjamin, 1921, *Kritik der Gewalt*, Online: <https://criticaltheoryconsortium.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Walter-Benjamin-Zur-Kritik-der-Gewalt-1.pdf> (Last access November 2th, 2023)

predefined premises and, of course, of the evidence provided for a possible verification of arguments.

The term “Pushtun” پښتون, as the endogenic ethnonym used by the Afghan people increasingly since mid 1930s, refers as to a population that were living in an outlined and limited geographic area of Sulaiman mountains in Southern Asia. In the following we will use the specific historical notion of “Afghan” and Afghan tribes, it is thus a descriptive terminus technicus stemming from general anthropology and area studies. Afghan tribal leader “are highly concerned with origin, descent, and genealogies.”<sup>4</sup> Pushtun tribal society is based on a format of kinship. The structure of this kinship is described as a “segmentary lineage system”. It is a principle of organization for the Pushtun tribal relation, determining the character of the tradition, communication, transportation, therefore the material infrastructure, as well the collective mental status. This structure is the base of local economies and local politics within a segment, a clan, a tribe or even tribal confederations. And more important, the structure of “segmentary lineage system” is the key element in social interactions between Afghans and other populations in peace and, more frequently, in war<sup>5</sup>. Afghans did not play “any relevant active and decisive role in regional politics till mid 18<sup>th</sup> century. The Pushtun element enters the field of regional politics and power mid 18<sup>th</sup> century”<sup>6</sup>. To be more precise, it is about the first appearance of Afghan tribes in autonomous function in Central Asia civilization, North and West of Hindu Kush. Before that time period, Afghans did, where they had a role or function outside their tribal areas and in social interactions with non-Afghan people or states in recent history, documented and written, it was in the context of war. Afghan tribal men discover before 18<sup>th</sup> century the “other”, either by making war against them or work for them in their war against someone else as legionnaires. An eminent example, easy to demonstrate because of the quantity and quality of external, non-Afghan, historical evidence is the case of Mohammad Ahmad Khan, born in India. He and his men worked as legionnaires for Nader Shah Afshar, the Persian king, from 1729 till 1747.

We do not discuss in this article the issues related to the interventions and interactions of Afghan tribes in South Asia. Research in this field has also been carried out, soon will be another paper deal with this issue.

We do not know much about the older history of Afghans before 18<sup>th</sup> century in terms of exact science and evidence-based rational approaches of scientific methodology. The reason for that matter of fact, are twofold: A pathologic tendency for “constructs”, to expressed it mildly, that means that the Afghan ruling family and their dependent scholars and quasi scholars were acting purposely against historical truth and scientific evidence by force and repetitively by, especially after mid 1930s. This is a period, as we will see some determining details in this article, the Mosaheban family took over the ruling, establishing the Hashemian despotism after November 1933 and building up a vigorous and unassailable machine for mensonge and distraction and an apparatus of blatant lie, falsehood and fabrications the country never experienced before. A state apparatus, dedicated to constructs and propaganda, has been established after mid 1930s by hashem Mohammadzai, the absolutist regent of the country. The court needed this apparatus for the deep state with its specific Afghan tribal foundational structure. The most ridiculous example has been the case that the Afghan state propaganda institution “Pashto Tolana” constructed a “New book of Afghans”,

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<sup>4</sup> Tainter, A & Mac Gregor, D (2011), Caroe, O. (1965). The Pathans. MacMillan, London

<sup>5</sup> ibid. And Sahlins, M. (1961), Lindholm, Ch. (1982), Barth, F. (1959)

<sup>6</sup> Taher Badakhshi wrote 1971, in his pivotal text “The National Question” that was written for an “educational workshop in Sociology” in Kabul. It will be published soon by “TBI academic Press”

or Pota Khazana پټه خزانہ , by invention it in 1944, out of sudden. The inventor was the notorious Afghan scholar Adul hai-Habibi, this is exactly the word he used “invention”. Astonishingly, in 2024, 80 years later, the original of the “New book of Afghans” has not been shown curam publicum. The pathologic tendency for “constructs” and fabrications by the ruling Afghan Mosaheban family (October 1929 till April 1978) and their dependent scholars and institutions made for the lack of knowledge about the history of Afghans, produced by evidence-based rational approaches of scientific methodology, is striking. The second obvious and impactful cause for the lack of knowledge about the history of Afghans is a main deep structure in the “collective tribal psyche of Afghans”<sup>7</sup> that seems to be an outspoken and classic ideology, Afghans name “Pushtunwali”<sup>8</sup>.

Both reasons, one might call them with Gaston Bachelard preliminary as determining “epistemic obstacle” regarding scientific knowledge about Afghan history before 1600, but they have been, disproportionately and violently, accompanied by a grand geste of exaggeration by the Afghan ruling family and their dependent scholars and quasi scholars in buildup of “constructs”, to expressed it mildly.

This single inquiry was inevitably followed by the question, what constituted the category “Afghan” as a term in the realm of jurisprudence, power and its institutions, as well in the entanglement of the political and the social in public spheres of Afghanistan since its imperative implementation by an official edict by a despotic one-clan-regime in 1930s. This is the time of “Hashemian despotism”, a term that was introduced by Dr. Harun Badakhshi in November 2023 at the Oxford Afghanistan conference for the first time<sup>9</sup>. Hashem Mohammadzai (clan) of Barekzai tribe was the absolutist ruler of the country after 1933.

Our main focus in this text will be the notion of “Afghanyat” افغانيت as the leading momentum of the Afghan ethnonationalism and its corresponding ideology on Afghanistanism افغانيسم in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. We will examine the consequences of Afghan ethnonationalism in 20<sup>th</sup> century. We may frame the main notion and related varia in a specific scientific concept (C1), positioning it into a precise and logical context (C2) and, then one will attempt to capture the very content (C3) of this issue.

A challenging exercise, with no doubt, but a possible option to reread history driven by critical analytics, societal structural approaches, and genuine power discourse analysis.

The research questions identified by the working group “Afghanistan revisited” within the “Taher Badakhshi Institute”, have been the matter of fact that today's status of general popular information within and outside of Afghanistan, as well the current scholar knowledge on the category “Afghanyat” is rudimentary<sup>10</sup>, indeed. Astonishingly, years of debate in Afghan-Stan (in Parsi precisely: the land of Afghan), frequently heated public disputations and even middle range manifestations in Kabul, seems to be not inductive or provocative enough in order to create a primary scientific question and to initiate a genuine scientific process of finding answers in this seemingly complex matter, that is, as you will read in my research results, not at all complex.

What is evident, is that it has been an obvious, solid, and manifest epistemic obstacle or, more likely, a large set of obstacles seem to be positioned to inhibit or delay a

<sup>7</sup> A term Taher Badakhshi implanted into the vocabulary of progressive emancipatory movement of mid 1970s

<sup>8</sup> Roy, O. (1990), see reference 15 p. 19, p 35, p.36. Gopal, A. & von Linshoten, AS (2017), Naz, A. et al (2012), Tainter, JA & MacGregor, DG (2011), Bezhan, A (2017), Borthakur, A. & Kotokey, A (2020)

<sup>9</sup> Badakhshi, H, 2023, “Oriental despotism revisited, the notion of “Hashemian despotism””, November 5th, 2023, Conference: Bringing Afghanistan into the Scale, Oxford University, UK

<sup>10</sup> See also references nr. 56-84 for in-depth critical reading

methodologically certain and secure evidence-based knowledge accumulation on this very issue. The mechanism of political power, exerted violently by the Mosaheban family of Afghan Mohammadzai clan of Barekzai tribe between 1929-1978, made this manifestation of obstacles possible. Production of knowledge was sanctioned by the ruling Afghan families.

