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همه حقوق نشر، تکثیر و الگو برداری این اثر به «پژوهشکده طاهر بدخشی» تعلق میگیرد

Consequences of the Afghan Despotism, the Case of Hashem Khan

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Introduction

There is an evident and deep gap of factual and reproducible scientific knowledge in the historiography of Afghanistan about the precise role of the Mosaheban family in their 49 years political ruling between October 1929 to April 1978. Observed from a structural analytical lens and referring to the evidence published by the court of the Mosaheban family itself, two individuals played a pivotal role and decisive function in this temporal projection. First, Hashem Khan and second, and not only by chance in family's scope, his nephew Daud Khan, both from of Mohammadzai clan of the Afghan Barezai tribe. Both special individuals, by evidence: the uncle, a dry, affectless, catatonic and emotionally neutralized, cold blood killer, and highly brutal Mohammad Hashem, and the nephew, this weird, ferrous and vicious, compulsive and emotionally bold, cold blood killer, and highly brutal Mohammad Daud. Both were having a determining role for the sake of power dynamics and formation of a regime of despotism materialized by themselves, respectively. In this article, the epistemic focus would be on "Hashemian despotism"¹, a term recently introduced in 2023 by this author based on certain logical premises for the sake of correct classification and mandatory categorization of historic events and related durable processes, formative institutions and power discourses.

The two questions are specific, explicit and transparent, there is no ambivalence or ambiguity in it, and it is addressing a real-world issue for millions of folks in the country with the current name "Afghanistan", either directly in terms of ideological effects produced by the Hashemian despotic regime or indirectly in terms of identity politics for almost a hundred years:

- 1- What would be the consequences of Afghan despotism of Hashemian typology after its full implementation till 1942, starting subtly in 1935, and after its sustainable institutionalization until 1953, within the 20th century in Afghanistan?
- 2- What exactly was nature of the ideological intertwining of those constitutive elements of the Hashemian despotism, a regime personified in the persona of Hashem; with the constitutive ideology of German Fascism, interpolated and converged in the persona of Adolf Hitler?

Some research has been carried out in the last years on this specific field. But the questions asked were not specific, never explicit, hardly transparent, persistently ambivalent and essentially ambiguous, ignoring, in almost all cases, the real need of large number of country's populations, neglecting the in-depth intentions of those who have been asking these questions.

And of course, one was witnessing a deeper typus of omnipresent but well-covered violence.

¹ Badakhshi, H, 2023, "Oriental despotism revisited, the notion of "Hashemian despotism"", November 5th, 2023, Conference: Bringing Afghanistan into the Scale, Oxford University in UK.

Hence structural violence² and at the peak of all power relate phenomena a pluripotent format of law-generated violence³, that effected many realms of life of the people and as it was practiced in the 20th century by the ruling family of Mosaheban between 1929 and 1978. The question asked in this specific context is, thus, not merely an academic, reductive and theoretical issue but a social, political and cultural urgency for today's understanding of polity, identity and history.

The precise question asked in this focused constellation is, thus, not in need to be generalized, compared generally, and embedded in general theoretical mosaics. It is specific to Afghanistan, it is completely and generally ignored by all, with no exception, Western experts and adepts, hence it needs, ultimately, an autochtone intrinsic perspective.

Multiple power discourses appeared in the period we will name "Hashemian despotism", a term that was introduced by Dr. Harun Badakhshi in November 2023 at the Oxford Afghanistan conference for the first time⁴. The order of discourses⁵ had been arranged around a single individual, functioning as an epicenter, conditioning his Mohammadzai clan of the Afghan Barezai tribe for the sake of an ideology that guaranteed real political, juridical military, administrative and educative power and, of course, unimaginable material wealth for the Afghan Mosaheban family. And ultimately, a next unavoidable question: which characteristics might this nomen contain, to be a valid proposition in terms of formal logic. We refer in this text to who, what and which of the "Hashemian despotism" in the frame of a specific scientific concept (C1), positioning the 3W questions into a precise logical context (C2) and, then one will attempt to capture the very content (C3) of this issue.

A challenging exercise, with no doubt, but a possible option to read history driven by critical analytics, societal structural approaches, and genuine power discourse analysis.

Astonishingly, years of debate in Afghan-Stan (in Parsi precisely: the land of Afghan), frequently heated public disputations and even middle range manifestations in Kabul, seems to be not inductive or provocative enough in order to create a primary scientific question and to initiate a genuine scientific process of finding answers in this seemingly complex matter, that is, as you will read in my research results, not at all complex.

² Judith Butler, 2020, *The Force of Non-Violence: The Ethical in the Political*. Verso NY; Slavoj Žižek, 2007, *Violence: Six Sideways Reflections*, Picador NY; Mann, Michael. 1986. *The Sources of Social Power*, Cambridge University Press; Girard, René, 2005, *Violence and the Sacred*, Continuum London; Widom, C. S., 1989, *The cycle of violence*. *Science*, 244, 160–166; Mark Vorobej, 2016, *The Concept of Violence*, Routledge; Coady, C.A.J. *Violence*, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2023; Robert Fischer, Peter Sloterdijk, Klaus Theweleit, 1994, *Bilder der Gewalt*, Verlag d. Autoren; Peter Sloterdijk, 1994, *Wenn die Gewalt erscheint – Versuch über die Explosivität der Bilder*, TV-show. Peter Sloterdijk, 2006, *Zorn und Zeit*, Suhrkamp, Berlin.

³ Walter Benjamin, 1921, *Kritik der Gewalt*, Online: <https://criticaltheoryconsortium.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Walter-Benjamin-Zur-Kritik-der-Gewalt-1.pdf> (Last access November 2th, 2023)

⁴ Badakhshi, H, 2023, "Oriental despotism revisited, the notion of "Hashemian despotism"

⁵ Foucault, M, (1971), *L'Ordre du discours: La leçon inaugurale de Michel Foucault au Collège de France*, 2 décembre 1970. Ils présente l'hypothèse que dans toute société la production du discours est contrôlée, afin d'éliminer les pouvoirs et les dangers et contenir des événements aléatoires dans cette production. (Wikipaedia)

What is evident, is that it has been an obvious, solid, and manifest epistemic obstacle or, more likely, a large set of obstacles seem to be positioned to inhibit or delay a methodologically certain and secure evidence-based knowledge accumulation on this very issue.

We have conducted a background literature review in June 2024 and refined afterward the research idea and considered new questions emerging on the horizon of contemplations. The consecutive determination of the research methods included the concise identification and precise location of primary and secondary data sources with the mandatory evaluation of the authenticity and accuracy of source materials. A database of plausible and valid sources after the literature review was designed. The result of the endeavor was a thorough and rigorous analysis of the data. Consecutively, was the designing and developing a narrative exposition of the findings at stake.

What constituted the Hashemian despotism would include a large array of academic implications and distinctive methodological criteria that are in need to reveal valid, reproducible, objectively derived and plausible answers for this eminent question people ask themselves.

Method and Material

Our scientific enquiry, in this context, is merely an immediate consequence of restlessness and irritations of intelligentsia, students, literati and academics and, on the other hand, of political activists of the last decade in Afghanistan. They asked the question about the paradox of a despotic regime led by the despotic regent Hashem that, for instance, was naming and labeling a whole a multiethnic, pluricultural, polyphonic land of many people, many cultures, many languages and a long durée, thus a diverse country, after a single “Afghan ethnic group”. They asked and scrutinized the very rationale of imposing a unescapable official duty for all people of the administration to learn the language of his ethnicity, thus “Afghani”, independent of the will, desire and affinities of the people whose mother tongue was not “Afghani” but Parsi (the absolute majority of the country), Uzbeki, Nuristani or Baluchi, as it is the case in a diverse multi-ethnic mosaic of populations of the country. And, of course, the most irritation and disturbing and against any basic human right and valid citizenship rights, was the intentionally act of ignorance of rulers and the violence of the state of converging large-volume state money, tax payer’s and foreign aid money, creating and financing an “Afghan Academy” in the administrative rank and budget of a cabinet ministry for the “cultivation and education” of only one language, “Afghani” (Pushtu) of a single ethnic group, thus his ethnicity, and ignore all those other non-Afghan and highly diverse inhabitants of the politico-juridical entity called Afghanistan.

I use the method of “Precision Analytics of History”, recently proposed in my previous articles.⁶

Our questions seem to be easy to be asked. The corpus of scholarly literature reviewed and read, had to undergo a rigorous structural analysis. The analysis, in its next step, had to be formed and structured to become logically firm, thus scientifically valid. For the sake of the logical structure of the paper, I am working with three premises (P1-3) that might be immediate, explicit and transparent, and make the concept (C1), the context (C2) and, first and foremost the content (C3) comprehensible.

The primary logical premise (P1), well-documented and stable, is that we refer to the country as a politico-juridical unit with the name Afghanistan (Afghan-Stan, the land of Afghan in Parsi). This politico-juridical geographic entity and its very territory we call today as Afghan-Stan, was formally and by international law emerging in the 1890s as a sole entity with its current geographical demarcations and thus its consecutively political borders. In previous scientific article we scrutinize this very issue and elaborated all historical and juridical details related to the birth of Afghan-Stan.⁷

This colonial formation received the official name “Afghanistan”. The legal base for the naming this politico-juridical geographic entity within its determined legal borders, that last till this day, “Afghan-Stan” was an agreement signed on November 12th of the year 1893 between the ruler of the kingdom of Kabul Abdur Rahman, from Mohammadzai clan of the Afghan Barezai tribe (as well Hashem’s “blood”) and the person acting as the Foreign Secretary of British Raj, namely Henry Mortimer Durand in Kabul⁸. Details were reported somewhere else in my article. Worth to note that the demarcation and establishment of a physical border endured till 13th May 1996, as we reported in another recent scientific writing⁹ with the usage of the “Precision Analytics of History” (Copyrights preserved by Harun Badakhshi 2023).

It is important to know that this “name” was not new and has been previously, precisely since 1815, allocated to the lands of Pushtu speaking ethnic tribes of Junubi and Mashreqi on the Northwestern frontiers of British Raj by its colonial official Stuart Elphinstone¹⁰. He writes Afghaunistaun in book 1, made of 6 chapters. In book 2 Elphinstone attempts to construct a pre anthropological account on inhabitants of the region. The author is speculating about the term and about the name “Afghaun” without any knowledge. It is the classical orientalist’s approach: you have no valid information, just speculate. In this case he writes: “The origin...is entirely uncertain; but is, probably modern. It is known to the Afghauns themselves only by the medium of Persian language. Their own name for their nation is Pooshtoon; in the plural, Pooshtauneh. The Berdooraunees pronounce this word Pookhtauneh; whence the name of

⁶ Badakhshi, H. (2024), What caused Afghan ethnonationalism in 20th century. By TBI Academic Press

⁷ Badakhshi, H. (2024). The Birth of Afghanistan. TBI Academic Press

⁸ November 12th, 1893, the agreement was signed in Kabul. Details see adnex.