We have conducted an extensive background literature review in February and March 2024 and refined afterward the research idea and considered new questions emerging on the horizon of contemplations. The consecutive determination of the research methods included the concise identification and precise location of primary and secondary data sources with the mandatory evaluation of the authenticity and accuracy of source materials. A database of plausible and valid sources after the literature review was designed. The result of the endeavor was a thorough and rigorous analysis of the data. Consecutively, was the designing and developing a narrative exposition of the findings at stake.

What precisely is constituting "Afghanyat" افغانيت, the main and most stable marker of Afghan ethnonationalism in Afghan-Stan, would include a large array of academic implications and distinctive methodological criteria that are in need to reveal valid, reproducible, objectively derived and plausible answers for this eminent question people ask themselves.

The background of this scientific endeavor has explicitly been the above-mentioned inquiries of the young educated generation of population and their recent cultural and political experiences.

# Method and Material

Our scientific enquiry, in this context, is merely an immediate consequence of epistemic restlessness and ideological irritations of intelligentsia, students, literati and academics and, on the other hand, of political and civil activists in Afghanistan.

Their questions, disputed in intensive round tables on TV and in heated discourses in scholarly conferences, were addressed on multiple levels of popular and scholar knowledge, namely the paradox of naming and labeling a multiethnic, pluricultural, polyphonic land of many people, many cultures, many languages and a long durée, thus a diverse country, after a single “Afghan ethnic group”. We discussed this issue, in detail and evidence-based, in another recent paper of Taher Badakhshi Institute for Social Transformation’s journal<sup>11</sup>.

Their questions, scrutinizing the very rationale of obscurantism of the state in 20<sup>th</sup> century’s Afghanistan about the origin and exact dates of the emergence of the same state. A century official historiography and well-paid state historians of Mosaheban family of the Afghan Mohammadzai clan, could not reveal the basic fact of facts, namely at what exact date the country with the name “Afghan-Stan” emerged on the surface of regional and global politics, in geopolitics discourses, in regional and international contracts, and, ultimately, on geographical maps and area cartography for academic and business implications. We discussed this issue too, in detail and evidence-based, in another recent paper of Taher Badakhshi Institute for Social Transformation’s journal<sup>12</sup>.

Their questions, enduring till this day and lost in manyfold translations and transgressions, about the core and the essential meaning of Afghanyat will be discussed in this article.

And, of course, the most irritation and disturbing and against any basic human right and valid citizenship rights, people of the country were never asked about their perspectives and understandings or acceptance.

It might seem like a facile nominalistic issue for the first question. It turns out, post hoc to be a pivotal social question mark in recent times. It also seemed to be an inquiry of minor importance to know when exactly your country entered the regional and global scene of small and great games. And again, it turns out, post hoc to be a relevant issue.

Our questions seem to be easy to be asked. What is the meaning of “Afghanyat”. The corpus of scholarly literature reviewed and reread, had to undergo a rigorous structural analysis. The analysis, in its next step, had to be formed and structured to become logically firm, thus scientifically valid. For the sake of the logical structure of the paper, I am working with two premises (P1-2) that might be immediate, explicite and transparent, and make the concept (C1), the context (C2) and, first and foremost the content (C3) comprehensible.

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<sup>11</sup> Badakhshi, H. (2024) Who can be called an “Afghan”. TBI Academic Press

[https://www.academia.edu/117697886/Who can be called an Afghan The genesis of a sustainable ideo logic strike](https://www.academia.edu/117697886/Who_can_be_called_an_Afghan_The_genesis_of_a_sustainable_ideo_logic_strike)

<sup>12</sup> Badakhshi, H. (2024) The Birth of Afghanistan. TBI Academic Press

[https://www.academia.edu/120220548/The\\_Birth\\_of\\_the\\_Country\\_Afghanistan](https://www.academia.edu/120220548/The_Birth_of_the_Country_Afghanistan)



The primary logical premise (P1), well-documented and stable, is that we refer to the country as a politico-juridical unit with the name Afghanistan (Afghan-Stan, the land of Afghan in Parsi). This politico-juridical entity of the geographic territory we know today as Afghan-Stan was formally and by international law emerging in the 1890s as a sole entity with its current geographical demarcations and thus its consecutively political borders.

This formation was given the official name Afghanistan. The legal base for the naming this politico-juridical entity of geographic territory within its determined legal borders, that last till this day, "Afghan-Stan" was an agreement signed on November 12th of the year 1893 between the ruler of the kingdom of Kabul Abdur Rahman Mohammadzai Barekzai and the acting as the Foreign Secretary of British Raj Henry Mortimer Durand in Kabul<sup>13</sup>.

It is important to know that this "name" was not new and has been previously, precisely since 1815, allocated to the lands of Pushtu speaking ethnic tribes of Junubi and Mashreqi on the Northwestern frontiers of British Raj by its colonial official Stuart Elphinstone<sup>14</sup>. He writes *Afghaunistaun* in book 1, made of 6 chapters. In book 2 Elphinstone attempts to construct a pre anthropological account on inhabitants of the region. The author is speculating about the term and about the name "Afghaun" without any knowledge. It is the classical orientalist's approach: you have no valid information, just speculate. In this case he writes: "The origin...is entirely uncertain; but is, probably modern. It is known to the Afghauns themselves only by the medium of Persian language. Their own name for their nation is Pooshtoon; in the plural, Pooshtauneh. The Berdooraunees pronounce this word Pookhtauneh; whence the name of Pitan, by which the Aufghauns are known in India may probably derived." (p. 151, Elphinstone 1815). He continues: "they have no general name for their own country; but sometimes apply the Persian in *Afghaunistaun*. Dr Lyder mentioned the name Pooshtoonkhau, as bearing this sense, but I never heard is used.... The name most generally applied to the whole country by its inhabitants is *Khorassaun*..." (p. 151 Elphinstone 1815)<sup>15</sup>. "For, on the one hand, the whole of the Afghaun country is not included in the strict limits of *Khorassaun*; and, on the other, a considerable part of that province is not inhabited by Afghauns." (p. 152 Elphinstone 1815)<sup>16</sup>. Regarding the language of Aghauns, Elphinstone writes "...it will be well to give some account of their language, wish, as I have already mentioned, is called Pushtoo." (p. 190, Elphinstone 1815)<sup>17</sup>. "The words connected with religion, government, and with science, are mostly introduced from Arabic through the Persian." (p. 190, Elphinstone 1815). And furthermore "The Afghauns" use the Persian Alphabet, in general to write in Nushk character. As they have some sounds, which are not represented by Persian letters, they express them by adding some points or other marks to the nearest Persian letter." (p. 191, Elphinstone 1815)<sup>18</sup>. As he describes in book 3, chapter 1, on "particular account of Afghaun tribes", he clearly is referring as to the inhabitants of today's Pushtun tribes and reflects extensively on the tribal constellation of "*Afghaunistaun*", that merely is encompassing the Eastern and Southern part of today's politico-juridical unit we know today as Afghanistan. Specifically, in the page 325 he notes "The tribes which inhabits the north-eastern part of the Afghaun country, enclosed

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<sup>13</sup> November 12<sup>th</sup>, 1893, the agreement was signed in Kabul.

<sup>14</sup> Elphinstone, Mountstuart (1815). *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul, and its Dependencies in Persia, Tartary, and India*. London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown. Online: <https://www.loc.gov/item/14015132> (Last access in October 2023)

<sup>15</sup> *ibid*

<sup>16</sup> *ibid*

<sup>17</sup> *ibid*

<sup>18</sup> *ibid*

between the range of Hindoo Coosh, the Indus, the Salt Range, and the range of Solimaun, are comprende in the general name of Berdooraunees, first giving them by Ahmed Shauh.” (p. 325, Elphinstone 1815)<sup>19</sup>. It is obvious and comprehensible to anyone that the northern boundary of Afghaunisaun had been Hindoh Kho (or Hindoo Coosh or Hindu Kush) and the North and Central part of the politico-juridical unit with the current name Afghanistan did not belong to it, not in 1815, as the author notes his concepts of Afghaunistaun. Astonishingly to read that the Mohammadzai clan, that determined the fate of the country in 20th century, was containing merely 8000 families at this time, as Elphinstone notes in the page 359 (Elphinstone 1815)<sup>20</sup>. The topographic division Elphinstone undertook in his book was based on tribe structures and tribal ruling region, in all his notes, till the page 461, the fact remains unchanged that the North and the West (inhabited by mostly Tajik, Turk speaking and Hazara and Aimaq populations) and broader Central parts (inhabited predominantly by Hazara population) of the politico-juridical unit with the current name Afghanistan did not belong to “Afghaunistaun”, observed by Elphisntone in 1815. In book 5, he describes the “Royal Government of Caubaul” as such.

The main message of Elphinstone’s book of 1815 regarding our focused and marcant scientific question could be summed up as such: Afghaun has been an exogenic ethnonym for those who call themselves (thus an endogenic ethnonym) Pooshtoon (or Pokhtoon, Pushtun, Pukhtun, Pashtun etc) in 1815 and they do so today. The language of “Afghauns” (Today Afghans) is called by themselves Pooshtoo, Pushtu, Pukhtu, Pakhtu (Today Pashto). The territory of “Afghaunistaun”, as received by Elphinstone in 1815, was explicitly the Eastern and Southern part of the kingdom of Kaubaul or Kabool (Today: Kabul) and the vast lands in the North, Central and West of Hindo Koh and Paropamisus was inhabited by other ethnicities than the Afghauns (Today Afghans). The book of Elphinstone of 1815 remained determinant, decisive and formative for the specific imperial discourse for the rest of the 19th century in different levels of actions such as inner-imperial spheres in the British commonwealth, British Raj’s communication and writings, and the perception of “Afghaunistan” as a region, of the kingdom of Kabul and its dependencies as a country, and as well for the region and globally. This is a matter of facts.

The revival of the word “Afghan-Stan” in 1893 by Mortimer Durand<sup>21</sup> had specific purposes in terms of sustainable imperial politics of the British Raj in Asia. The teleological line from Stuart Elphinstone (came 1809 to Kaubaul, wrote the book in 1815) to Mortimer Durand<sup>22</sup> (1893 in Kabul) contains its imperial connotation. A connotation that was accompanied by a massive quantity of dead bodies, blood and destruction of native cultures in the area, that will have the name “Afghan-Stan” in the 20th century.

The agreement between the ruler of the kingdom of Kabul Abdur Rahman Mohammadzai Barezai and the acting as the Foreign Secretary of British Raj Henry Mortimer Durand in Kabul between Abdur Rahman and Mortimer Durand was signed on November 12th of 1893. By this agreement the British Raj defined its Northwestern frontiers and its operational radius toward

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<sup>19</sup> ibid

<sup>20</sup> ibid

<sup>21</sup> Percy Sykes, 1940, A History of Afghanistan, MacMillan & Co, London, online <https://dn790005.ca.archive.org/0/items/historyofafghani031122mbp/historyofafghani031122mbp.pdf> (Last access November 2023)

<sup>22</sup> Percy Sykes, 1926, The Right Honourable Sir Mortimer Durand: A Biography, Cassell and company, London. Online: <https://archive.org/details/dli.csl.8412> (Last access November 2023)

Afghanistan. As expected, the work on border demarcation for the real-world definition and determination took its time.

The Afghan Boundary Commission (ABC) terminated its work on 13<sup>th</sup> May 1896, with the inscription of a stone pillar in the region of Kohe Malik Siah in the convergence of Persia, British Raj and the new country Afghanistan<sup>23</sup>.

In terms of local, regional and international law and jurisdictions, as well in 1896 and as today, the new politico-juridical entity of the geographic territory we know today as Afghan-Stan exists since 13<sup>th</sup> 1896<sup>24</sup>.

A new politico-juridical unit of the geographic territory we know today as Afghan-Stand emerged into existence exactly in this time. Not earlier. Hence, we are obliged to accept the fact that the entity exists merely for a century and two and half decades. Facts matter.

And yet, it took at least two decades that the country was evidently named and labeled itself as Afghanistan. This fact is also well documented that during the first two decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the country was mentioned, declared, named, labeled as "The Dominion of Kabul"<sup>25</sup> (Dar el-Sultana-e Kabul) by its own state, run by Habib Saraj from the Saraj family of Mohammadzai clan of Barezai tribe, the son of Abdur Rahman.

The primary logical premise (P1), well-documented and stable shown above, is that we refer to the country as a politico-juridical unit with the current name Afghanistan (Afghan-Stan, the land of Afghan in Parsi) as a new historical product created in a process of institutionalization in 1890s under the reign of Abdur Rahman Mohammadzai Barezai (1880-1901), defined for the first time ever its Southern and Eastern boundary in legally in November 12<sup>th</sup> 1893 with three page agreement with the British Raj (responsible official was Mortimer Durand) and the last border pillar was pictured in 13<sup>th</sup> May 1896. This is the moment of the legal, historical, and geographical emergence of Afghanistan as a new country. The birth of Afghanistan<sup>26</sup>.

The secondary logical premise (P2), also well-documented and stable, would be that we refer to the evidently despotic rule of two families of the Mohammadzai-clan of the Barezai tribe in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, up to April 28<sup>th</sup>, 1978, this is the final day of this dynasty. The Saraj Mohammadzai family with Habib-ullah Saraj (October 1<sup>st</sup> 1901 until his assassination by his sons on February 20<sup>th</sup>, 1919) and Amanollah Saraj (February 28<sup>th</sup> in 1919 until his escape on January 14<sup>th</sup>, 1929) was the royal descendent of Abdur Rahman Mohammadzai Barezai (31<sup>st</sup> May 1880 until his death October 1<sup>st</sup>, 1901). After a brief but significant disruption happened by Habib-ullah Kalakani (January 17<sup>th</sup> 1929 until his escape in October 12<sup>th</sup> 1929), a Parsi speaking Tajik, the clan of Mohammadzai ruled with the family of

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<sup>23</sup> Mc Mohan 1896, Letters on The Baluch Afghan Boundary Commission Of 1896. Online: <https://ia802502.us.archive.org/1/items/1896-letters-on-the-baluch-afghan-boundary-commission-of-1896-by-mc-mahon-s/1896%20Letters%20on%20the%20Baluch-Afghan%20Boundary%20Commission%20of%201896%20by%20McMahon%20s.pdf>

<sup>24</sup> To our knowledge for the first time ever with this precision by Badakhshi, H. (2024).

<sup>25</sup> Books published by the court of Habib Saraj between 1901 and 1919 had been explicitly and implicitly named/labeled the country as "The Dominion of Kabul " (Arabic Parsi: Dar el Sultanata Kabul). hence, the state itself ignored the new status in terms of being named Afghanistan:

1916 الامر اولی کتابچہ حسب فرمان جنب نایب السلطنه 1914, مفتاح الصرف مفتاح الصرف 1915, اطاعت

, از هر دهن سخنی و از هر چمن سمن 1913

Even a book by Mahmoud Tarzi Afghan with the title "Afghanistan" was published 1912 in the "The Dominion of Kabul"

<sup>26</sup> Badakhshi, H. (2024)

Mosaheban for 49 years, namely with Nadir Mohammadzai Barezai, who called himself Nader Afghan (October 15<sup>th</sup> 1929 until his assassination in November 8<sup>th</sup> 1933), Hashem Mohammadzai Barezai (November 9<sup>th</sup> 1933 until his death in October 26<sup>th</sup> 1953), in this time the son of Nadir, Zaher Mohammadzai Barezai was nominally and symbolically the king due to the logic of blood genealogy, but with no real power, neither material nor immaterial, in this time period. Since 1946 the function of prime minister underwent a change, Hashem, tired of every day's state business appointed his brother Shah Mahmoud Mohammadzai Barezai (1946-1953) as a prime minister without power, as he determined in 1933 his nephew Zaher to be factually a Mr. nobody but play the theatric role a king, mostly in uniform or in shorts. As well as in a Shakespearean play, the Mosaheban court was in a way, a large-scale theater.