⁹ Badakhshi, H. (2024). The Birth of Afghanistan. TBI Academic Press

¹⁰ Elphinstone, Mountstuart (1815). An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul, and its Dependencies in Persia, Tartary, and India. London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown. Online: <https://www.loc.gov/item/14015132> (Last access in October 2023)

Pitan, by which the Aufghauns are known in India may probably derived.” (p. 151, Elphinstone 1815). He continues: “they have no general name for their own country; but sometimes apply the Persian in Afghaunistaun. Dr Lyder mentioned the name Pooshtoonkhau, as bearing this sense, but I never heard is used.... The name most generally applied to the whole country by its inhabitants is *Khorassaun...*” (p. 151 Elphinstone 1815)¹¹. “For, on the one hand, the whole of the Afghaun country is not included in the strict limits of Khorassaun; and, on the other, a considerable part of that province is not inhabited by Afghauns.” (p. 152 Elphinstone 1815)¹². Regarding the language of Aghauns, Elphinstone writes “...it will be well to give some account of their language, wish, as I have already mentioned, is called Pushtoo.” (p. 190, Elphinstone 1815)¹³. “The words connected with religion, government, and with science, are mostly introduced from Arabic through the Persian.” (p. 190, Elphinstone 1815). And furthermore “The Afghauns” use the Persian Alphabet, in general to write in Nushk character. As they have some sounds, which are not represented by Persian letters, they express them by adding some points or other marks to the nearest Persian letter.” (p. 191, Elphinstone 1815)¹⁴. As he describes in book 3, chapter 1, on “particular account of Afghaun tribes”, he clearly is referring as to the inhabitants of today’s Pushtun tribes and reflects extensively on the tribal constellation of “Afghaunistaun”, that merely is encompassing the Eastern and Southern part of today’s politico-juridical unit we know today as Afghanistan. Specifically, in the page 325 he notes “The tribes which inhabits the north-eastern part of the Afghaun country, enclosed between the range of Hindoo Coosh, the Indus, the Salt Range, and the range of Solimaun, are comprende in the general name of Berdooraunees, first giving them by Ahmed Shauh.” (p. 325, Elphinstone 1815)¹⁵. It is obvious and comprehensible to anyone that the northern boundary of Afghaunisaun had been Hindoh Kho (or Hindoo Coosh or Hindu Kush) and the North and Central part of the politico-juridical unit with the current name Afghanistan did not belong to it, not in 1815, as the author notes his concepts of Afghaunistaun. Astonishingly to read that the Mohammadzai clan, that determined the fate of the country in 20th century, was containing merely 8000 families at this time, as Elphinstone notes in the page 359 (Elphinstone 1815)¹⁶. The topographic division Elphinstone undertook in his book was based on tribe structures and tribal ruling region, in all his notes, till the page 461, the fact remains unchanged that the North and the West (inhabited by mostly Tajik, Turk speaking and Hazara and Aimaq populations) and broader Central parts (inhabited predominantly by Hazara population) of the politico-juridical unit with the current name Afghanistan did not belong to “Afghaunistaun”, observed by Elphisntone in 1815. In book 5, he describes the “Royal Government of Caubaul” as such.

The main message of Elphinstone’s book of 1815 regarding our focused and marcant scientific question could be summed up as such: Afghaun has been an exogenic ethnonym for

¹¹ ibid

¹² ibid

¹³ ibid

¹⁴ ibid

¹⁵ ibid

¹⁶ ibid

those who call themselves (thus an endogenic ethnonym) Pooshtoon (or Pokhtoon, Pushtun, Pukhtun, Pashtun etc) in 1815 and they do so today. The language of "Afghauns" (Today Afghans) is called by themselves Pooshtoo, Pushtu, Pukhtu, Pakhtu (Today Pashto). The territory of "Afghaunistaun", as received by Elphinstone in 1815, was explicitly the Eastern and Southern part of the kingdom of Kaubaul or Kabool (Today: Kabul) and the vast lands in the North, Central and West of Hindo Koh and Paropamisus was inhabited by other ethnicities than the Afghauns (Today Afghans). The book of Elphinstone of 1815 remained determinant, decisive and formative for the specific imperial discourse for the rest of the 19th century in different levels of actions such as inner-imperial spheres in the British commonwealth, British Raj's communication and writings, and the perception of "Afghaunistan" as a region, of the kingdom of Kabul and its dependencies as a country, and as well for the region and globally. This is a matter of facts.

The revival of the word "Afghan-Stan" in 1893 by Mortimer Durand¹⁷ had specific purposes in terms of sustainable imperial politics of the British Raj in Asia. The teleological line from Stuart Elphinstone (came 1809 to Kaubaul, wrote the book in 1815) to Mortimer Durand¹⁸ (1893 in Kabul) contains its imperial connotation. A connotation that was accompanied by a massive quantity of dead bodies, blood and destruction of native cultures in the area, that will have the name "Afghan-Stan" in the 20th century.

The Afghan Boundary Commission (ABC) terminated its work on May 13th, 1896, with the inscription of a stone pillar in the region of Kohe Malik Siah in the convergence of Persia, British Raj and the new country Afghanistan¹⁹. In terms of local, regional and international law and jurisdictions, as well in 1896 and as today, the new politico-juridical entity of the geographic territory we know today as Afghan-Stan exists since May 13th, 1896.

A new politico-juridical unit of the geographic territory we know today as Afghan-Stand emerged into existence exactly in this time. Not earlier. Hence, we are obliged to accept the fact that the entity exists merely for a century and two and half decades. Facts matter.

And yet, it took at least two decades that the country was evidently named and labeled itself as Afghanistan. This fact is also well documented that during the first two decades of the 20th century, the country was mentioned, declared, named, labeled as "The Dominion of Kabul"²⁰ (Dar el Sultanat-e Kabul) by its own state, run by Habib Saraj from the Saraj family of Mohammadzai clan of Barezai tribe, the son of Abdur Rahman.

¹⁷ Percy Sykes, 1940, A History of Afghanistan, MacMillan & Co, London, online <https://dn790005.ca.archive.org/0/items/historyofafghani031122mbp/historyofafghani031122mbp.pdf> (Last access November 2023)

¹⁸ Percy Sykes, 1926, The Right Honourable Sir Mortimer Durand: A Biography, Cassell and company, London. Online: <https://archive.org/details/dli.csl.8412> (Last access November 2023)

¹⁹ Mc Mohan 1896, Letters on The Baluch Afghan Boundary Commission Of 1896.

²⁰ Books published by the court of Habib Saraj between 1901 and 1919 had been explicitly and implicitly named/labeled the country as "The Dominion of Kabul " (Arabic Parsi: Dar el Sultanata Kabul). hence, the state itself ignored the new status in terms of being named Afghanistan:

1916 الامر اولى كتابجة حسب فرمان جنب نايب السلطنه 1914, مفتاح الصرف مفتاح الصرف 1915, اطاعت
از هر دهن سخني و از هر چمن سمن 1913,

Virtually and factually, the first autochtone intentional and official naming with “Afghanistan” by the Afghan state occurred in the time of reign of Aman Saraj, the son of the previously mentioned Habib Saraj, in April 1923.

The text of the „Nezam Namah Assasi Daulat Alia Afghanistan“ نظامنامه اساسی دولت علیه افغانستان, from 9th April 1923 is accessible²¹, it is parted in brief 73 paragraphs, and beautifully handwritten text with a tirage of 2500 pieces, and with a sinister red cover.

To sum up our primary logical premise (P1), well-documented and stable shown above, is that we refer to the country as a politico-juridical unit with the current name Afghanistan (Afghanistan, the land of Afghan in Parsi) as a new historical product created in a process of institutionalization in 1890s under the reign of Abdur Rahman Mohammadzai Barezai (1880-1901), defined for the first time ever its Southern and Eastern boundary in legally in November 12th of 1893 with a three page agreement with the British Raj (responsible official was Mortimer Durand) and the last border pillar was inserted in May 13th, 1896. This is the moment of the legal, historical, and geographical emergence of Afghanistan as a new country²².

The secondary logical premise (P2), also well-documented and stable, would be that we refer to the evidently despotic rule of two families of the Mohammadzai-clan of the Barezai tribe in the 20th century, up to April 28th, 1978, this is the final day of this dynasty. The Saraj Mohammadzai family with Habib-ullah Saraj (October 1st, 1901, until his assassination by his sons on February 20th, 1919) and Amanollah Saraj (February 28th, 1919, until his escape on January 14th, 1929) was the royal descendent of Abdur Rahman Mohammadzai Barezai (May 31st, 1880, until his death October 1st 1901). After a brief but significant disruption happened by Habib-ullah Kalakani (January 17th 1929 until his escape in October 12th also in 1929), a Parsi speaking Tajik, the clan of Mohammadzai ruled with the family of Mosaheban for 49 years, namely with Nadir Mohammadzai Barezai, who called himself Nader Afghan (October 15th 1929 until his assassination in November 8th 1933), Hashem Mohammadzai Barezai (November 9th 1933 until his death in October 26th 1953), in this time the son of Nader, Zaher Mohammadzai Barezai was nominally and symbolically the king due to the logic of blood genealogy, but with no real power, neither material nor immaterial, in this time period. Since 1946 the function of prime minister underwent a change, Hashem, tired of every day's state business appointed his brother Shah Mahmoud Mohammadzai Barezai (1946-1953) as a prime minister without power, as he determined in 1933 his nephew Zaher to be factually a Mr. nobody but play the theatric role a king, mostly in uniform or in shorts. As well as in a Shakespearean play, the Mosaheban court was in a way, a large-scale theater.

Even a book by Mahmoud Tarzi Afghan with the title “Afghanistan” was published 1912 in the “The Dominion of Kabul”

²¹ The original text of the constitution 1923. Online:

<https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/llscd/2002341382/2002341382.pdf>

²² Badakhshi, H (2024)

Within the 20th century, with focus on the first phase of reign of Saraj family two facts (Content, C3) must be recalled for the proper scientific and formally logical understanding context (C2) and, consecutively, for the apprehension of the constitutive concept (C1) of this paper the grounding concept of the whole project the “Taher Badakhshi Institute” for Social Transformation executed in this on-going academic semester. The Institute published already a cluster of scientific articles on these topoi in recent months. We thematized the history of “Afghanism” as an ideology and its catastrophic consequences, “Afghan ethnonationalism” and its severe consequences by using the method of “Precision Analytics of History” (Copyrights preserved by Harun Badakhshi 2023)²³. Exemplary, the first strike of a “pre-ideologic movement” in the first phase was realized and executed by Mahmud Beg Tarzi Afghani in 1913.

Mahmud Beg Tarzi Afghani was raised in Ottoman Kingdom between 1882 and 1902²⁴, while in exile with his family in-large, the family was called “Sardars of Kandahar”. The Sardars of Kandahar, the Tarzi family, were exiled by the new ruler of the kingdom of Kabul Abdur Rahman Mohammadzai Barezai (reigned 1880-1901). “Mahmud Tarzi, born in 1865, near the tomb of Mahmud Ghaznavi, was named Mahmud by his father, in honor of the King Mahmud of Ghazna. Mahmud Tarzi’s father, Ghulam Mohammad Tarzi (1830-1900), a poet, took the pen name “Tarzi” (the stylist). Ghulam Mohammad Tarzi was son of Rahmdil Khan, an Abdali tribal leader from Kandahar, in receipt of a yearly stipend from Amir Dost Mohammad Khan (1826-1839). He was a renowned poet known to be erudite and outspoken that led his family into exile. During Amir Abdur Rahman’s Kandahar expedition to eliminate his last surviving foe Sardar Ayub, son of Sher Ali Khan (1825-1879), Ghulam Mohammad Tarzi successfully tried to save lives, property of many of his countrymen. Mahmud Tarzi’s father was arrested along with his family for being sympathetic to Sardar Ayub, who lost the battle of Kandahar, in 1880, to Amir Abdur Rahman. After three-month imprisonment in early days of 1882, Tarzi family was deported to the border town of Fort Abdullah (currently in Baluchistan, Pakistan). After a brief sojourn at Karachi, the family traveled to the Ottoman Empire, where they were well received by Sultan Abdul Hamid II, and were allowed to establish residence in Damascus. Exiled at the age of sixteen Tarzi spent most of his time in Damascus and Istanbul, the hotbed of late nineteenth century Muslim reformist activities. Early contact with ‘Young Turk’ writers at Ottoman Empire shaped his social and political thought. Stay abroad, stretched over two decades, had a great impact on the education and thought process of Mahmud Tarzi.”

Mahmud Beg Tarzi Afghani were appointed in 1911 by the King Habib Saraj to direct the state newspaper” Seraj al-Akbar-e Afghaniya” (English: Torch of the news of Afghans, published from October 1911 to December 1918), the second newspaper at all in the Kingdom of Kabul, after Shams al-Nahar”. After establishing the regular printing procedures in Kabul and his cautious behavior encountering the King’s taste, he started his mission soon.

²³ The Institute website: <http://taher-badakhshi-institute.info/research/>

²⁴ Khan, Sarfraz and Afridi, Sharfi, Works of Mahmud Beg Tarzi, The Precursor of Reform in Afghanistan (April 14, 2016). Central Asia Journal No. 62, Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2764841>

Gregorian wrote that Seraj al-Akhbar-e Afghaniyah was the “first successful news medium in modern Afghan history” and it “helped formulate the basic tenets of Afghan nationalism and modernism.”²⁵ Even Dr. Gregorian seemed to be an extraordinary savvy adept in Afghanistan affairs at that time, one of very few, he, still, is mistakenly describes Mahmud Beg Tarzi Afghani’s ideologically driven political actions and ideologically driven monocultural chauvinist activities with the rubric “modernist”, which is astonishing and, of course, highly naive. This is the Westerner’s gaze; time of decolonizing at-large adepts has arrived. And Tarzi, accompanied and driven also by a high degree of naivety, writes “news reporting is a mirror of the world sitting in one’s house, introducing the person to the world and keeping him informed. Even conditions within ones own home and motherland is better depicted and more beautifully received.”²⁶ The operative mode of the mentioned naivety remains, while he beliefs that “at this time, in this century, other than the savage, primitive states and tribes, where there is any existing nation under state governance, there will be strong evidence for national knowledge of writing and reading.”²⁷ And, still in the beginning of his “Afghanization” concept, he formulates in the same text that “as a medium [akhbar], is language, which defends the right against the false, and language has an instrumental ability to distinguish true gold from fraudulent gold.” And in the same text, a weird metaphor: “[news] is like a sharp knife that cuts evil thoughts produced by evil people. It is a shame that there is no medium that can distinguish right from wrong in what people say.”

In one of his articles Mahmud Beg Tarzi Afghani claimed that Afghani was the “ancestor to all Aryan languages” (from today’s perspective: Pashto), this is the title of the article. And more dramatically, in the text, he claims that “the origin of Aryan is Afghanistan”²⁸ (Translated by Badakhshi, 2024). One could imagine that the unlimited naivety and overt simplism of Tarzi would be the cause of this format of statements in a state newspaper. But it is becoming more, not only, ridiculous or ultrachauvinist even in terms of 1912, but it is an antimodernist and explicitly antiscientific tribalism, dangerous and damaging for times to come, as we will witness in 1930s, 1940s till today. Tarzi continues in the same text “the real ancestors of all Aryan groups also is the same Afghan tribe”²⁹

(Translated by Badakhshi, 2024 from (و اجداد اصلی همه فرقه های آریان باز هم خود قوم افغان است.

And as if it was not enough, the reader might not forget this is the leader ideologue of the Barezai tribal state writing, he continues „those small numbers that remained in their origin land, is this Afghan tribe that since that time till today protected their tribe and language ³⁰”

(Translated by Badakhshi, 2024 from

همان مقدار کمی که در وطن اصلی خود باقی مانده بودند همین قوم افغان است که از همان وقت تا به ایندم قومیت و زبان خود را محافظه کردند.)

²⁵ Gregorian, V (1967)

²⁶ Tarzi in: Seraj al-Akhbar, 1, no. 1, 1290 H.S: 1911 A.D., 1.

²⁷ ibid

²⁸ Tarzi, M (1912) in Seraj al-Akhbar, vol. 2, no. 9, Dalw 3, 1291/Jan. 23, 1912.

²⁹ ibid

³⁰ ibid

Shortly afterwards, Tarzi devoted a column in Saraj al-Akhbar to Parsi (Farsi, Persian) and Pashto literature under the epigram “A nation will not survive without its language and a language will not survive without its literature.”

Four years later in the issue of September 12th 1915 of Saraj al-Akhbar, Mahmud Beg Tarzi Afghani published another brief text article under the title “Language and its Importance” in which he explained that “Farsi is the official language of our favored and holy state, and our nationality language is Afghani.”³¹ (Translated by Badakhshi, 2024 from زبان رسمی دولت متبوعه و مقدسه ما زبان فارسی است و زبان ملتی ما زبان افغانی است)

It is to note that the writing style of this member of the “Young Turks” who spent twenty determining and integral years of his life, 16th to 36th age years, in “Ottoman” Syria is just special. Rarely a sentence that fits into the mainstream language of 1910s (or earlier) or into the literary idiom or jargon of 1910s (or earlier). This unfitness of Tarzi’s writing style into the mainstream or literary idiom of his time, would have seemed to be interesting and attractive, it is just not, because the “style” merely demonstrates his inability to write correct Parsi (Farsi, Persian) with a mediocre degree of meaning. The most paradoxical issue is not that he was unable to write correct Parsi (Farsi, Persian) in terms of impossibility of the comprehensibility and logical structure of his sentences, it is, of course, his inability to speak or write the “Afghani” language at all, that language he is propagating as a “national language”. It the Young Turk, Beg Tarzi, who called himself later as Tarzi Afghani, was by ethnic definition from the Afghan tribe of Barezai, the so-called Kandahar Sardars, unable to speak or write Afghani and attempting to force the state’s administration and the country to learn it. He never learnt it. A contradictory moment in the history of this country, the initiator of Afghan ethnonationalism, created much sorrow and pain for the population, especially for the majoritarian non-Afghan population like Hazaras, Uzbeks, Baluchs, Tajiks, Nuristanis, Arabs, Aimaqs etc, was completely unable to speak and write this Afghan language and to write Parsi, that he intended to delete, correctly. It is important to consider these undeniable facts while analyzing the course of the Afghan ethnonationalism in his first steps.

Tarzi will provide in his articles in the period between 1912 and 1915 the ideological substance for a sustainable course of Afghan ethnonationalism³² in years to come. In long term, his “arguments” were used for the renaming of Parsi (Farsi, Farsi dari, Persian) into Dari by the explicitly ethnonationalistic driven and implicitly fascist activists like the former minister Majid Zaboli, the mayor of Kabul Mohammad Farhad and few classic Afghan chauvinists of the “Pushto Tolana”.

For example, he declared further in a weird formulation as explanation that “Farsi is the official state language because the clean soil of our holy land counted as elements of the Iran lands before formation and finding foundation of our holy Afghanyat state and the finding of independency of our nationality regency.”³³

³¹ Tarzi, M (1912) in Seraj al-Akhbar, vol. 5, no. 2, Sonbola 20, 1294 (Sept. 12, 1915).

³² Badakhshi, H (2024) on ethnonationalism and consequences, recently published.

³³ Tarzi, M (1912) in Seraj al-Akhbar, vol. 5, no. 2, Sonbola 20, 1294 (Sept. 12, 1915).

(Translated by Harun Badakhshi, 2024 from

زبان فارسی از این سبب زبان رسمی دولتی ما شده است که قبل از تشکیل و تاسیس یافتن دولت مقدسه افغانیه و استقلال یافتن حاکمیت ملتی ما خاک پاک وطن مقدس ما از اجزای ممالک ایران محسوب بود.

Tough this is the direct and immediate translation of his sentence from Parsi to English, not only the formulation is unintelligible and plainly false in the declination of Parsi verbs and in inscription of words in a sentence.

By historical facts, is the explanation also incorrect. In the context of the Afghan ethnonationalism and its course in the history, Tarzi provides ideological raw material for the adepts of extremist Afghan ethnonationalism in years to come.

Evidently and against all historical scientific knowledge of that time, Tarzi Afghani is claiming in this text of 2015 that the reason of Parsi being the “official” language of the country might be “as elements of the Iran lands”. This is textbook knowledge of 8th grade of a regular school; we will not discuss here. The reason though is not the lack of historical knowledge not the lack of scientific reproducible and falsifiable facts, it is ideology in the making. Ideology is constructing parallel realities and parallel truth. The contribution of Mahmud Beg Tarzi Afghani to the making of the ideology of “Afghanism” is immense. And these citations are the starting point.