All first-degree historical evidence demonstrates the real constellations of power within the Mosaheban family' court and state. The structure of power was concentrated around one axis: The family<sup>27</sup>, especially the two main grand tyrants, Hashem from November 9<sup>th</sup>, 1933, till his suicidal death on October 26<sup>th</sup>, 1953, and Daoud, factually from October 26<sup>th</sup>, 1953, till his suicidal death on April 28<sup>th</sup>, 1978. Both starting points I mention are the factual dates of takeover of the despotic scepter, respectively. Hashem had been prime minister since the entrance of the Mosaheban families to Kabul with the aid of "young tribal men"<sup>28</sup> of the Eastern provinces (Mashreqi) and starting to rule on October 17<sup>th</sup>, 1929, but he merely became "The One and Only", the absolutist hyper regent, after the mysterious assassination of his stepbrother Nader Afghan on November 8<sup>th</sup>, 1933, at the royal palace. Surprisingly, Hashem was at the day of assassination of his stepbrother absent "because of traveling". He was, astonishingly (or may not) absent in all relevant historical days during his absolutist reign of two decades "because of traveling" or "health issues". There might be a pattern hereby in his "tactical absences" that is under researched in Afghanistan historical studies.

He stayed four more days after the "spontaneous assassination" in Maimana and Mazar in the North, despite the large-scale crisis that happened again. His older (maternal) brother Mohammad Aziz was assassinated on June 6<sup>th</sup> 1933 in Berlin by Said Kamal under paradoxical circumstances.

Michel Foucault noticed in his text "les mots and les choses" of 1966, a function of the "essential void", in analogy, I would propose for understanding the underlying structures of the Hashemian despotism (Badakhshi 2023), the term essential absence for his eloquent and practice-oriented strategy of action in polity. The real-world functioning of power structure in regard to institutions and processes on the level of military (and police and intelligence), economy (and political economy of deletion and detention other players than the family), administration (raw violence, oppression of non-Afghans within the state apparatus) and

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<sup>27</sup> Formed by Yaya Mohammadzai, a Barezai elderly, his most relevant historical function was to act as the main negotiator of the Gandamak treaty with the British Raj on 26th May of 1879. His son Yusuf Mohammadzai Barezai, born in 1855, was living partly in the town of Dehra Dun in India/British Raj, where for instance his oldest son Aziz was born in 1877. This desired "exile" is to an unknown or under researched field in Afghanistan research.

<sup>28</sup> Young tribal men (YTM), an anthropological category Dr. Harun Badakhshi proposed 2022 for a specific, large and well-outlined violent group of tribal militias in Eastern and Southern Afghanistan, being operationable for money, privileges, women slaves and material merits, especially for war-like projects of ethnic supremacy of Afghans toward Kabul and the North. On October 13th of 1929 they were looting, stealing, raping and killing in Kabul for three days. Taleban as such has been a reference group of the YTM group in recent history. In November 2023 a large group of YTM is on the way toward the North of Afghanistan, precisely for the same motifs and reasons and for looting, stealing, raping and killing.

education (propaganda, lies, and systematic disinformation in schools and madrasas) was explicitly determined by Hashem<sup>29</sup>, the first tyrant who became a sort of “prime minister” (rather in an archaic mode than a modern time PM) at the end of October of the year 1929, but enhanced its absolutist power in November 8th of 1933 after the assassination of his step brother Nader Afghan by remaining a “prime minister”<sup>30</sup> by official labeling, cum the regent of his Nader’s son and successor Zaher, at this time 19 years old, immature. This regency has been, by all available first-degree evidence, published by official publications and published and unpublished archive materials, an absolutist *modus operandi* power exertion of a single person with the complacency of the family. The especial effect in this theatric scenery was the focus of Hashem’s efforts to generate his own “natural” successor Daud, his nephew, son of his older maternal brother Aziz<sup>31</sup> and Naiim, younger brother of Daoud. The two newspapers became the favorites of the regent immediately after their arrival in Kabul from France where Daoud lived since 1921 with his cousin Zaher.

All data, information and assumptions are well documented and what serves as the primary source, as we will see later in the text, is the Mosaheban family itself and its official publications.

A continuum of an extremely violent ruling of these two-families of Saraj family (October 1st in 1901-October 12th in 1929) and the Mosaheban family (October 15th in 1929 until April 28th in 1978), both Mohammadzai clan from the Afghan Barekzai tribe, is a matter of fact. This continuum determined the fate of a new politico-juridical unit of geographic territory with the name “Afghan-Stan” during the 20th century substantially. Seventy-seven years of violence and lawlessness was accompanied by individual imprisonment of hundred thousand of individuals, normalcy and normativity of torture and unaccountable deaths, this the legacy of Mohammadzai clan ruling in Afghanistan of 20th century.

To sum up our premises (P1-2) before the start of our research work up the history of the word “Afghan-Stan”, back to 1815 and forth to 2024. The rule of Mohammadzai clan in 20<sup>th</sup> century, and therefore comprehending, analyzing, and concluding real world mechanisms and power structures of the two ruling families from 1901 to 1978, and, of course, focusing on the main research question what is the meaning of “Afghanyat” based on all objective scientific evidence we have today?

All those premises (P1-2) help the reader to understand the concept (C1) of the research, to determine the epistemic position in adequate historic context (C2) and to comprehend the content (C3) without prejudices and with full awareness that research must be performed in

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<sup>29</sup> Mohammad Hashem, born at Dehra Dun in British Raj/India in 1884, educated in British India by British teachers until 1900, after 1901: military training at Sar Saros in British Raj 1904-1907, Lt-Gen 1917, governor of Herat 1917-1919, Jalalabad 1919-1920, and of Nangahar 1920-1921, minister for war 1921, governor of Mashreqi (Eastern Province) 1919-1923, envoy to the USSR 1924-1926, prime minister 1929-1933, nominally prime minister 1933-1946, the absolutist regent 1933-1953. Death at Kabul, 26th October 1953.

<sup>30</sup> The new cabinet was announced on November 27<sup>th</sup>, 1933. Seven ministers, all the inner circle of the Mohammadzai clan, especially Mohammad Gul Momand as the new interior minister to whom I would allocate the attribute “The Practitioner” (Badakhshi 2023, paper at Oxford university’s conference) and who executed Hashem’s absolutisms into the practice. News: Eslah Nr 5, November 27, 1933 (the government’s official propaganda medium)

<sup>31</sup> Mohammad Aziz, elder maternal brother of Hashem, born also at Dehra Dun in British Raj/India in 1877, educated in British Raj by British teachers until 1900, after 1901: assist. secretary to the ruler of the dominion of Kabul Habibullah Saraj, minister for foreign affairs 1917-1919, exiled to Europe by Ammanhollah Saraj in 1921, “inspector of Afghanistan Scholars” in Europe 1921-1926, envoy to the USSR 1929-1932, and Germany 1932-1933. Killed in Berlin Germany on June 6<sup>th</sup> 1933, by a student Said Kamal.

area where certain scientific knowledge does not exist and must be led by a basic and intensive curiosity for Erkenntnis.