Tarzi’s notion that Afghani language (from today’s perspective: Pashto language) is the “nationality language” (زبان ملتی) and not national language, because of his evident inability to write correct Parsi) and should therefore be learned by all the ethnically non-Afghan groups illustrates “how historiography in the hands of Tarzi himself plays a great role in the evaluation of what is inclusive and what is not, Afghan. In fact, as Antonio Gramsci argues in his Prison Notebooks, the attempted imposition of a national language, raised by a small elite, cannot engage the “very different social, class, and geographic conditions” of its people.³⁴ Thus, it is not the language, eo ipso, which is problematic for our purposes, but rather the ideology furnishing it as a universal language in which its formation neglects peoples experiences, feelings and participation in creating meaning. Language and vernacular variations produce different meanings to historical events and ideas.³⁵ Like cultural hegemony itself, language is a process of complex human activity constantly negotiated through simultaneity of coercion and consent.”³⁶

Hyman argues in 2002 that Pashtuns have dominated Afghanistan historically. He calls this domination “internal colonialism” of other ethnic minorities.

³⁴ Ives, P, (2004) Language & Hegemony in Gramsci. Pluto Press; Winnipeg, Fernwood Publishing: 57.

³⁵ Ives, P (2006), Gramsci’s Politics of language: Engaging the Bakhtin Circle & the Frankfurt School University of Toronto Press, 18.

³⁶ Zareie, F. (2010) „The Role of Language in Defining Afghan Nationalism“. Middle Eastern Communities and Migration Student Research Paper Series #1, Building Knowledge in and of Afghanistan.

Therefore, he concludes that “national idea remained very weak” and this was caused by Pashtuns’ ruling class.³⁷ The statements of Hyman present a highly compressed and comprehensive version of the Afghanistan in 20th century.

To sum up our second logical premise (P2), there had been one initiating large-scale attempt, a pre-ideological strike, by Mahmud Beg Tarzi Afghani, a Young Turk, spent 20 years of his decisive formatting youth in Syria (from the age of 16 to 36), unable to write correct Parsi (Farsi, Farsi dari, Persian), creating a new style of writing an incorrect Parsi and making it to a new standard procedure in the media, and, more grave, unable to speak and write the “Afghani language” (from today’s perspective: Pushto language, his mother tongue) at all but promoting its education by state force and by state violence. The making of the ideology of Afghanism starts with Tarzi, he is the initiator. The maturation of the ideology and its uncontrollable violence will lead in 1930s to a regime of despotism by Hashem Mohammadzai, a grandchild of Peshawar Sardars, born in India, and unable to speak and write the “Afghani language” (from today’s perspective: Pushto language, his mother tongue).³⁸

And some notes to the formal aspects of this article: in reference to the rules of standard romanization of Parsi (or Parsi Dari, Farsi, Persian) words into English or any other roman/Latin alphabet in the Western academic disciplines, there might appear a difference in this text. Normally, authors refer to DMG (1969), or ALA-LC (1997), or ALA-LC (1997), BGN/PCGN (1958), and currently more to the UN systematics of 2012. The inherent issues and academic discussions of transliteration and transcription are not the focus of this text. For instance, when I write a name like “Hashem” normally formulated as “Hashim” in the current scholarly literature and press jargon, it is not a complex issue. In Parsi, whatever the Western adepts and academics might guess and think, Hashem will be phonologically pronounced as Ha Sh “e” m, with a mild and weak “e” and not normally formulated with “i” and being sharper and enhanced. This is my decision and all Westerners' rules determining the writing of my language Parsi will be ignored. Consider it as a new step in the process of necessary decolonization of West’s cultural hegemony that had always been ignorant, arrogant and determined.

This is the end.

³⁷ Hyman, Anthony. “Nationalism in Afghanistan.” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 34 (2002), pp. 299-315

³⁸ See also other publications of the “Taher Badakhshi Institute” by TBI Academic Press in 2024.

Research results

We have predefined the research questions: clear-cut, implicit and transparent. We explained our methodology, the previously reflected “Precision Analytics of History”. It is according to the basics of research inquiries in social and historical sciences and all disciplines of humanity in the global south and in the West.

The extensive work-up in reference to our premises (P1-2) has been necessary for the prevention of senseless disputations, and anti-scientific and meaningless phraseology and, especially, in overall disadvantage of extremist ideologues and Afghan demagogues.

The two questions were asked at the beginning of the research program about the ideological effects produced by the “Hashemian Despotism”:

1-What would be the consequences of Afghan despotism of Hashemian typology after its full implementation till 1943 and after its sustainable institutionalization until 1953, within the 20th century in Afghanistan?

2-What exactly was nature of the intertwining of those constitutive elements of the Hashemian despotism, a regime personified in the persona of Hashem; with the constitutive ideology of German Fascism, interpolated and converged in the persona of Adolf Hitler?

Main research findings on the “Afghan despotism of Hashemian typology”

All first-degree historical evidence demonstrates the real constellations of power within the Mosaheban family’s court and state. The structure of power was concentrated around one axis: The mafia family³⁹, especially the two main grand tyrants, Hashem from November 9th 1933, till his suicidal death on October 26th of 1953 and his nephew Daud, factually from October 26th 1953 till his suicidal death on April 28th of 1978. Both starting points I mention are the factual dates of takeover of the despotic scepter, respectively. Hashem had been prime minister since the entrance of the Mosaheban families to Kabul with the aid of “young tribal men”⁴⁰ of the Eastern provinces (Mashreqi) and starting to rule on October 17th 1929 but he merely became “The One and Only”, the absolutist hyper regent, after the mysterious

³⁹ Formed by Yaya Mohammadzai, a Barekzai elderly, his most relevant historical function was to act as the main negotiator of the Gandamak treaty with the British Raj on 26th May of 1879 for economic privileges for his family. His son Yusuf Mohammadzai Barekzai, born in 1855, was living partly in the town of Dehra Dun in India/British Raj, where for instance his oldest son Aziz was born in 1877. This rationale for this desired “exile” is an under-researched field in Afghanistan history.

⁴⁰ Young tribal men (YTM), an anthropological category Dr. Harun Badakhshi proposed 2022 for a specific, large and well-outlined violent group of tribal militias in Eastern and Southern Afghanistan, being operationable for money, privileges, women slaves and material merits, especially for war-like projects of ethnic supremacy of Afghans toward Kabul and the North. On October 13th of 1929 they were looting, stealing, raping and killing in Kabul for three days. Taleban as such has been a reference group of the YTM group in recent history. In November 2023 a large group of YTM is on the way toward the North of Afghanistan, precisely for the same motifs and reasons and for looting, stealing, raping and killing.

assassination of his stepbrother Nader Afghan on November 8th 1933 at the royal palace Delkoshah. Surprisingly, Hashem was at the day of assassination of his stepbrother absent “because of traveling”, as we read four day later in governments’ official newspaper “Eslah”, right on 12th November 1933⁴¹. He explains in an open letter on the first site of “Eslah” that he is declaring his allegiance to the late king’s son Zaher. He was, astonishingly (or may not) absent in all relevant historical days during his absolutist reign of two decades “because of traveling” or “health issues”. He stayed four more days after the “spontaneous assassination” in Maimana and Mazar in the North, despite the large-scale crisis that happened again. His older (maternal) brother Mohammad Aziz was assassinated on June 6th 1933, in Berlin by Said Kamal under paradoxical circumstances.

Michel Foucault noticed in his text “les mots and les choses” of 1966, a function of the “essential void”, in analogy, I would propose for understanding the underlying structures of the Hashemian despotism (Badakhshi 2023), the term essential absence for his eloquent and practice-oriented strategy of action in polity. The real-world functioning of power structure in regard to institutions and processes on the level of military (and police and intelligence), economy (and political economy of deletion and detention other players than the family), administration (raw violence, oppression of non-Afghans within the state apparatus) and education (propaganda, lies, and systematic disinformation in schools and madrasas) was explicitly determined by Hashem⁴², the first tyrant who became a sort of “prime minister” (rather in an archaic mode than a modern time PM) at the end of October of the year 1929, but enhanced its absolutist power in November 8th 1933 after the assassination of his step brother Nader Afghan by remaining a “prime minister”⁴³ by official labeling, cum the regent of his Nader’s son and successor Zaher, at this time 19 years old, immature. This regency has been, by all available first-degree evidence, published by official publications and published and unpublished archive materials, an absolutist modus operandi power exertion of a single person with the complacency of the family. The especial effect in this theatric scenery was the focus of Hashem’s efforts to generate his own “natural” successor Daud, his nephew, son of his older maternal brother Aziz⁴⁴ and Naim, younger brother of Daud. Both became the

⁴¹ Eslah, 12th November 1933, Nr. 83 (عقرب ۱۳۱۲ خورشیدی)

⁴² Mohammad Hashem, born in Dehra Dun in British Raj/India in 1884, educated in British India by British teachers until 1900, after 1901: military training at Sar Saros in British Raj 1904-1907, Lt-Gen 1917, governor of Herat 1917-1919, Jalalabad 1919-1920, and of Nangahar 1920-1921, minister for war 1921, governor of Mashreqi (Eastern Province) 1919-1923, envoy to the USSR 1924-1926, prime minister 1929-1933, nominally prime minister 1933-1946, the absolutist regent 1933-1953. Suicidal death in Kabul, on 26th October 1953.

⁴³ The new cabinet was announced on November 27th, 1933. Seven ministers, all the inner circle of the Mohammadzai clan, especially Mohammad Gul Momand as the new interior minister to whom I would allocate the attribute “The Practitioner” (Badakhshi 2023, paper at Oxford university’s conference) and who executed Hashem’s absolutisms into the practice. News: Eslah Nr 5, November 27, 1933 (the government’s official propaganda medium)

⁴⁴ Mohammad Aziz, elder maternal brother of Hashem, born also in Dehra Dun in British Raj/India in 1877. educated in British Raj by British teachers until 1900, after 1901: assist. secretary to the ruler of the dominion of Kabul Habibullah Saraj, minister for foreign affairs 1917-1919, exiled to Europe by Ammanhollah Saraj in 1921, “inspector of Afghanistan Scholars” in Europe 1921-1926, envoy to the USSR 1929-1932, and Germany 1932-1933. Killed in Berlin Germany on June 6th, 1933, by a former student with the name Said Kamal.

favorites of the regent. Daud arrived with Zaher, son of the king Nader Afghan, in 1930 in Kabul from France where he lived since 1924 with his cousin Zaher. We will publish another article on Daud despotism.

Hashem established himself in November as the new ruler of Afghanistan.

Research revealed further that Hashem Mohammadzai from the Mosaheban family revived the core of the Afghan ethnonationalism's driven ideology, namely "Afghanism" افغانستانيسم and its core product, namely "Afghanyat" افغانستانيت after 1935. At this time, he already had established the absolutist despotism that will last till his death in 1953.

In this context (C2), we reflect the best available evidence and undertaking a brief interpretation by the means of mirroring our concept (C1) based on real-life content (C3).

- A- After the establishment of his regency, one of very first decrees of Hashem Mohammadzai was to build up a new prison in Deh Mazang.⁴⁵ This was announced and presented by four images in the Almanach of Kabul from 1935.
- B- Eslah, the official publication of the despotic Hashem regime, published on 4th November 1936 an official royal decree about the duty of non-Afghan adults and especially for coworkers of the government and state, to learn "Afghani language" زبان افغانی⁴⁶. This official and royal edict was mandatory and therefor was policed. The segment of non-Afghan population was at that time the absolute majority of inhabitants in 1936, as it is today in 2024. They had been forced by police and even intelligence to learn the "Afghani language" زبان افغانی of the ruling class of the Afghan Mohammadzai clan. This royal edict contains following: All adults working in government and state, civil servants and army, must learn the Afghani language within three years. They must learn this "national language", otherwise they will be sanctioned by the government. For the first time the term "Pushtu" appeared in the short text in Eslah No. 76 and the term "national language" too, a language that all servants must learn and use in writing and oral communication. The decision was abruptly and without any precautions announced in Eslah Nr. 76, government's official propaganda medium, and implemented rigorously and violently by the order of one man, the absolutist ruler Hashem. And it is not unimportant to know that Hashem Mohammadzai, the principal promotor of the violent and bloody Afghan ethnonationalism and of the Afghanism ideology, was himself unable to speak the "Afghani language" زبان افغانی in a proper way, with less ability to write it. And, of course, he forced a large part of the population, namely non-Afghans, to learn it.
- C- Research reveals that the allocation and assignment hence the usage of the term "Afghan" افغان for *all inhabitants* of the country, namely the politico-juridical entity

⁴⁵ Mehrin, N (2012) https://www.kabulnath.de/Salae_Hashtoum/Shoumare_174/nasir%20mehrini.html,

Online catalogue: <https://catalog.acku.edu.af/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=3182>

⁴⁶ Eslah Nr 76, November 4th, 1936 (the government's official propaganda medium)

with the name Afghanistan, was implemented for the first time ever on March 14th, 1937⁴⁷.

This official royal edict was formulated during the absolutist despotic reign of Hashem Mohammadzai Barezai. It has been shown that there were no public discussions, neither disputations within the Hashem government nor any hearings before national counsel prior to the announcement of this edict. We did not find any evidence of a public or intra-governmental survey for the announcement of this decision. The decision was abruptly and without any precautions announced in Eslah Nr. 180, government's official propaganda medium, and implemented rigorously and violently by the order of one man, the absolutist ruler Hashem. I wrote an extensive and evidence-based article on this topic recently.⁴⁸

D- Research reveals that in the process of Afghanization *افغانی سازی* of the absolutist despotic reign of Hashem Mohammadzai Barezai, a next step was undertaken to complete the Afghan ethnonationalism's totalitarianism. The foundation of an "Afghan Academy" *اکادمی افغان* by the regime. This event took place on 20th April 1937⁴⁹. The core idea was, again, and in the very identical ideological stream of Afghan ethnonationalism's recent activisms, the spread of "Afghani language" *زبان افغانی* with corresponding literature and linguistics.

This academy changed its name slightly fast after its foundation to "Pashto Tolana" *پشتو تولنه*, this nominal change was related to a simultaneous ideological process that one might call the "Pashtunization" of the Afghan populations in the country. This notion contained three evident components: First, it had to change the minds of Afghan folks to suggest that they might call themselves Pushtuns (Pashtuns, Pakhtun) and not any more Afghan.

Afghan has been the exogenic ethnonym Parsi speaking rulers and at a certain time British colonial authors gave them. Afghan has been the exogenic ethnonym Parsi speaking rulers and at a certain time British colonialists gave them. And because the term should have been applied and allocated to all inhabitants of the country. A weird and unintelligible construct the protagonists of Afghan ethnonationalism were attempting to execute.

Second, it had to change the minds of Afghani language speaking folks to suggest that they might call their language Pushtu (Pashto, Pakhtu) and not any more Afghani. Afghani has been the exogenic allocation Parsi speaking rulers and at a certain time British colonialists gave to their language.

Third, it had to change the minds of all inhabitants of the country to suggest them

⁴⁷ Eslah Nr 180, November 14th 1937 (the government's official propaganda medium)

⁴⁸ Badakhshi, H. (2024). Who Can Be Called an "Afghan". TBI Academic Press. See references section.

⁴⁹ Sal Nahma Kabul 1937 *سال نامه کابل* ۱۳۱۶, website of Afghanistan Science Academy <https://asa.gov.af/en/history> (last access May 2024), in one part of this Almanac the deputy of society explains the goals highly detailed.

that all people living in the country must call themselves from now “Afghan” and that Pushtu is a national language and more important than Parsi. Another paradox and irrational decision the regent Hashem Mohammadzai and his court made.

Main research findings on “Hashemian despotism and Hitlerian Fascism”

The unique historical case of an “oriental despotism”⁵⁰ in a country of global South, a prototypical “frontier state”, constructed virtually in 1890s as a colonial buffer zone between British Raj and Zarian Russia, with an ethnic name, “Afghan-Stan”, was explained in former chapter. We explored the process of initiation, establishment and petrification of the “Hashemian Despotism” in some examples, a regime run by one man, build up and functioning as a family business, and its respective dependent lackeys in the army, police and intelligence. We may recall that Hashem was an absolute colonial product, born in British Raj/India’s Dehra Dun. Dehra Dun had been constructed and constituted by the British Raj as a military garrison place and the center of the colonial Intelligence agency. He was raised and educated in the epicenter of British Raj’s army, police and intelligence training and education center. His explicit anglophone attitude and worldview and his implicit anglophile ideology was the rationale for his splendid career during the Saraj family’s reign after 1901.

What makes this narrative more striking and peculiar, is indeed the also unique intertwining of the Hashem regime with the German fascism of Adolf Hitler. We here merely reflect the facts and attempt not to interpret those striking facts.

As we narrated the story of the takeover of the power on 9th November 1933 after the assassination of his Stepbrother Nader on 8th November 1933 in the royal palace “Arg” (in front of the “Delkoshah Palace” in the Arg compendium) as a regent. From this day till his suicidal death in Kabul, on 26th October 1953, he remained the absolute ruler, as we know from Fascist Franco’s Spain or Fascist Mussolini’s Italy in these very times. The story of Afghan (tribal) fascism, created by Hashem, converted to a full Germanophile one, is unique in all its details. We here merely revisit the objective facts.

In this context (C2), we reflect the best available evidence and undertaking a brief interpretation by the means of mirroring our concept (C1) based on real-life content (C3).

A- Eslah, the official publication of the despotic Hashem regime, published on 4th November 1936⁵¹, reported that the regent had been traveling on 3rd November from Kabul to Berlin.

⁵⁰ Wittvogel, A (1957). *Oriental Despotism; a Comparative Study of Total Power*. New Haven: Yale University Press

⁵¹ Eslah, 1936, Nr 76, November 4th (the government’s official propaganda medium)

- B- Eslah, the official publication of the despotic Hashem regime, published on 8th March 1937⁵², reported that the regent had been traveling back on 6th March from Berlin to Bombay/India and a day later to Kabul.

The population was informed by the two Eslah-publication that the regent (aka prime Minister) of the country had been four months in Fascist Germany. This is, as one recalls, at the height of German fascism including killings fields and concentrations camps (Dachau etc) and the industrial push for the war in times to come⁵³. This peculiar time will be called “Die Ruhe vor dem Sturm” (the calm before the storm) in German historiography. No information had been provided in regard th content in both news messages.

What did research reveal from the Fascist Germany perspective?

A large corpus of evidentiary material has been found. Among them, some highly relevant sources in regard to the stay of the Afghan Regent Hashem in Germany for the before mentioned four months seem to be worth to note.

- C- The “chief ideologist” of the German Fascist Party NSDAP, an old and very close friend of the fascist dictator Adolf Hitler and a co-founder of the party, Alfred Rosenberg who run an office named after him “Amt Rosenberg” (ARo)” within the state administration of Hitlerian Fascism. This “personal” office, in Berlin, within the fascist state’s system, named after Rosenberg, was the responsible office for cultural policy and ideological control policy in state since 1934. Rosenberg was appointed by Hitler as “Beauftragten des Führers für die Überwachung der gesamten geistigen und weltanschaulichen Schulung und Erziehung der NSDAP (English: Commissioner of Führer for Control of Comprehensive Mental and Ideological Education of NSDAP). NSDAP is the acronym for „nationalsozialistische deutsche Arbeiterpartei“, the German fascist party of Adolf Hitler. He led “Das Aussenpolitische Amt” (APA), the office for planning foreign affairs of the German Fascist Party NSDAP, mainly responsible for basic ideological efforts and global political activities in other countries.

Rosenberg knew Hitler since 1918. He belonged to the first generation of organized fascists in Germany (Thule-Gesellschaft, and later NSDAP)⁵⁴. He was the responsible director of the main fascist newspaper “Völkischer Beobachter” since 1923. While in prison, Hitler named him as his deputy. In 1930 his pus magnum “The Myth of the Twentieth Century”, the second pivotal work of German Fascism after Hitlers book. From 1939 on, Rosenberg organizes systematically a massive cultural pogrom, incl. destroying and stealing and looting cultural heritage in Eastern Europe. After 1941 he acted, additionally to the other functions, as the minister of occupied Eastern

⁵² Eslah, 1937, Nr 175, March 8th (the government’s official propaganda medium)

⁵³ Schwarze Reihe, Multiple authors. Concept: Pehle. W. Die Zeit des Nationalsozialismus by Fischer Publications and see also Kershaw 2009, Wehler 2003, Hildebrand 2009, Herbst, L 2005 and Pohl 2011

⁵⁴ German History Museum’s project LEMO. Website: <https://www.dhm.de/lemo/biografie/alfred-rosenberg>

territories and arranged the systematic and systemic mass killings of millions of humans in Eastern Europe, especially in Soviet Union. After the war, he was in 1946 trialed in Nürnberg and consecutively executed.

The diary of Alfred Rosenberg has been a main source of valid information on Hashem and its appendices in Fascist Germany.

This diary that was “lost” for decades, and then found has been the object of intense interest in academic historian circles. The edition I use is the ultimate critical academic edition, edited with a high degree of scrutiny by Dr. Jürgen Matthäus and Dr. Frank Bajohr.

Matthäus, a German scholar historian, Director of “Applied Research Scholars” at the US Holocaust memorial Museum, took over in 2005 the Mandel Center’s Applied Research team⁵⁵. Bajohr, also a German scholar historian, director of Center for Holocaust Studies of the Institute of Contemporary History of the München University⁵⁶. Both scholars have been distinguished historians with an explicit focus on German fascism and its implication.