Again, one more thing, the term “Afghan” افغان is in first instance nothing more than an exogenic ethnonym for the ethnic group of Afghan, and it is astonishingly fuzzy, inductive, imaginative in its linguistic aspects, and simultaneously, violent and imperative in its social functioning since 1930s Afghanistan. My usage of the exonymic Parsi word “Afghan” in this article, is allocated and assigned explicitly and implicitly merely to that social group calling themselves by the endonym “Pushtun”. I use “Afghan” merely for the sake of semantic precision, and of course, for avoidance of vagueness, for Pushtun rulers, dictators, regents, tribes, clans, but never for the absolute majority of inhabitants of today’s Afghanistan like Hazaras, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Aimaqs, Nuristani, Turkmen, Balushs, Pashais, Sadat/Arab etc. It is pivotal for understanding the line of my arguments and their predefined premises and, of course, of the evidence provided for a possible verification of arguments.

Some remarks on orthography in this manuscript:

In reference to the rules of standard romanization of Parsi (or Parsi Dari, Farsi, Persian) words into English or any other roman/Latin alphabet in the Western academic disciplines, there might appear a difference in this text. Normally, authors refer to DMG (1969), or ALA-LC (1997), or ALA-LC (1997), BGN/PCGN (1958), and currently more to the UN systematics of 2012. The inherent issues and academic discussions of transliteration and transcription are not the focus of this text. For instance, when I write a name like “Hashem” normally formulated as “Hashim” in the current scholarly literature and press jargon, it is not a complex issue. In Parsi, whatever the Western adepts and academics might guess and think, Hashem will be phonologically pronounced as Ha Sh “e” m, with a mild and weak “e” and not normally formulated with “i” and being sharper and enhanced. This is my decision and all Westerns' rules determining the writing of my language Parsi will be ignored. Consider it as a new step in the process of necessary decolonization of West’s cultural hegemony that had always been ignorant, arrogant and determined.

# Research results

## What is not the meaning of the notion “Afghanyat”?

Any word and notion that merely relate to the very existence of the ethnic group of Afghans, as exogenically ethnonymized in Parsi<sup>32</sup>, or Pushtuns, as endogenically ethnonymized and used by themselves.

“Afghanyat” افغانستان, our research inquiry, is not, on epistemic level, identical with the word Afghan.

“Afghanyat” افغانستان, is not, on semantic level, identical with the word Afghan. On both levels, epistemic and semantic, Afghanyat has rather got a phonetic and historic relation to the word Afghan, but it is ultimately a product of efforts of ethnolinguistic work-up after 1913.

“Afghanyat” افغانستان, is not, on the level of everyday social experiences, identical with Pushtunwali.

“Afghanyat” افغانستان though, relate virtually to another sphere of meaning. It is, to be precise, a category for its own and with its own genesis and dynamics.

This category is based on sustainable strike of ideology called “Afghanism” افغانيسم.

The ideology of “Afghanism” افغانيسم is cultivated on the soil of Afghan ethnonationalism of 20<sup>th</sup> century.

We examined in this scientific endeavor the consequences of Afghan ethnonationalism’s driven ideology, namely “Afghanism” and its core product, namely “Afghanyat”.

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<sup>32</sup> پارسی **Parsi** is the language of 150 million people living in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Iran, and also in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Pakistan and India. Western idioms as **Persian** (Eng), **Persisch** (Ger), **Persan** / (Fr), **Persiano** (It), **Persa** (Spa and Port), **Persisk** (Swe and Norw), **персидский** (Ru), **Perski** (Pol), **Pershano** ペルシアの (Japan). You see the identical phonetic structure of **P**. Still, it is called also Farsi, Farsi Dari, Parsi Dari.

## What is the meaning of the ideological notion “Afghanyat”?

We have predefined our research questions in context of our approach I named “precision analytics of history”: clear-cut, implicit and transparent. We have explained our methodology, according to the basics of research inquiries in social and historical sciences and disciplines of humanity in the global south and in the West.

The extensive work-up in reference to our premises (P1-2) has been necessary for the prevention of senseless disputations and defamation I expect, anti-scientific behavior predominating the scene of demagogic Afghan ethnonationalists, and meaningless empty phraseology and, especially, in overall disadvantage of ideologues and demagogues.

### Main finding

Research revealed that for the first time Mahmud Big Tarzi’s rise to political power made the implementation the notion “Afghanyat” افغانيت possible.

In October 1911 Mahmoud Big Tarzi was allowed by the king of Kabul (Dar ul-Sultana Kabool), Habib Saraj (1901-1919), to revive a newspaper that was led to date by Abd al-Rauf. He renamed it to Saraj al-Akhbar-e Afghaniyya<sup>33</sup>. It was distributed to every government department with subscriptions deducted from civil servant’s salaries<sup>34</sup>. “The newspaper has a profound effect on educated Afghans”, as Jonathan Lee

stated in his pus magnum on Afghanistan. Lee is using, still and despite his deep insights, falsely the word “Afghans” everyone for the sake of understanding. I use it in the very semantic way, as explained prior in this article.

The explicite first expression of the terms “Afghan and Afghaniyya” in its new notion had been published in Saraj al-Akhbar-e Afghaniyya, on 23<sup>rd</sup> January 1913, No. 2, second year<sup>35</sup>. Afterward, Mahmud Tarzi Afghan, so his later nominal transformation from the young Turk to an Afghan ethnofaschist, published in Saraj al-Akhbar published few related short texts, for instance on 3<sup>rd</sup> September 1915 and on 3<sup>rd</sup> March 1917<sup>36</sup>.

Here we witness the emergence of an imported version of ethnonationalism, alienated from its core modernistic ambitions, as witnessed in post Ottoman republican Turkey of Kamal Ata Turk. The basic premise of Mahmud Tarzi Afghan was a construct. That construct he termed “Afghaniyya (plural Afghaniyyat) shall bear the notion of Afghaness or Afghanistanism”<sup>37</sup>. And it is not unimportant to know that Mahmoud Tarzi Afghan, the principal initiator of Afghan ethnonationalism, was unable to speak the Afghan language in a proper way, with less ability to write it at all.

And, of course, he attempted a large part of the population, namely non-Afghans, to convince to learn the language he was not able to speak and write.

Research revealed further that Hashem Mohammadzai from the Mosaheban family revived the core of the Afghan ethnonationalism’s driven ideology, namely “Afghanism” افغانيسم and its core product, namely “Afghanyat” افغانيت after 1935. At this time, he already had established the absolutist despotism that will last till his death in 1953.

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<sup>33</sup> Lee, J, 2018

<sup>34</sup> ibid

<sup>35</sup> Saraj al-Akhbar-e Afghaniyya, on 23 January 1913, No. 2, second year. All relevant archives. Also in Badakhshi, H (2022) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tUeHaxnS7Dc>

<sup>36</sup> ibid

<sup>37</sup> Li, J, 2018



Eslah, the official publication of the despotic Hashem regime, published on 4<sup>th</sup> November 1936 an official royal edict about the duty of non-Afghan adults and especially for coworkers of the government and state, to learn “Afghani language” زبان افغانی<sup>38</sup>. This official and royal edict was mandatory and therefor was policed. The segment of non-Afghan population was at that time the absolute majority of inhabitants in 1936, as it is today in 2024. They had been forced by police and even intelligence to learn the “Afghani language” زبان افغانی of the ruling class of the Afghan Mohammadzai clan. This royal edict contains following: All adults working in government and state, civil servants and army, must learn the Afghani language within three years. They must learn this “national language”, otherwise they will be sanctioned by the government. For the first time the term “Pushtu” appeared in the short text in Eslah No. 79 and the term “national language” too, a language that all servants must learn and use in writing and oral communication. The decision was abruptly and without any precautions announced in Eslah Nr. 79, government’s official propaganda medium, and implemented rigorously and violently by the order of one man, the absolutist ruler Hashem. And it is not unimportant to know that Hashem Mohammadzai, the principal promotor of the violent and bloody Afghan ethnonationalism and of the Afghanistanism ideology, was himself unable to speak the “Afghani language” زبان افغانی in a proper way, with less ability to write it. And, of course, he forced a large part of the population, namely non-Afghans, to learn it.