Alfred Rosenberg, the chief ideologist of German Fascism, writes in his diary⁵⁷:

27th April 1936


“Von Dr. von Bruck[?] läuft der Bericht über die erfolgreichen Handelsverhandlungen in Belgrad ein... Durch ihn haben wir unterhandelt. Jetzt geht das in amtliche Hände über. Wie vieles andere: der brasilianische Vertrag, die Erfolge in Persien u. Afghanistan, die allein durch das APA eingeleitet worden sind.”

English translation:

“Dr. von Bruck[?]'s report on the successful trade negotiations in Belgrade arrives...We negotiated through him. Now it's in official hands. Like many other things: the Brazilian treaty, the successes in Persia and Afghanistan, which were initiated solely by the APA “

According to the predefined duties of APA and his chief, Alfred Rosenberg, negotiations and relevant agreements with were monopolized by Rosenberg’s “Amt”. Not the ministry for foreign affairs, but Rosenberg did the ideological and political relevant work outside Germany. He mentions here Persia (which was named “Iran” in 1935) and Afghanistan.

10th August 1936

“Dann war vor längerer Zeit ein Scheich aus Iran da, ein Mitkämpfer des jetzigen Schahs. Er brachte mir als Geschenk eine mit Mosaikmustern ausgelegte Zigarettenbox, in der Mitte ein Hakenkreuz. Dazu Lichtbilder iranischer Bauwerke, die das  zeigten. Der jetzige iranische

⁵⁵ <https://www.ushmm.org/research/about-the-mandel-center/our-staff-and-scholars/juergen-matthaeus>

⁵⁶ <https://www.ifz-muenchen.de/zentrum-fuer-holocaust-studien/mitarbeiterinnen>

⁵⁷ Alfred Rosenberg: Die Tagebücher von 1934 bis 1944 – 23. Published in 2015 by Jürgen Matthäus and Frank Bajohr (Editors)

Gesandte sprach von arischer Erneuerung Irans. Der afghanische Aussenminister, dem ich ein Frühstück gab, schreibt ein grosses Werk über die arischen Denkmäler in Afghanistan."

English translation:

"Then a long time ago there was a sheikh from Iran, a comrade-in-arms of the current shah. As a gift he brought me a cigarette box decorated with mosaic patterns and a swastika in the middle. There were also photographs of Iranian buildings that showed the卐. The current Iranian envoy spoke of Aryan renewal in Iran. The Afghan foreign minister, to whom I gave breakfast, is writing a major work about the Aryan monuments in Afghanistan."

Again, a note on Iran (now he noted the name change of the country since 1935) and Afghanistan. Noteworthy is herein the beginning of a paradigm shift toward "Aryan" renewal and "Aryan race" in Iran and Afghanistan that is no banal coincidence. Primarily, it relates to ideological slow and subtle tectonics toward the racial implications of German Fascism and all its murderous consequences. Another friend and appointee of the dictator Hitler, Hans F.K. Günther, by profession a philologist, might be relevant to mention. Günther, an activist of "race" and racial issues during 1920s, published 1922 a book, titled "Rassenkunde des deutschen Volkes"⁵⁸ (English: The race Knowledge about German People) that became a foundational work of racism and German racist ideology. Günther published many books around the themes of race. Hitler received and valued his work early, while living in Norway and Sweden till 1928. After 1929 he published regularly for the "Kampfbund für deutsche Kultur" (English: Fight Union of German Culture), founded by Alfred Rosenberg. A book published in 1934 by Günther, with the title

"Die Nordische Rasse bei den Indogermanen Asiens: Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Frage nach der Urheimat und Rassenherkunft der Indogermanen" (English: The Nordic Race in Asia's Indogermans: A Contribution to the Question of Ancient Land and Racial Origin of Indogermans), gained a kind of popularity in the German communities in Tehran and Kabul. There was no translation. At this time Günther was since 1930 a professor of social anthropology at the University of Jena, appointed by Wilhelm Frick, the first ever fascist minister in a German land, by the wish of Adolf Hitler. On 15th November 1930, during his inauguration lecture in Jena, Frick, Göring und Hitler were present. Hitler brought him 1935 to himself and appointed him at the university of Berlin with an institute for research of race, people biology and rural sociology⁵⁹. Juxtaposed in theory to Arthur de Gobineaus and Houston Stewart Chamberlains racial theories and racist ideology, in praxi, Günther remained a "real and active practitioner" of German fascism and racism in support of Hitler and his massive genocides in Eastern Europe till to end of Hitler's reign. In regard to the theoretical and practical effects of Günther' ideological work and massive euthanasic and genocidal activities in Asia, especially in

⁵⁸ Günther, FK, 1922

⁵⁹ German Scientific Society's Historical records tracking Günther's grant application for his "Anstalt für Rassenkunde, Völkerbiologie und Ländliche Soziologie". Einrichtungs-ID: 16630
<https://gepris-historisch.dfg.de/einrichtung/16630#faelle>

Afghanistan, there is no research yet. To the best of my knowledge, this article is a first commencing research effort undertaken in this field.

12th August 1936

“Zwei Mal hat der Führer mich beauftragt, für den Fall eines russ. Überfalls Aufklärungsarbeiten vorzubereiten. Ich habe ihm zwei Denkschriften darüber gegeben; Einzelarbeiten liegen vor u. müssen jetzt erweitert werden. Aber das ist rein literarische Arbeit. Praktisch bedeutet das: Zusammenfassung der Staaten des Ostraumes, des Donaubeckens bis hinunter nach Afghanistan, dann Japan. Dem einen Ziel dient die Nordische Gesellschaft, die ich betreue[?] u. die jetzt grösstes Interesse erweckt hat (700 Skandinavier in Lübeck), [sic] dem anderen die mühselige Arbeit mit Cuza-Goga[?], sowie die Wirtschaftsunterhandlungen mit Jugoslawien, Iran etc. Der afghanische Aussenminister hat meinem Mitarbeiter Malletke in 10 Minuten langer Rede gedankt: nur durch das APA sei sein Land in Europa eingeführt u. innerlich anerkannt worden.”

English translation:

“The Führer commissioned me twice to prepare reconnaissance work in the event of a Russian attack. I gave him two memoranda about it; Individual work is available and now needs to be expanded. But this is purely literary work. In practical terms, this means combining the states of the eastern region, the Danube basin down to Afghanistan, then Japan. The Nordic Society, which I look after[?] and which has now aroused the greatest interest (700 Scandinavians in Lübeck), serves one goal, [sic] the arduous work with Cuza-Goga[?], as well as the economic negotiations Yugoslavia, Iran etc.

The Afghan Foreign Minister thanked my colleague Malletke in a 10-minute speech: “It was only through the APA that his country was introduced into Europe and recognized internally.”

It seems that Afghanistan’s regent, commissioning foreign minister Mohammad Faiz Khan, and Hitler, commissioning Alfred Rosenberg, were coming closer and preparing an event.

30th October 1936:

“Im Verlauf des Vortrags a. d. Obersalzberg hatte der Führer mir zugestimmt, Druck hinter die Verhandlungen mit Afghanistan u. Iran zu setzen. Die Sachen sind jetzt in Ordnung gekommen, so dass Ritter, sonst ständiger Quertreiber a. d. A.A., lächelnd sagte, „man müsse diesen Fragen weit mehr Bedeutung schenken als bisher.“ Mit Afghanistan ist also der Vertrag von 22 Millionen fertig; davon 15 Millionen Heereslieferungen, die zu 20% von den Afghanen in Devisen bezahlt werden. Das d.-iranische Abkommen umfasst 80 Millionen. Das APA hat jetzt also den dritten Handelsvertrag mit Zähigkeit [sic] durchgesetzt: und nur deshalb, weil die „Praktiker“ eine klare politische Zielsetzung spürten. Jetzt übernahm noch neue Sachen [sic] (Flugverbindung nach Kabul), Blomberg will unsern Attaché in Ankara ansetzen, um den Widerstand der Türken zu schmelzen.

Am 4.11. kommt der afgh. Ministerpräsident, den ich empfangen werde,... Gestern u. heute war ich beim Führer zu Mittag u. hatte über diese Dinge Vortrag. Der Führer war sehr befriedigt."

English translation:

"In the course of the lecture a. d. Obersalzberg, the Führer had agreed with me to put pressure behind the negotiations with Afghanistan and Iran. Things have now come to order, so that Ritter, who was otherwise a constant troublemaker, a. d. A.A., smiling, said, "We have to give these questions far more importance than before." So, the contract for 22 million is finished with Afghanistan; Of these, 15 million are army supplies, 20% of which are paid for by the Afghans in foreign currency. The D-Iranian agreement covers 80 million. The APA has now pushed through the third trade agreement with tenacity [sic]: and only because the "practitioners" sensed a clear political objective. Now we have taken over new things [sic] (flight connection to Kabul), Blomberg wants to place our attaché in Ankara to melt the Turkish resistance.

On November 4th comes the Afgh. Prime Minister, whom I will receive.

... Yesterday and today, I had lunch with the Führer and had a talk about these things."

Rosenbergs notes win contour in perspective to Afghanistan. Hitler presses to more activities. A large package of 22 million Reichsmark for Afghanistan seems to be ready, most of that is military aid. Lufthansa is flying to Kabul.

And the regent of Afghanistan will come Berlin. And Rosenberg will receive him in Berlin. According to the protocols valid at that time and today, the prime minister of a foreign country will be received by the foreign minister or his deputies. The prime minister of Afghanistan will be received by the chief ideologist of the NSDAP. This is a unique event.

Rosenberg writes in retrospect further on 14th November 1936:

"Der afgh. Ministerpräsident kam an. Ich empfang ihn, liess auch eine S.S. Ehrenkompanie mit Musik bestellen. Der afgh. Gesandte sagte mir nachher: Herr Reichsleiter, Sie wissen gar nicht, wie es in meinem Herzen aussieht, dass Sie uns so schön empfangen u. stets so liebenswürdig sind. Der Afghane, Onkel des Königs, macht wirklich den Eindruck ihres natürlichen Oberhauptes und ist ein feiner, schmaler Oriental. Typus. Er war schon vor 12 Jahren hier.

Zum Tee sagte er mir: „Ihr Führer ist nicht nur der Führer Deutschlands, sondern der grösste Mann der Welt.“ Sie brauchen für Ihre Ideen keine Propaganda. Genauso wie die Erfindung der Elektrizität als Tatsache die alten Beleuchtungsmethoden ersetzte, so der N.S. auf politischem Gebiet die bisherigen Methoden."

Der afgh. Aussenminister sah etwas sauer darin, er ist offenbar für eine sehr versöhnliche Haltung Moskaus gegenüber.

Der 8./9. November verlief würdig... Ich ging, wie einst vor 13 Jahren, einen Schritt hinter dem Führer. Als die Wache vorübergezogen war, sagte der Führer: „An das kommen sie mit ihren alten Heiligen nicht mehr heran.“ Ich: „Das war die germanische Fronleichnamsprozession.“ – Dies Wort hat schon begonnen, die Runde zu machen."