Research reveals that the allocation and assignment hence the usage of the term “Afghan” افغان for *all inhabitants* of the country, namely the politico-juridical entity with the name Afghanistan, was implemented for the first time ever on March 14<sup>th</sup>, 1937,<sup>39</sup>. This official royal edict was formulated during the absolutist despotic reign of Hashem Mohammadzai Barezai. It has been shown that that there were no public discussions, neither disputations within the Hashem government nor any hearings before national counsel prior to the announcement of this edict. We did not find any evidence of a public or intra-governmental survey for the announcement of this decision. The decision was abruptly and without any precautions announced in Eslah Nr. 180, government’s official propaganda medium, and implemented rigorously and violently by the order of one man, the absolutist ruler Hashem. I wrote an extensive and evidence-based article on this topic recently.<sup>40</sup>

Research reveals that in the process of Afghanistanization سازی افغانی of the absolutist despotic reign of Hashem Mohammadzai Barezai, a next step was undertaken to complete the Afghan ethnonationalism’s totalitarianism. The foundation of an “Afghan academy” اکادمی افغان by the regime. This event took place on 20<sup>th</sup> April 1937<sup>41</sup>. The core idea was, again, and in the very identical ideological stream of Afghan ethnonationalism’ recent activisms, the spread of “Afghani language” زبان افغانی with corresponding literature and linguistics. This academy changed its name slightly fast after its foundation to “Pashto Tolana” پښتو ټولنه, this nominal change was related to a simultaneous ideological process that one might call the “Pashtunization” of the Afghan populations in the country. This notion contained three evident components: First, it had to change the minds of Afghan folks to suggest that they might call themselves Pushtuns (Pashtuns, Pakhtun) and not any more Afghan.

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<sup>38</sup> Eslah Nr 76, November 4th, 1936 (the government’s official propaganda medium)

<sup>39</sup> Eslah Nr 180, November 14th, 1937 (the government’s official propaganda medium)

<sup>40</sup> Badakhshi, H. (2024). Who Can Be Called an “Afghan”. TBI Academic Press. See references section.

<sup>41</sup> Sal Nahma Kabul 1937 ۱۳۱۶ سال نامه کابل, website of Afghanistan Science Academy <https://asa.gov.af/en/history> (last access May 2024), in one part of this Almanac the deputy of society explains the goals highly detailed.

Afghan has been the exogenic ethnonym Parsi speaking rulers and at a certain time British colonialists gave them. Afghan has been the exogenic ethnonym Parsi speaking rulers and at a certain time British colonialists gave them. And because the term should have been applied and allocated to all inhabitants of the country. A weird and unintelligible construct the protagonists of Afghan ethnonationalism were attempting to execute.

Second, it had to change the minds of Afghani language speaking folks to suggest that they might call their language Pushtu (Pashto, Pakhtu) and not any more Afghani. Afghani has been the exogenic allocation Parsi speaking rulers and at a certain time British colonialists gave to their language.

Third, it had to change the minds of all inhabitants of the country to suggest them that all people living in the country must call themselves from now “Afghan” and that Pushtu is a national language and more important than Parsi. Another paradox and irrational decision the regent Hashem Mohammadzai and his court made.

To sum up the main findings:

Mahmud Big Tarzi, the diplomat and intelligentsia, arriving from Ottoman kingdom with Turkish as his primary language, had initiated the Afghan ethnonationalism, focused with ethnolinguistic components, even though he was not speaking and writing this very Afghan language with an adequate degree of correctness. He called himself cowardly then “Mahmud Tarzi Afghan” anyway. All Afghan ethnonationalists with strong chauvinist tendencies named themselves “Afghan” for the distinctive hierarchical reasons of Pushtun ethnic supremacy.

The absolutist regent Hashem Mohammadzai, the cold-blood despot ruler, arriving from British Raj/India, with Hindi his primary languages, had established and institutionalized the Afghan ethnonationalism, focused also on ethnolinguistic components, even though he was not speaking and writing this very Afghan language with an adequate degree of correctness. In this rapid paced and intensive process of Afghanization *افغانی سازی* of the country and the state, Hashem Mohammadzai initiated, after his five months stay in Hitler Fascism Germany, a multiple level process of discourse formation in favor of “Afghanism” *افغانیسم* and its core product, namely “Afghanyat” *افغانیت*. A first step was the forced and violent nationalization of “Afghani language” *زبان افغانی* via an official and royal edict, second step was to allocate, hence the usage, of the term “Afghan” *افغان* for *all inhabitants* of the country, third step was the foundation of the “Afghan academy” *اکادمی افغان* that was the ultimate manifestation of the Afghan ethnonationalism on institutional level.

To the best of our knowledge, our research article is the first ever that publishes this specific evidence-based findings with this degree of precision. There has been, to our knowledge, no other scientific paper to date that dealt explicitly and implicitly with this highly focused research questions and this pivotal research results. We may introduce the discipline of “precision analytics of history”<sup>42</sup>.

## Interpretation and contextualization of the main finding

Two newcomers arrive in a country both do not know. Both have experienced basically different life in other countries and empires. Both lived in best economic conditions provided by the two imperial bureaucracies of British Raj/India and Ottoman imperium, respectively.

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<sup>42</sup> Badakhshi, H, (2024), speech and presentation on 23rd May 2024 in Berlin.

Mahmud Big Tarzi was born in 1865 in Ghazni in times of Ameer Sher Ali Mohammadzai within the realm of the Dar ul-Sultana Kabul or kingdom of Kabul. His father Ġolām Moḥammad Khan, a rich businessman and poet, had to leave the kingdom of Kabul in 1882 (not 1881 as stated usually), forced by the new king Abdur Rahman, who was imported from Bukhara of Turkestan and installed by the British government. The Tarzi family, Sardars of Kandahar by the Afghan tribal classification, forced out because of tribal conflicts, had to travel to Damascus in the Ottoman Empire<sup>43</sup>. Mahmoud Big was 16 years old. They stayed twenty years there. Mahmoud became a polyglot well educated noble young man, conditioned and educated as a young Turk. His primary language became Ottoman Turkish, Arab and French were his second languages. Parsi, somehow seemed to be his tertiary language, as you read the unusual idiom, he was using in Saraj al-Akhbar after 1911. A language he was unable to speak or to write was the Afghan language, that language he wished the majority of non-Afghan people to learn for the sake of ethnolinguistic Afghan nationalism. It did not work.

Hashem Mohammadzai was born in Dehra Dun in Northern India in 1884. His father Mohammad Yusuf was exiled with his own father Yahya Khan and family in 1879 to Dehra Dun in India. Hashem was raised in British education system there. They stayed till 1901 there. Mahmoud became a well educated noble young man, conditioned and educated as a young colonialized Indian man. Hashem arrived with 16 back in Kabul. Parsi, somehow seemed to be his second language after Hindi. A language he was not good at, was the Afghan language, that language he forced most non-Afghan people to learn by policing and imprisonment in case they did not so. It did not work.