English translation:

“The Afghan Prime Minister arrived. I received him and left an S.S. Order an honorary company with music. The Afghan ambassador said to me afterwards: Mr. Reichsleiter, you have no idea how it feels in my heart that you welcome us so beautifully and are always so kind. The Afghan, uncle of the king, really gives the impression of their natural head and is a fine, slim oriental. Type. He was here 12 years ago. Over tea he said to me: “Your leader is not just the leader of Germany, but the greatest man in the world”. You don't need propaganda for your ideas. Just as the invention of electricity as a fact replaced the old methods of lighting, according to the N.S. in the political field, the previous methods.”

The Afghan Foreign Minister was a little angry about this; he is obviously in favor of a very conciliatory attitude towards Moscow.

The 8th/9th November went well... As I once did 13 years ago, I walked one step behind the leader. When the guard had passed, the guide said: “They can't get close to that anymore with their old saints.” Me: “That was the Germanic Corpus Christi procession.” – This word has already begun to make the rounds.”

These remarks of Rosenberg sound precise and concise. Rosenberg received him and left an S.S. Order honorary company with music. As mentioned before, a paradox. Nothing in this encounter seems to be according to any protocol.

What would be the relevance of Afghanistan and his regent Hashem Mohammadzai Barezai that made Hitler to send his chief ideologist and his “Beauftragten des Führers für die Überwachung der gesamten geistigen und weltanschaulichen Schulung und Erziehung der NSDAP (English: Commissioner of Führer for Control of Comprehensive Mental and Ideological Education the leader of “Das Aussenpolitische Amt” (APA), the office for planning foreign affairs of the German Fascist Party NSDAP, to receive a politician, with an S.S. Order honorary company. A question that is worth to be reflected.

19th December 1936

„Der afgh. Ministerpräsident wurde dieser Tage vom Führer empfangen, wobei ich zugegen war. Er dankte für alles, was er gesehen hatte u. sprach seine Bewunderung für D. aus. Zum Führer: Er müsse der glücklichste Mann sein, da er soviel Gutes tue nicht nur für D., sondern für alle. – Gestern sprach ich ihn erneut. Er dankte mir, der ich alles so gut vorbereitet u. sie alle so gut empfangen hätte.“

English translation:

“The Afghan Prime Minister was recently received by the Führer, and I was present. He thanked him for everything he had seen and expressed his admiration for D. To the Führer: He must be the happiest man because he does so much good not only for D., but for everyone. – Yesterday I spoke to him again. He thanked me for preparing everything so well and for welcoming them all so well.”

For the first time, ever, we demonstrate the evidence of a meeting of Hashem Mohammadzai Barezai with the leader of Fascist Germany Adolf Hitler. To the best of our knowledge, we

present here first-hand evidence of the intertwining of Hitlerian Fascism with Hashemian despotism.

The traditional historiography in Afghanistan neglected the voyage of Hashem Khan to Hitler completely. For different reasons.

The Western adepts, the connoisseurs of Afghanistan, dealing with these questions have been ignoring this inquiry also. Also, for different reason.

This finding is in need for a proper interpretation and conclusive understanding in the realm of history.

Additionally, to the notes of Rosenberg, Commissioner of Führer for Control of Comprehensive Mental and Ideological Education, we performed a comprehensive search in a multiple data bases and archives. The rationale for the search was to find a pictorial document showing the meeting of Adolf Hitler with Hashem Mohammadzai. The systematic search endured some weeks. We finally found the picture, depicting Hashem and Rosenberg just after the meeting with Hitler, on 19th December 1936.



Fig. 1: Hashem (third from Left/Right) with Alfred Rosenberg (far left) after the meeting with Adolf Hitler on 19th December 1936.

Source: Stuttgarter Neues Tageblatt, published in this article for the first time. The legend of the picture in German: „Rechts: Nach einem Empfang beim Führer. Von Links: Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg, Staatssekretär Dr. Meißner, Seine Königliche Hoheit Mohammad Hashim Khan (Premierminister von Afghanistan), Legationsrat Dr. Schmidt und der afghanische Gesandte in Berlin Nowaz Khan“. English translation: Right: after a reception with the Führer (the title of Adolf Hitler). From Left: Reichsleiter (an extraordinary and highly privileged title giving by Adolf Hitler to highly distinguished activists of the German fascist system) Alfred Rosenberg), secretary of state Dr. Meißner, His Royal Highness Mohammad Hashim Khan (Ministerpräsident of Afghanistan), Legation counsiler Dr. Schmidt, the Ambassador of Afghanistan Nowaz Khan.

For the first time, ever, we demonstrate here the pictorial evidence of a meeting of Hashem Mohammadzai Barekzai with the leader of Fascist Germany Adolf Hitler. This picture is taken, so the legend of the newspaper, "nach einem Empfang beim Führer" (English: after a reception with the Führer (Ed: Adolf Hitler)". To the best of our knowledge, we present here first-hand evidence of the intertwining of Hitlerian Fascism with Hashemian despotism, communicated by a German newspaper. We recall that in year four of Hitlerian fascism in Germany, the press was controlled to 100% by the fascist state, and each word

Alfred Rosenberg had been one of highest-ranking functionaries of the fascist regime of Adolf Hitler and his special and old times friend. To our knowledge, this source is published here for the first time, ever.

The picture of Hashem and Rosenberg immediately after the meeting with the dictator Adolf Hitler, to whom Hashem found very warm words, also is published here for the first time, ever.

Research revealed further details on a journey into the pivotal centers of industry and meeting with other leaders and functionaries with Fascist party of Germany NSDAP. We could provide multiple newspaper reports from December 1936 to February 1937.

The ideological approximation of Hashem to Hitler became materialized in factual service and interaction between the Fascist Germany before the great war and the converted Afghan tyrant.

The Rosenberg diary has got one more historically interesting note in it on 1 November 1939:

„Als 2. Punkt besprach ich den Fall Afghanistan. Amanullah hat mir einen deutschen Freund geschickt: er wolle in Kabul einen Putsch machen u. m. russischer Hilfe in Nordwestindien einbrechen. Ich sagte, ich hätte noch erfahren, dass Canaris von sich aus einem ähnlichen Fall bearbeite. F.: Gut, sprechen Sie mit Canaris darüber. – Ich: Welche Aussichten ein solches Unternehmen hat, kann ich eben nicht beurteilen. Wir haben ja die Polizeichefs u. viele Wegebauingenieure gestellt. Dazu eine Division bewaffnet. - Ich werde also Admiral Canaris zu mir holen.“

English translation:

“The second point I discussed was the case of Afghanistan. Amanullah sent me a German friend: he wanted to stage a coup in Kabul and break into northwest India with Russian help. I said that I had learned that Canaris was working on a similar case. Q.: Well, talk to Canaris about it. – Me: I can't judge what prospects such a company has. We provided the police chiefs and many road construction engineers. A division is also armed. - So, I'm going to bring Admiral Canaris to me.”

This note shows that the interactions with Afghanistan remained an issue for the chief ideologist of German Fascism Alfred Rosenberg, as the special commissioner, party comrade and personal close friend of the German dictator Adolf Hitler.

Koplik writes on German efforts in Afghanistan that “in 1937, they helped to find the Kabul Mechanical School. This institution trained industrial workers, and its equipment was a gift from Berlin. The next year, the director of the Skoda company in Kabul told the British that the German government gave the Afghans a trade credit of 16 million Reichsmarks, with a four per cent interest rate repayable over eight years.”⁶⁰

And she adds that “by the autumn of 1936, several protocols were signed between Germany and Afghanistan. These provided for an educational exchange, flying instructors, the delivery of arms and weapons to Afghanistan, and a credit of fifteen million marks to be repaid partially in goods within seven years. Perhaps the most important element was an agreement with the Organisation Todt, signed on 18 October 1937. Hauner describes the Organisation Todt as “not merely a huge road construction firm, but also a vast Nazi institution in its own right which probably had no parallel in the world.”⁶¹

Fritz Todt, a senior Nazi joined the NSDAP in 1922. In 1931, he came to paramilitary group the Sturmabteilung (SA), commanded by Ernst Röhm. In 1938 he was attaining the rank of SA-Obergruppenführer. The dictator Hitler seemed to value his individual loyalty and ideological affinity to German fascism. He made possible that a “organization” was build up explicitly for Todt: “Organization Todt” (OT) was a paramilitary labor battalions. This German military organization, dedicated to construction in general and constructing labor concentration camps. OT co-operated in the of “SS-Einsatzgruppen” (special units of SS for killing actions in Eastern Europe, additionally to the German army) mass killing activities.”⁶²

Regarding the special implications of the Hashem visit, Koplik writes “The APA’s stated goal was to infiltrate the political and economic structure of Afghanistan so it would be easily controlled in the event of an invasion. In December 1939, the head of Rosenberg’s staff, Amo Schickedans detailed the position of the APA in Afghanistan. He mentioned the visits of Muhammad Hashim Khan and other high officials to Berlin in 1936 and 1937, because of which “a number of basic treaties covering military, cultural, and economic matters” were concluded. Schickedans highlighted “German-Afghan collaboration,” stating that his department had drawn up a comprehensive plan for all sectors of the Afghan state and arranged for the appointment of German experts to positions in the Afghan government service as an essential condition for the successful implementation of the plan. By means of such experienced German personnel a network of strong points was to be established in the vital positions providing Germany with the possibility of utilizing them in the event that Afghanistan should take military action with German aid. The position of an inspector-general

⁶⁰ Koplik, S (2015)

⁶¹ *ibid*

⁶² <https://www.dhm.de/lemo/kapitel/ns-regime/ns-organisationen/todt/> (Last access August 2024)

was created to supervise the work of all German nationals. This man was to become an advisor to the Afghan government on construction and communication projects. Despite these efforts, Schickedans and others in the APA did not account for the Afghans' distrust of too much foreign assistance. The Afghan government was able to subvert German plans for economic domination by limiting control over roads projects and by hiring men of different nationalities. Road building was undertaken by Polish employees, while architecture was left to the Swiss, and Japanese engineers were also hired. These employees were not supervised by the Organisation Todt's chief engineer, but rather directly by the Afghan Minister of Public Works. The Todt Agreement was limited further in

November 1938, to cover only the construction projects assigned to the Germans.⁶³

Koplik continues "Despite invoking the unity of the Aryan race, Germany provided incomplete equipment at excessive cost to the Afghan government, apparently showing to a more condescending attitude. In Schickedans' 1939 memorandum, he explains that the Third Reich helped to train soldiers, modernize the Afghan army, and increase its potential by delivering equipment like: "antiaircraft guns, trench mortars and mountain artillery."