It is intriguing and ridiculous that the dictator himself, called “the Hashem hizak” (hizak for eunuch) by the Kabul inhabitants that tend to a specific style of humor, was not able to speak the Afghan language to what he forced large parts of the population. Worse, the dictator spoke Parsi with a strong Indian accent because he was born in India, raised by British colonial officers in Dehra Dun, the city built for training of espionage and intelligence. It is weird to know that someone forced the majority<sup>44</sup> of inhabitants that had been and are to date non-Afghan country natives like Hazaras, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Aimaqs, Nuristani, Turkmen, Balushs, Pashais, Sadat/Arab etc, despite his own very inability to speak the Afghan language in a proper way, or write it as expected from an Afghanistanism-driven ethnonationalist.

For the proper contextualization of the matter, we discuss in the following an article of Tufts University’s professor Elisabeth Leake who is the Lee E. Dirks Professor in Diplomatic History and Associate Professor of History at the Fletcher School. She states “the history of language within Afghanistan is rich. Persian (known also as Farsi...) was Afghanistan's chief administrative and political language for centuries, while Pashto had a long literary tradition in South Asia, with extant texts from the sixteenth century. Pashto speaking became affiliated with “Afghan” identity in South Asia by at least the fifteenth century, leading to subsequent centuries in which being “Afghan” was often synonymous with being Pashtun”<sup>45</sup>. She interprets the conditions of possibility for the Afghan ethnonationalism with a microscopic attention to details, the method I prefer too. She writes further “in the early twentieth century, state leaders increasingly sought to reconcile the label “Afghan” and its Pashtun

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<sup>43</sup> A short glance on his life in Encyclopedia Iranica <https://iranicaonline.org/articles/tarzi-mahmud>

<sup>44</sup> Gregorian, A. (1967)

<sup>45</sup> Leake, E. (2023) Constitutions and Modernity in Post-Colonial Afghanistan: Ethnolinguistic Nationalism and the Making of an Afghan Nation-State.

connotations with embodying all those living within the state's geographical perimeter. The 1923 constitution made no mention of language or ethnicity but confirmed that “all persons residing in the Kingdom of Afghanistan ... are considered to be subjects of Afghanistan.” This foregrounded, in state leaders’ perspective, the primacy of a shared locational history in determining citizenship and national belonging. As it was shown in results section, she states that “Tarzi exhorted Afghan readers of the need for national unity and a shared love of homeland (watan). He also advocated learning Pashto, describing Persian as Afghanistan's official language but Pashto as its “national” one, declaring, “A nation will not survive without its language and a language will not survive without its literature.” Amanullah and his supporters followed in Tarzi's footsteps. The king, while not a Pashto speaker himself, supported new Pashto societies and institutions, particularly around Kandahar, using Pashto-language literary publications to legitimate the Afghan state.”<sup>46</sup> She describes the time period between Tarzi Afghani’s emergence and the manifestation of Hashem Mohammadzai despotism, as follows “ethnolinguistic nationalism proved a source of continuity during and after the downfall of Amanullah and the rise of the Musahiban dynasty under Nadir Shah (1929–33). Nadir Shah's government, as well as ambitious Afghan intellectuals around Kabul and the eastern provinces, expanded upon many of Amanullah's initiatives. The king established the Anjoman-i-Adabi (Literary Society) to promote Persian and, more specifically, Pashto language and literature, alongside Afghan culture... Nadir Shah and his successors co-opted Pashto-speaking intellectuals, who participated in *musha’ira*, poetic exchanges, to present and praise the ruling family and their government. State-backed intellectuals sought to rewrite the history of Pashto”<sup>47</sup> and “in this regard, attempts by some Afghan elites and the ruling family to define Afghanistan in terms of an ethnolinguistic nationalism were unsurprising, and the choice to focus on Pashto as an indigenous language and one affiliated with a large Pashtun community (including the ruling dynasty) was even less so. Nadir Shah, his successor Zahir Shah (1933–73), their kinsmen, and many government advisors saw Pashtun nationalism as a tool to assert their legitimacy.”<sup>48</sup>

To contextualize it for the first instance, we must know that “in order to consolidate their monopoly on power and to mobilize people around their internal and external policies in a changing world, the Musahiban rulers transformed Pashtun nationalism into a collective national ideology.” As Faridullah Bezhan states in his 2017 article<sup>49</sup>.

Professor Leake states furthermore that “Pashtun ethnolinguistic nationalism manifested in several ways. The government declared Pashto the official language of Afghanistan in 1936, attempting to force Pashto-language schooling across Afghanistan. The government mandated that all civil servants and military officials learn Pashto. Meanwhile, the titles of some journals and publications were switched to Pashto (although much content remained in Persian) to further express the state's backing for Pashto and its implicit Afghan-ness. As Prime Minister Hashim Khan told to a Swiss reporter in 1937, “our legends and our poems will be understood by everyone. We shall draw from them a pride in our culture of the past which will unite us.”<sup>50</sup> Unfortunately and interestingly, the turn to Afghan ethnonationalism by the

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<sup>46</sup> *ibid*

<sup>47</sup> *ibid*

<sup>48</sup> *ibid*

<sup>49</sup> Bezhan, F. (2017)

<sup>50</sup> Leake, E. (2023) *ibid*.

royal family did not translate into more speakers of Afghani language in the same Afghan royal court. The project of Afghanistanization was born dead.

In year 1937, Hashem Mohammadzai, the cold-blood despotic ruler, gave an interview to Ella Maillart, a reporter of Journal of The Royal Central Asian Society (Volume 27, 1940 - Issue 2), in which he states "our legends and our poems will be understood by everyone. We shall draw from them a pride in our culture of the past which will unite us."<sup>51</sup> I will add that exactly this is the nonsensical core of Hashem's statement, because he by himself never understood Afghan legends and poems because of the lack of language skills stemming from his Indian upbringing and education. He even rarely understood the vox populi in Kabul and somewhere else. The Afghan dictator says much more in this paradoxical interview that took place after his return from his five months stay in Hitler's Berlin.

Hashem states "then, again, who knows if our mountain climate which is so harsh may not give us a common character, as in Switzerland, independently of race? Then you have mentioned Pushtu... From next year it is to become the language of our officials, doing away with Persian."<sup>52</sup>

To put this statement in an adequate and comprehensive civilizational context of long durée, Parsi<sup>53</sup> (or Farsi, Persian in English/Persan in French/Persa in Spanish/Portuguese, Persiano in Italian) has been the lingua franca<sup>54</sup> in the Persianate worlds for the last millennium, to say the least. The Persianate world from extended from Balkan to Bangal, and from Southern Russia to the coasts of the Indian Ocean. It contained in its civilizational nucleus of course of Persia (renamed to Iran in 1935), today's Afghanistan (emerged as a new colonial construct late in 1896<sup>55</sup>, substantially of Central Asia lands (to this date, the new soviet republics Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan ) as well explicitly of India<sup>56</sup> (from 1025 AD, Delhi Sultanat till Moghul empire 1526 till 1857<sup>57</sup>, British colonialism, after 1947 division to three countries as India and East and West Pakistan), and it extended to far East Asia, China<sup>58</sup>, Russian lands<sup>59</sup>, Caucasus and relevant parts of Ottoman empire, till Balkans. The language Parsi has been a lingua franca and a shared sphere of cultural experiences<sup>60</sup>.

Hashem's statements on "doing away with Persian" is the result of a totalitarian fascist ideology, to what he tended as an authoritarian absolutist regent and dictator, stemming from the Afghan Barekzai tribe's Mohammadzai clan. He imported the main streams of pseudo-scientific ideas principally from Hans

, a totalitarian fascist historian<sup>61</sup>, positioned by the fascist Führer Adolf Hitler himself onto the chair of history at the university of Jena in Fascist Germany in 1934. We remember that Hashem stayed five months in Hitler's Berlin and was educated in demagoguery and skills for

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<sup>51</sup> Afghanistan Rebirth: An Interview H.R.A. Hashim Khan in 1937. Journal of the Royal Asian Society, 27:2, (April 1940), P. 224

<sup>52</sup> ibid

<sup>53</sup> Kia, M. (2020), Jabbari, A. (2023), Green, N. (2019)

<sup>54</sup> Multiple articles in Green, N. (2019), see references 45-50.

<sup>55</sup> Badakhshi, H. (2024)

<sup>56</sup> Eaton, RM, (2019), India in the Persianate Age, University of California Press

<sup>57</sup> Encyclopaedia Britannica, Oxford Research Encyclopedias

<sup>58</sup> Ford, G (2019), Brophy, D. (2019)

<sup>59</sup> Bustanov, A (2019)

<sup>60</sup> Amanat, A., Asharafi, A. (2018) The Persianate World: Rethinking a Shared Sphere.

<sup>61</sup> Hans Günther in „Deutsche Biographie“. See reference in No. 55 his main text inducing an Afghan-style fascism in the ruling Mosaheban family of Mohammadzai clan of the Afghan Barekzai tribe

dictatorship. It seemed that his “deutsche Erwachsenenbildung” (in English: German adult education) resulted in first instance into a genocidal concept of “doing away with Persian”. However, it did not work.

Jonathan Lee writes in his opus magnum “Afghanistan, A history from 1269 to the present” of 2018<sup>62</sup> on Mosaheban family and Pushtun nationalism that “Muhammad Da’ud and Muhmmad Na’im. Actievely promoted closer ties with the Third Reich.”<sup>63</sup>

Sympathy with Hitler’s Germany, he writes, “and National Socialism ran deep within the ruling elite, due in part to the government’s active promotion of Pushtun nationalism, which was increasingly conflated with ideas of racial and cultural superiority and Aryanism. One reason for the adoption of this more hard-edged version of Tarzi’s Afghaniyya was an attempt by the Musaheban to appeal to its primary support base, the Pushtun tribes of the Afghan Indian frontiers.”<sup>64</sup> He writes further that “the government took its version of Pushtun nationalism to the illogical conclusion and decreed Pushtu henceforth to be the only official language of Afghanistan.”<sup>65</sup> In this specific context, we never mentioned Zaher Shah, the king of Afghanistan. Despite his intronization as the king after the assassination of his father Nader Shah on 8<sup>th</sup> November 1933, he was an absentee beyond ceremonies and symbolic acts. The power has always been in the body of Hashem, the stepbrother of Nader Shah and Zaher’s step uncle. Amin Saikal wrote in his book “Modern Afghanistan” of 2004 with an anecdotic manner that the “domineering and dictatorial Hashim... made sure that Zahir remained a figurehead for a long time to come”<sup>66</sup> He continues “His (Hashem’s) efforts at isolating Zahir were so successful that at one stage the King had to seek his uncle’s permission and advice for almost everything, including when and where to hunt or to eat.”<sup>67</sup> So far, professor Saikal describes on a detailed level the weird dichotomy of Zaher and his step uncle, the regent. And he leaves out, due to the anecdotic style of storytelling, the character and the very ideologic nucleus of Hashem’s attitude. The traditional historiography is unable to grasp traces of discourses and effects of ideology as such, so does professor Saikal. He does not understand the genocidal connotation of Hashem’s “doing away with Persian and its consequences, till today. And of course, there is the format of storytelling of many Western high experts with no clue at all. For instance, Ralph H. Magnus (joint with Eden Naby), who made an economically well-paid practical endeavor in Kabul during the last republic. He writes on this period of Hashem’s absolutist despotism, while calling him an iron-fisted uncle, “the proliferation of newspapers and journals...nonetheless allowed for the impassioned exchange of ideas among Kabul elites on the problem of modernization and the relationship of Islam to society and the individual as well as Islam and modernization.”<sup>68</sup> The traditional historiography is unable to grasp traces of discourses and effects of ideology as such, so does professor Magnus, too.

Today in 2024, the extremist Taleban militia, another Afghan ethnonationalist group, made of 90% Afghans, thus Pushtuns, ruling in Afghanistan, attempt to “doing away with Persian”. The structural similarities between Hashemian despotism, an Afghan ruler against all other

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<sup>62</sup> Lee, J, (2018). See for details reference No. 35.

<sup>63</sup> ibid

<sup>64</sup> Ibid

<sup>65</sup> ibid

<sup>66</sup> Saikal, A. (2004)

<sup>67</sup> ibid

<sup>68</sup> Magnus and Naby (2002), this book is certainly one example for the worse Western adepts attempt to publish on Afghanistan. Read it and enjoy the maximization of Western nonsense.

people living in the country, all non-Afghans, and the terrorist Taleban militia is intriguing. The Taleban tyranny, infra structured by their version of Afghan ethnonationalism, seems to have explicitly the identical goals of Tarzi Mohammadzai (1913-1928) and Hashem Mohammadzai (1933-1953) of puritanic ethnic supremacy of Afghans über alles<sup>69</sup>.

## Conclusion

Our research method would be called “precision analytics of history”. We attempted to find a precise and concise answer to the primary questions, what caused the Afghan, thus Pushtun, ethnonationalism in the country Afghanistan. A country named after one ethnic group. We found the answer by a systematic approach in which we perform a systematic literature review, gathering all relevant data and information into a database. The next step was to scrutinize and to analyze the database. During this phase of the study, at least two additional inquiries emerged. Driven by the sheer density of the data and information.

Mahmud Tarzi Afghan, the diplomat and intelligentsia, arriving from Ottoman kingdom with Turkish as his primary language, had initiated the Afghan ethnonationalism, focused with ethnolinguistic components, even though he was not speaking and writing this very Afghan language with an adequate degree of correctness. He was the initiator for an ethnolinguistic nationalistic movement that induced a chain of catastrophes and disasters, especially against the non-Afghan majority in the country. And it lasts till today and the terror of Taleban is a consequence.

The absolutist regent Hashem Mohammadzai, the cold-blood despotic ruler, arriving from British Raj/India, with Hindi/English his primary languages, had established and institutionalized the Afghan ethnonationalism, focused also on ethnolinguistic components, even though he was not speaking and writing this very Afghan language with an adequate degree of correctness. In this rapid paced and intensive process of Afghanization *افغانی سازی* of the country and the state, Hashem Mohammadzai initiated, after his five months stay in Hitler Fascism Germany, a multiple level process of discourse formation in favor of “Afghanism” *افغانیسم* and its core product, namely “Afghanyat” *افغانیت*. A first step was the forced and violent nationalization of “Afghani language” *زبان افغانی* via an official and royal edict, second step was to allocate, hence the usage, of the term “Afghan” *افغان* for *all inhabitants* of the country, third step was the foundation of the “Afghan academy” *اکادمی افغان* that was the ultimate manifestation of the Afghan ethnonationalism. He was the main promotor, while Tarzi was just the initiator, for the ethnolinguistic nationalism that induced a chain of catastrophes and disasters, especially against the non-Afghan majority in the country. And it lasts till today and the terror of Taleban is a consequence.

The consequences of the Afghan ethnonationalism were bloody, disastrous, ferocious, obscene and deadly for millions of people, especially for non-Afghan majority.

To my knowledge, this is the first time in modern Afghanistan historiography, be it from the country or from other authors. be it in this century or in the last century, that the primary scientific question and additionally secondary questions have been answered, as precise and evidence-based as possible. The evidence is unique in its meaning and consequences.

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<sup>69</sup> “Über alles” is part of the main fascist parole of “Deutschland über alles” (English: Germany above all)

I find that the discussions around this issue and this term, which has been astonishingly fuzzy, inductive, imaginative in its linguistic aspects, and simultaneously, violent and imperative in its social functioning, might ultimately have an end.



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