When this shipment arrived in July 1940, 'Abd al-Majid Khan complained that the artillery was useless, as ammunition was not included. In fact, a man simply called "Atik" informed the British that Afghanistan had many difficulties receiving weapons from Nazi Germany. Atik accompanied Muhammad Hashim Khan on his trip to Berlin in 1936 and reported that after asking for weapons "Hitler immediately began to make difficulties." They soon learned that Afghanistan was charged "exactly double" the prices that Turkey and Iran paid for arms and had to wait almost two years for the shipments to begin while the other countries received them promptly. When some weapons arrived; they were "incomplete with the most ridiculous results at the Kabul end. Guns without breech blocks and so on." And "Despite these various affronts, German officials continued to make overtures to Afghanistan. In August 1939, another agreement was signed which sought to expand trade between these two nations, as Germany increasingly valued Afghanistan's raw materials, primarily cotton and wool. While this was potentially lucrative for Afghanistan, it still had to consider the inherent political risks."

The archive findings of Dr. Koplik reveal the broad spectrum of material interactions between Afghan Hashemian despotism and German Hitlerian fascism that must have had an ideological interlace and affinity.

Thomas Ruttig states in 2015 that "Ebenfalls im Jahr 1933 wurde NSDAP-Mitglied Kurt Ziemke deutscher Gesandter in Kabul. Eine NSDAP-Ortsgruppe Kabul wurde gebildet, die zunächst von dem schon seit 1929 in Afghanistan wirkenden Militärberater Christenn und dann von Oberingenieur Thomas geleitet wurde, der im Hauptberuf Vertreter der Siemens-

⁶³ *ibid*

Schuckert-Werke war. Bei Kriegsausbruch 1939 bestand die deutsche Kolonie in Afghanistan aus etwa 170 Personen (1933 hatten 25 Deutsche in afghanischen Diensten gestanden).“

English translation:

“Also in 1933, NSDAP member Kurt Ziemke became the German ambassador in Kabul. An NSDAP Kabul local group was formed, which was initially led by the military advisor Christenn, who had been working in Afghanistan since 1929, and then by senior engineer Thomas, who was in the main job was a representative of Siemens-Schuckert-Werke. When war broke out in 1939, the German colony in Afghanistan consisted of around 170 people (in 1933 there were 25 Germans in Afghan service).”⁶⁴

Matin Baraki writes that “Auf Grund des ‘Dr.-Todt-Abkommens besaßen sie [die Mitarbeiter der OT] relative weitgehende Möglichkeiten ... faschistische Propaganda zu betreiben. ... berichtete Oberregierungsbaurat Schnell beispielweise “über die erfolgreiche Auswertung der seitens der Organisation Todt in Afghanistan zum Einsatz gebrachten Filme“. Solche Streifen wie „Westwall“, „Feldzug in Polen“, „Sieg im Westen“ sowie Ufa-Wochenschauen wurden nicht nur vor der deutschen Kolonie, sondern auch vor dem Diplomatischen Korps, afghanischen Regierungskreisen und der Bevölkerung gezeigt. In Pol-i-Chomri, wo OT-Ingenieure eine Textilfabrik installierten und gleichzeitig auch ein kombiniertes Hallen- und Freilichtkino bauten, zeigten sie mit einem Schmaltonfilmgerät, das im Kuriergepäck nach Afghanistan gebracht worden war, faschistische Hetz- und Kriegsfilme, darunter Filme über die Nazi-Parteitage. Da es in Afghanistan nur ein einziges öffentliches Kino gab, erhielten solche Vorführungen starken Zuspruch.”⁶⁵

English translation:

“Because of the ‘Dr. Todt Agreement’ they [the OT employees] had relatively extensive freedom possibilities... to conduct fascist propaganda. ... reported senior government building officer Schnell for example, “about the successful evaluation of the Todt organization’s deployment in Afghanistan brought films“. Such films as “Westwall”, “Campaign in Poland”, “Victory in the West” and Ufa Newsreels were shown not only in front of the German colony, but also in front of the diplomatic corps, shown to Afghan government circles and the population. In Pol-i-Khomri, where OT engineers a They showed that they installed a textile factory and at the same time built a combined indoor and open-air cinema fascist agitation with a narrow-tone film recorder that had been brought to Afghanistan in courier luggage. and war films, including films about the Nazi party rallies. Since there is only one public one in Afghanistan There was a cinema, such screenings were very well received.”

⁶⁴ Ruttig weblog reveals some details, the overall scientific value of Ruttig’s notes seem to be indeed limited and rather light-weighted and anecdotal without any systematic approach.

<https://thruttig.wordpress.com/2015/04/13/die-afghanen-die-rier-und-wir-eine-art-rezension-teil-2/>

⁶⁵ Baraki, M (1996)

We add some findings of T. Ruttig and M. Baraki here, despite their limited relevance and anecdotal character, for the sake of demonstration of weak epistemic “nature” of the these works of Afghanistan-adepts in German speaking lands and to show their scientific uselessness.

Interpretation of the main finding

Prior to March 14th of 1937, thus before the political stabilization and solidification of “The Hashemian Despotism”, where Hashem Mohammadzai Barezai ruled in an absolutist manner, the *inhabitants* of the country had been named and called anything else but not “Afghan”. All available official publications show clearly that the term “Afghan ” was used for the ethnic Pushtuns, the other term “Afghani” افغانی have primarily been utilized expressis verbis for the language of ethnic Afghans, hence for Pushtu. The list of the words in usage for the people of the country before March 1937 is manageable. General terms of belonging to a kingdom or country used centuries ago were: Mardom (مردم people), Melat (ملت Nation), Meliat (ملیت Nationalität).

In a more traditional monarchic way of expression for the people, it was used the following words in Parsi: Atbah (اتباع), Tabah (تبعه), Taabeh (تابع), Matabeh (متابع), Ahal (اهل), Reihat (رعیت), banda (بنده), hambaihat (همبیت), hamwatan (هموطن), in a neutral expression: Bashendagan (باشندگان) etc.

None of these terms mean citizen or citizenship in the sense of a modern nation-state.

All these terms have been a premodern expression referring to factual belonging of individuals, whose obedience and devotion was expected by the despotic government, without any reservation and in absolutist context.

All terms present a mixture of Parsi words. At the same time, different people and country's inhabitants were traditionally labeled with specific ethnonyms: Afghan for Pushtuns (Pukhtun, Patan, Pashtun, Patana etc), Tajik or Farsiwan for Tajiks, Hazara for Hazara, Turks for Turkic speaking people like Uzbeks and Turkmens, Kafer for the Nuristanis, Hundo for Sikhs and Hindus, Baloch for Balochs etc. The situation of other minorities like Jews or Armenians have hardly been researched. Some ethnonyms were exogenic, like “Afghan” or Awghans or Aughans, which seems to be a Parsi word allocated to the Pushtun people of Mashreqi and Junubi in the Khorasan area. Some ethnonyms were endogenic, like Turk referring to Turkic speaking people.

To the best of our knowledge, it was, in this geographic and cultural area, the first ever attempt by a centralistic one-man tyrannic regime to pose violently a specific name, the label of his own ethnicity, thus a two-century old exogenic ethnonym, to *all inhabitants* of a country he was ruling, without any societal reservations and political juridical preconditions. The tyrant commanded it was the absolutist despotic Hashem Mohammadzai Barezai, who ruled from 1933 on till his death in 1953. In 1946 he gave up the very “function of prime minister”, simulated it since 1929, then an evidently effectless position, to his brother Shah Mahmoud Mohammadzai Barezai, to rule in a supra position he created for himself. This government method of supra positioning will be to be observed many times in the history of this area, thinking of the juridical functionality between the role of a “leader” and the prime minister and president in Iran after 1979. Hashem took another path of sustaining the continuum of the one-man of one-clan despotism in Afghanistan, he permanently was resident at the royal

palace and nothing, no political act or edict, no economic official initiative or cultural official action, could be decided without his allowance, till his last days in October 1953.

Who cannot be called Afghan?

The first act of emancipation of the people might be the delineation of mechanisms of cultural hegemony executed by raw violence of the ethnocentric despotism of Hashem and his family. This text is enlightenment by scientific research.

Everyone everywhere within Afghanistan and in the world, independent of the status of current citizenship, who has no desire and no wish to be called an "Afghan", may not be called an "Afghan" or group of "Afghans". Any individual or social group has got the basic and untouchable right to be respected in this wish, with no exception, no social pressure, no cultural hegemony, or any ideological preconditions.

This is an implication of the right to self-determination of individuals and of peoples, being one of the universal values of emancipation and human dignity.

Conclusion

We attempted to find a precise and concise answer to the primary questions of this research inquiry: what would be the consequences of Afghan despotism of Hashemian typology after its full implementation till 1942, starting subtly in 1935, and after its sustainable institutionalization until 1953, within the 20th century in Afghanistan? And what exactly was nature of the ideological intertwining of those constitutive elements of the Hashemian despotism, a regime personified in the persona of Hashem; with the constitutive ideology of German Fascism, interpolated and converged in the persona of Adolf Hitler?

The first question was answered by multiple case studies and their corresponding evidence. The cited evidence referred to, was communicated by the very despotic regime's official publications. Noteworthy that we did not attempt to interpret in detail and in-depth, as it was an option, the reason was just because the evidence is speaking for itself, and it is self-explanatory. The second question was answered precisely and concisely by the evidence, published by the official Afghanistan state newspaper and by a main protagonist of German Fascist chief-ideologue Alfred Rosenberg. To the best of my knowledge, this evidence has now been published for the first time, ever. Also, the meeting of the Afghan pro-fascist regent Hashem Mohammadzai with the German fascist dictator Adolf Hitler has been documented here, again to the best of my knowledge, for the first time, ever. In this case I did not perform a comprehensive analytical review of the unique and first-to-be -published findings about Hashem and Hitler. That will be a separate inquiry for the near future.

The course of the 20th century of Afghanistan shows the obvious installation of a special version of "Asian despotism", I name here the Hashemian Despotism, based on four case studies. Although it could have been more cases and examples. And in a peculiar constellation, this paradox version of Afghan tribal ethnonationalism, I call Hashemian despotism, was manifestly intertwined, driven by its intense radicalization by the absolutist regent Hashem Mohammadzai and his nephews Daud and Naim Mohammadzai toward the German Fascism, as shown by first-degree undeniable and epistemically solid evidence. The case of Daudian despotism will be the content of the article, to be published soon. The reign of Mosaheban family endured 49 years, at least two periods, 1933 to 1953 with Hashem and 1953 to 1963 (and 1973-1978) with Daud, were determined by raw and bloody violence of the Hashemian and Daudian despotisms.

The story must be told, finally. The history must also be to be written, ultimately, for the sake of the people of Afghanistan that was the victim of this violent and bloody despotism.

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